People v. Elliott

• Decision Date: 25 June 2013
• Docket Number: Docket No. 144983.,Calendar No. 9.
• Citation: 833 N.W.2d 284,494 Mich. 292
• Parties: PEOPLE v. ELLIOTT.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

494 Mich. 292

833 N.W.2d 284

PEOPLE

v.ELLIOTT.

Docket No. 144983.

Calendar No. 9.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued March 6, 2013.

Decided June 25, 2013.

Bill Schuette, Attorney General, John J. Bursch, Solicitor General, Henry C. Zavislak, Prosecuting Attorney, and Jerrold Schrotenboer, Chief Appellate Attorney, for the people.

Linda D. Ashford, P.C., Detroit (by Linda D. Ashford), for Samuel Lee Elliott.

Bill Schuette, Attorney General, John J. Bursch, Solicitor General, Richard A. Bandstra, Chief Legal Counsel, and B. Eric Restuccia, Deputy Solicitor General, for Amicus Curiae the Department of the Attorney General.

MARKMAN, J.

We granted leave to appeal to consider whether the trial court erred by admitting defendant's confession to a parole officer. The Court of Appeals held that the admission of defendant's confession violated Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), because Evans was a “law enforcement officer” for purposes of Miranda. We respectfully disagree because this is not a sufficient condition for the application of these decisions. Even if every parole officer constitutes a “law enforcement officer,” neither an accused's right under Miranda to be given a series of warnings nor an accused's right under Edwards to have counsel present apply absent “custodial interrogation” by the officer. Because defendant was not subjected to “custodial interrogation” by the parole officer as that term has come to be understood under Miranda and its progeny, neither defendant's Miranda nor defendant's Edwards rights were violated, regardless of whether the parole officer was a law enforcement officer. Thus, the trial court did not err by admitting defendant's confession. By focusing on the wrong constitutional question, the Court of Appeals considerably expanded the domain of Miranda, particularly with regard to parole officers. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate defendant's conviction and sentence.

I. FACTS AND HISTORY

In 2006, defendant was convicted of unarmed robbery in violation of MCL 750.530, and the trial court sentenced him to serve a prison term of 3 to 15 years.¹ In February 2010, at the discretion of the parole board, defendant was granted parole and provisionally released from prison. Upon release, defendant was placed under the supervision of a parole officer and required to abide by certain conditions of parole. These conditions included that defendant not engage in behavior that constitutes a violation of any federal, state, or local law, that he not use or possess controlled substances, and that he follow the parole officer's instructions and report as required by the officer.

On June 17, 2010, defendant was taken into custody by police pursuant to a warrantfor failing to report, and the next day, his parole officer, Jason Golightly, served defendant with a notice of parole violation pertaining to that failure. On the same day, after advising defendant of his Miranda rights, detectives of the Jackson Police Department questioned defendant concerning a robbery that had occurred at approximately 4:00 a.m. on June 16, 2010, at a Jackson gas station. After voluntarily answering several questions, defendant requested an attorney. The police then discontinued the interrogation.

On June 21, 2010, while defendant was still incarcerated, his parole officer was on vacation, so another officer, Cheryl Evans, went to the jail to serve defendant with an amended notice of parole violation that identified three additional parole violations, one of which related to the June 16 robbery. ² Evans testified as follows regarding what occurred at the jail:

Q. And what, exactly does [“serve him parole violation charges and get his statement”] mean? What do you do? What's the process when that happens?

A. When a person is served with a parole violation charge, when we determine they—or we believe they have violated a condition of their parole, we have charges made up. They're on a piece of paper.

We then go and meet with the person. We serve them the charges, which means I say “Count I,” “Count II”—or, for him, it was Count—it was an additional count, so it was Count III, Count IV, Count V. And then I review it with him. I ask him for a statement. We talk a little bit. And then he decides whether he signs the bottom—not saying he's guilty—just signs that he received the charges.

Then he's offered a preliminary parole violation hearing, which is a probable cause hearing. And, again, he waived that, but waiving that does not admit he's guilty. It's just that he's waiving the preliminary hearing.

Q. So, did you do all this with the Defendant?

A. Yes.

* * *

Q. And did he give you a statement?

A. Yes, he did.

Q. Did one of the charges have to do with the robbery at the Admiral gas station?

A. Yes.

Q. Did he give you a statement as to those charges?

A. Yes.

Q. And what did he say?

A. We talked generally about everything that was going on and he said that he'd been having a rough time. He said that he was living with his cousin, Laurie Brooks, who has a couple of kids, and that he felt—he wasn't able to get a job and hold a job—and he felt that he was putting a lot of financial stresses on her. And he also said, you know, he, himself, got a little stressed about it and was having a lot of trouble adjusting and he slipped and started using his cocaine again.

And he said he went into the Admiral gas station. He told me that he walked in there to the clerk, asked the clerk for some cigarettes. The clerk turned around to get cigarettes. As the clerk turned around—he actually showed me what he did—he leaned forward like this onto the counter and told the guy in a low voice to—told him to give him the money and he wouldn't get hurt, and then he said the guy gave him the money and he left.

Relevant here, the meeting between Evans and defendant took place in the jail library and lasted approximately 15 to 25 minutes. Evans did not inform defendant of his Miranda rights or tell defendant that he was not required to speak to her absent a lawyer being present. According to Evans, during the meeting, defendant told her that he had submitted a letter indicating that he wished to talk to the police again, and at the end of the meeting, defendant asked Evans to convey to the police that he wished to speak to them.

Defendant was eventually charged with armed robbery for the gas station incident, and he was tried before a jury. At the beginning of trial, defendant moved to suppress Evans's testimony regarding defendant's confession, arguing that it was improperly obtained because defendant had not been informed of his Miranda rights and because defendant had previously requested counsel. After conducting a hearing, the trial court determined that Evans had not been acting in concert with law enforcement officials and that Evans was not herself a law enforcement officer obligated to give Miranda warnings. Accordingly, the court denied defendant's motion and admitted Evans's testimony regarding defendant's confession. The jury convicted defendant of armed robbery, and he was sentenced as a fourth-offense habitual offender to a prison term of 15–30 years.

Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court had erred when it denied his motion to suppress Evans's testimony regarding his confession and that the error was not harmless. In a published opinion, the Court of Appeals held that a parole officer is a law enforcement officer for purposes of Miranda, that defendant was in custody when Evans interrogated him, and that the statements made by defendant were thus “inadmissible in a subsequent trial [because] the parolee invoked the right to counsel before questioning.” People v. Elliott, 295 Mich.App. 623, 646, 815 N.W.2d 575 (2012). The Court of Appeals agreed with defendant that the trial court's error in denying the motion to suppress was not harmless given the significance the prosecutor had placed on Evans's testimony. Id. at 647–648, 815 N.W.2d 575. The Court of Appeals reversed defendant's conviction and remanded for a new trial. Id. at 626, 815 N.W.2d 575. We granted the prosecutor's application for leave to appeal. People v. Elliott, 491 Mich. 938, 815 N.W.2d 129 (2012).³

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“We review a trial court's factual findings in a ruling on a motion to suppress for clear error. To the extent that a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress involves an interpretation of the law or the application of a constitutional standard to uncontested facts, our review is de novo.” People v. Attebury, 463 Mich. 662, 668, 624 N.W.2d 912 (2001). Whether a court applied the correct constitutional standard is reviewed de novo. People v. McRae, 469 Mich. 704, 710, 678 N.W.2d 425 (2004).

III. ANALYSIS

In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against compelled self-incrimination requires that the accused be given a series of warnings before being subjected to “custodial interrogation.” ⁴Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (“Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.”). The right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation is a corollary of the right against compelled self-incrimination, because the presence of counsel at custodial interrogation is one way in which to “insure that statements made in the government-established atmosphere are not the product of compulsion.” Id. at 466, 86 S.Ct. 1602; see also id. at 470, 86 S.Ct. 1602. If the custodial interrogation is not preceded by an adequate warning, statements made during the custodial interrogation may not be introduced into evidence at the accused's criminal trial. I...