People v. Ranes

• Decision Date: 25 August 1975
• Docket Number: Docket No. 18210
• Citation: 63 Mich.App. 498,234 N.W.2d 673
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Danny RANES, Defendant-Appellant. 63 Mich.App. 498, 234 N.W.2d 673
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 673

234 N.W.2d 673

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Danny RANES, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 18210.

63 Mich.App. 498, 234 N.W.2d 673

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Aug. 25, 1975.

Released for Publication Nov. 10, 1975.

[63 MICHAPP 499] Thomas M. Powers, Kalamazoo, for defendant-appellant.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Donald A. Burge, Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before V. J. BRENNAN, P.J. and J. H. GILLIS and D. E. HOLBROOK, Jr., JJ.

D. E. HOLBROOK, Jr., Judge.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of first degree murder. M.C.L.A. § 750.316; M.S.A. § 28.548. Thereafter, defendant was sentenced [63 MICHAPP 500] to life imprisonment in solitary confinement at hard labor. He now appeals as of right.

Crucial to defendant's conviction was the testimony of witnesses Brent Koster, who testified that he and defendant acting together raped and murdered the deceased, Pamela Fearnow; Lee Keaton, a county jail inmate who testified that defendant, while also in jail, asked Keaton if he knew of anyone that could take a contract to kill Koster because he, the defendant, would have a lot better chance of beating the rap if Koster was out of the way; and one Richard Fee, who testified that defendant attempted to get him to appear as a witness for the defense and further attempted to convince Fee to say that Koster had been lying about defendant's involvement because of a deal made with the prosecution.

Initially, defendant contends that the testimonies of Keaton and Fee relating to evidence which occurred subsequent to the crime were improperly admitted into evidence, resulting in reversible error. We disagree. This issue is controlled by People v. Hooper, 50 Mich.App. 186, 199, 212 N.W.2d 786, 792 (1973), Lv. den., 391 Mich. 808 (1974). The following quote from People v. Hooper, supra, illustrates the rule:

'Michigan has long followed this rule and held that evidence that a defendant has attempted to suppress testimony or induce perjury is admissible. People v. Salsbury, 134 Mich. 537, 96 N.W. 936 (1903), People v. Adams, 162 Mich. 371, 127 N.W. 354 (1910), People v. Randall, 294 Mich. 478, 293 N.W. 725 (1940). This Court recently reaffirmed this long-standing rule in People v. Casper, 25 Mich.App. 1, 7, 180 N.W.2d 906, 909 (1970), wherein the rule was stated as follows:

"Michigan authority appears uniform in holding that actions by the defendant such as flight to avoid lawful arrest, procuring perjured testimony and attempts[63 MICHAPP 501] to destroy evidence, while possibly as consistent with innocence as with guilt, may be considered by the jury as evidence of guilt.'

'Thus, in the instant case there was no error in allowing this testimony since it was proper evidence for the jury to consider.'

Defendant by attempting to procure a contract on Koster attempted to suppress his testimony. Further, by attempting to get Fee, a witness to lie defendant was attempting to induce perjury. Under People v. Hooper, supra, the testimony of both Keaton and Fee was proper evidence for the jury's consideration.

Next defendant contends that the following colloquy between the prosecutor and the witness Fee constitutes reversible error:

'Q: Have you lied to keep from getting into trouble in the past?

'A: Yes.

'Q: Are you telling the truth now, Rich?

'A: Yes.

'Q: How do we know that?

'A: I took a lie detector test--' Immediately following the foregoing colloquy the court stated:

'Members of the jury, what the witness just said about having taken a lie detector test, you should disregard entirely.'

The court further proceeded to explain the unreliability of lie-detector tests and again cautioned the jury to put it out of their minds because it had no evidentiary value. Defendant moved for a mistrial which motion was denied and now claims [63 MICHAPP 502] that the court committed reversible error in denying said motion.

It is a long-standing rule in Michigan jurisprudence that the results of polygraph tests are not admissible in evidence. People v. Frechette, 380 Mich. 64, 155 N.W.2d 830 (1968). This includes polygraph tests given both the defendant and any witnesses. People v. Goodwin, 40 Mich.App. 709, 199 N.W.2d 552 (1972).

We are of the opinion however that reversible error does not exist where the polygraph reference is unsolicited, no mention is made of its results, and where the court gives a complete cautioning instruction. In People v. Davis, 53 Mich.App. 94, 96, 218 N.W.2d 787, 789, Cert. den., 419 U.S. 1080, 95 S.Ct. 670, 42 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974), the Court held:

'We find no merit in defendant's argument that reversible error was committed at trial when reference was made to defendant's taking a polygraph examination and when the trial court denied defendant's subsequent motion for a mistrial. The reference to the polygraph examination was made by defendant as a nonresponsive answer to a question posed by the prosecutor. The trial court immediately after defendant's answer was given, instructed the jury to disregard any mention of the polygraph and in its final instructions specifically instructed the jury to disregard 'any and all references made to the term 'polygraph' or 'polygraph administration". No grounds for mistrial were present, and we find no reversible error. People v. Tyrer, 19 Mich.App. 48, 51, 172 N.W.2d 53 (1969), Appeal dismissed, 385 Mich. 484, 189 N.W.2d 226 (1971), People v. Paffhousen, 20 Mich.App. 346, 351, 174 N.W.2d 69 (1969), Leave to appeal denied, 383 Mich. 825 (1970).'

In the instant case the court immediately ordered the testimony stricken and gave complete cautionary instructions. In addition the court explained[63 MICHAPP 503] to the jury the unreliability of lie-detector tests. The reference here to the witness having taken a lie-detector test was isolated and never mentioned again throughout the course of the trial. The reference by Fee to having taken the test was brief and we cannot say it was intentional, advertent or solicited. Nor can we say that the prosecutor was seeking the answer he received. Occasionally an unsophisticated witness may, inadvertently, make reference to improper information in the hearing of the jury. Under the circumstances here, however, and especially in view of the fact that the polygraph reference was unsolicited, no mention was made of its results, the court immediately instructed the jury to disregard the testimony, proceeded to explain the unreliability of such tests, and cautioned the jury to remove it from their minds because it had no evidentiary value, no error existed. Defendant's motion for mistrial was properly denied.

Defendant also contends that the trial court committed reversible error in denying two pre-trial motions for change of venue. We do not agree. While either party may be granted a change of venue 'upon good cause shown', M.C.L.A. § 762.7; M.S.A. § 28.850, the denial of such motion rests in the trial court's discretion. To set aside such a decision, a clear showing of abuse on the part of the trial court must be demonstrated. People v. Kochan, 55 Mich.App. 326, 222 N.W.2d 317 (1974), People v. Shugar, 29 Mich.App. 139, 185 N.W.2d 178 (1970), People v. Ranes, 58 Mich.App. 268, 227 N.W.2d 312 (1975).

A showing that some jurors may have read or heard of the case through the news media is not sufficient. The party seeking the change must show juror influence and the burden of showing [63 MICHAPP 504] such influence is on the challenger. People v. Moore, 51 Mich.App. 48, 52, 214 N.W.2d 548 (1974). The record on appeal does not indicate that the jurors selected would be unable to render an impartial verdict. People v. Stockard, 48 Mich.App. 680, 211 N.W.2d 62, Aff'd 391 Mich. 481, 219 N.W.2d 68 (1974). Defendant has therefore failed to meet his burden of showing undue influence or pre-conceived opinion in this case. Hence, no abuse of discretion exists.

Further, following commencement of trial, the following colloquy occurred between the court and defense counsel:

'The Court: Am I correct, Mr. Contos, that you have exhausted your peremptories.

'Mr. Contos: I have, your Honor.

'The Court: Alright swear the jury. Let me say for the record that I am satisfied that none of the jurors now in the box entertain such a present opinion as to influence the verdict of any such jurors, and you may swear the jurors in the box.'

There was no comment or objection to the trial judge's observations and ruling. Counsel's conduct created an inference of satisfaction with the jury which militates against his argument of jury bias. People v. Stockard, supra, People v. Collins, 43 Mich.App. 259, 263, 204 N.W.2d 290 (1972), Lv. den., 391 Mich. 798 (1974), People v. Greene, 42 Mich.App. 154, 155, 201 N.W.2d 664 (1972), Lv. den., 388 Mich. 783 (1972), People v. Harrell, 54 Mich.App. 554, 221 N.W.2d 411 (1974). We therefore conclude that the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motions for change of venue.

Defendant further contends the trial court erred in refusing to give the following instruction regarding alternative verdicts:

[63 MICHAPP 505] 'Lesser included offenses are second-degree murder, manslaughter, assault with intent to commit murder, assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than the crime of murder, felonious assault, assault with intent to commit any felony not otherwise punished, assault and infliction of serious injury, assault and battery, and simple assault.'

Defense counsel objected to the court's failure to give the requested instruction. Instead, the trial court gave the jury the choice of four verdicts: first-degree murder, second-degree murder, manslaughter and not guilty. The court's instruction as to alternative verdicts reads as follows:

'Consequently, if...