People v. Dolphy
| Decision Date | 07 January 1999 |
| Citation | 685 N.Y.S.2d 485,257 A.D.2d 681 |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
| Parties | THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent,<BR>v.<BR>SETH D. DOLPHY, Appellant. |
Mikoll, J. P., Crew III, Yesawich Jr. and Graffeo, JJ., concur.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted as charged and was sentenced as a second violent felony offender to concurrent terms of imprisonment of 6 to 12 years for his conviction of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree and 4 to 8 years for his conviction of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree. Defendant was also sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 10 years for his conviction of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, 10 years for his conviction of attempted assault in the first degree and 5 years for his conviction of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. These latter three sentences are to run concurrent to each other, but consecutive to defendant's sentences on the drug convictions. Defendant appeals.
We affirm. Initially, we reject defendant's contention that the prosecutor's use of a peremptory challenge to exclude the only African American on the jury panel violated his equal protection rights under the 14th Amendment of the US Constitution (see, Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79). Defendant's counsel challenged the prosecutor's strike of the juror in question based on the fact that defendant was an African American and that the juror was the only African-American person on the jury panel. County Court, noting that the juror was the only African-American juror and that the juror properly answered voir dire questions, held that defendant had made a sufficient prima facie showing to shift the burden to the prosecutor to put forward a race neutral explanation for the strike (see, Batson v Kentucky, supra). The prosecutor, in response to the Batson challenge, stated that he struck the juror based on the fact that she was overweight. As a matter of practice, the prosecutor stated that, based on his own personal jury criteria, he omitted obese people based on his past experience that "heavyset people tend to be very sympathetic toward any defendant". County Court found the explanation to be race neutral and denied defendant's request for a mistrial.
In Batson v Kentucky (supra), the Supreme Court determined that the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment prohibits peremptory challenges on the basis of race (see, People v Payne, 88 NY2d 172, 181). (id., at 181 [citations omitted]). Moreover, the trial court's factual assessment of the prosecutor's motivation in making the peremptory challenge is entitled to great deference on appeal since it will usually turn on evaluations of the prosecutor's credibility (see, Batson v Kentucky, supra, at 98, n 21; see also, Hernandez v New York, 500 US 352; People v Hernandez, 75 NY2d 350, 356; People v Gregory ZZ., 134 AD2d 814, 816, lv denied 71 NY2d 905). Furthermore, "the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike" (Purkett v Elem, 514 US 765, 768). In our view, the prosecutor met his burden by coming forward with a racially neutral explanation which was given credence by County Court. We reject defendant's bald contention that the explanation was pretextual in nature and, therefore, we will not disturb County Court's determination.
Next, we reject defendant's contention that the verdict was not supported by legally sufficient evidence and was against the weight of the evidence. The standard of review in determining whether the evidence adduced by the prosecution at trial is legally sufficient is, looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see, People v Harper, 75 NY2d 313, 316; People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621), "whether there is any valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could lead a rational person to the conclusion reached by the jury * * * and as a matter of law satisfy the proof and burden requirements for every element of the crime charged" (People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [citation omitted]; see, People v Cabey, 85 NY2d 417, 420). When analyzing whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, this Court views the evidence in a "neutral light" and makes its "own independent determination of the relative probative value of the inferences that may be drawn from the testimony" (People v Jefferson, 248 AD2d 815, 817, lv denied 92 NY2d 926).
Here, the testimony at trial advanced that on February 26, 1997 defendant had an altercation on a street corner in the City of Binghamton, Broome County, with Steven Wade, a drug dealer, regarding drug-selling territory. Wade had engaged in selling crack cocaine out of an apartment at the location, and had warned defendant to leave the area earlier that same day. When Wade approached defendant again that day, defendant pulled out a pistol and began firing in the direction of Wade, who ran away and was not struck by any bullets.
Subsequently, defe...
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