People v. Dixon

• Decision Date: 17 July 1978
• Docket Number: Docket No. 77-373
• Citation: 270 N.W.2d 488,84 Mich.App. 675
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard Frederick DIXON, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 488

270 N.W.2d 488

84 Mich.App. 675

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard Frederick DIXON, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 77-373.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

July 17, 1978.

Released for Publication Oct. 20, 1978.

James R. Neuhard, State App. Defender, Janet Tooley, Asst. Defender, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Fred R. Hunter, III, Pros. Atty., Thomas C. Nelson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Pros. Attys. App. Serv., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before BEASLEY, P. J., and ALLEN and DEMING, ^* JJ.

DEMING, Judge.

On July 27, 1976, defendant was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder, M.C.L. § 750.317; M.S.A. § 28.549, and was sentenced to life imprisonment. This prosecution arose out of the fatal shooting of a police officer on January 9, 1976. Defendant admitted shooting the officer but claimed that he acted in self-defense.

The first issue raised by defendant concerns the effect of pretrial publicity on his right to trial by an impartial jury, U.S.Const. Am. VI. The circumstances surrounding this case generated newspaper articles on the crime, the defendant, and the fact that, at the time of the shooting, defendant was sought by Federal authorities on an indictment arising out of an airplane hijacking. Prior to the selection of the jury, defendant made a motion for a change of venue on the basis of this pretrial publicity but the judge reserved judgment on this motion until an attempt was made to impanel an impartial jury, see People v. Jenkins, 10 Mich.App. 257, 159 N.W.2d 225 (1968); People v. Dailey, 6 Mich.App. 99, 148 N.W.2d 209 (1967). Voir dire was very extensive, lasted eight days and occupied over 1,500 pages of transcript. Of the 89 prospective jurors examined, many remembered being exposed to the news media's coverage of this case. Each juror who had formed an opinion about the case and who did not think that he could set that opinion aside and render a verdict solely on the evidence introduced at trial was excused, M.C.L. § 768.10; M.S.A. § 28.1033. Each prospective juror who had any knowledge of the hijacking charge was challenged for cause and all but two of these jurors were excused. During the voir dire, the trial judge denied defendant's motion for a change of venue and he also denied defendant's later motions for a change of venue.

The decision to grant or deny a motion for a change of venue is entrusted to the discretion of the trial judge and his decision will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion, People v. Nard, 78 Mich.App. 365, 260 N.W.2d 98 (1977). The burden is on defendant to show undue influence or that the jurors had a preconceived opinion, People v. Nard, supra; People v. Ranes, 63 Mich.App. 498, 234 N.W.2d 673 (1975). The existence of publicity and some newspaper articles about a criminal case and the fact that some jurors may have read or heard about the case from this publicity does not necessarily require a change of venue, People v. Ranes, supra; People v. Jenkins, supra. There is no evidence of a strong community feeling or a pattern of bitter prejudice against the accused that would indicate that an impartial jury could not be drawn; see People v. Eddington, 77 Mich.App. 177, 258 N.W.2d 183 (1977). People v. Freeman, 16 Mich.App. 63, 167 N.W.2d 810 (1969); People v. Jenkins, supra. This is not a case like Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 83 S.Ct. 1417, 10 L.Ed.2d 663 (1963), or Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966), in which the pretrial publicity was so extensive, inflammatory and patently prejudicial that it raised a presumption that prospective jurors could not remain impartial when exposed to it. All the jurors who were seated stated that they could set aside any opinion they might have of the case and determine their verdict solely on the evidence introduced at trial. Also a review of the evidence introduced at trial indicates that the jury could have found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of first-degree murder. Since the jury returned a verdict of guilty of second-degree murder and acquitted defendant on the first-degree murder charge, it is obvious to us that the jury independently and impartially weighed the evidence in reaching its determination; see People v. Eddington, supra. The defendant has not shown the trial judge abused his discretion in denying the motion for a change of venue; see People v. Hoffmeister, 52 Mich.App. 219, 217 N.W.2d 58 (1974), Rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 394 Mich. 155, 229 N.W.2d 305 (1975), Reh. den., 394 Mich. 944, 230 N.W.2d 270 (1975); People v. Freeman, supra, People v. Jenkins, supra.

Defendant also claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial on the basis that the jury drawn was not impartial. Nine of the twelve jurors who ultimately decided the case had been exposed to some pretrial publicity. Two jurors stated on voir dire that they had heard of the hijacking incident. In support of this motion for a mistrial, defendant introduced an affidavit by the jury foreperson stating that four members of the jury said, during deliberations, that they knew why defendant was a fugitive from justice when he was arrested. However, this reason was never disclosed to the rest of the jury or discussed by the jury. Knowledge of publicity concerning a case does not automatically make a juror unfit to serve if that juror does not have a preconceived opinion concerning the defendant's guilt or innocence which cannot be laid aside, M.C.L. § 768.10; M.S.A. § 28.1033. All the prospective jurors who stated that they had a preconceived opinion which they could not set aside were excused. The trial judge conducted a very thorough voir dire examination and he repeatedly warned the jurors to avoid exposing themselves to any discussions or media reports about the case. Defendant has not shown that any juror had an opinion of the case which prevented him from rendering an impartial verdict according to the evidence submitted to the jury at trial. Also, defendant has not shown any juror misconduct requiring reversal. The affidavit from the foreperson that four jurors said in the jury room that they were aware of why defendant was a fugitive does not require reversal. The reason why defendant was a fugitive was not disclosed to the rest of the jury, considered, or discussed. This fact distinguishes People v. Moreland, 12 Mich.App. 483, 163 N.W.2d 257 (1968), where inadmissible evidence of prior convictions came to the jury's attention during trial and was discussed and considered by the jury in deliberating on a verdict. The trial judge did not err by failing to order a mistrial.

Defendant also claims that it was reversible error to admit into evidence some statements that defendant made to the police because these statements were involuntary. The statements in question were made following defendant's arrest and after defendant had been advised of his Miranda rights. A Walker hearing was conducted and after this hearing, the trial judge found the defendant's statements to be voluntary and admissible. On appeal from a trial court's determination of voluntariness, this Court is required to examine the whole record and make an independent determination of voluntariness, People v. Robinson, 386 Mich. 551, 194 N.W.2d 709 (1972). When conflicting evidence is introduced and the determination of voluntariness depends to a large extent on the credibility of the witnesses at the hearing, deference will be given to the findings of the trial court, People v. Smith, 80 Mich.App. 106, 263 N.W.2d 306 (1977); see also GCR 1963, 517.1. If after such a review, this Court does not possess a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was committed, the trial judge's determination will be affirmed, People v. McGillen # 1, 392 Mich. 251, 257, 220 N.W.2d 677 (1974). After a review of the record, we are not left with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake was committed and so defendant's claim of error does not justify reversal, People v. Smith, supra.

Defendant's third claim on appeal is that it was reversible error for the prosecutor to introduce testimony and to make references during his closing argument which infringed on defendant's right against self-incrimination, U.S.Const., Am. V, Const.1963, art. 1, § 17, People v. Bobo,390 Mich. 355, 212 N.W.2d 190 (1973). During his closing argument the prosecutor referred to the fact that when a second police officer arrived on the scene of the shooting, the defendant fled. The prosecutor urged the jury to infer from this fact that defendant murdered the victim rather than acting in self-defense. Evidence of flight is relevant, material and admissible, People v. Kyles, 40 Mich.App. 357, 360, 198 N.W.2d 732 (1972). The prosecutor is entitled to comment on this evidence and draw reasonable inferences from it. The...