People v. Estrada

• Decision Date: 27 January 1975
• Citation: 80 Misc.2d 608,364 N.Y.S.2d 332
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Ruben ESTRADA.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Page 332

364 N.Y.S.2d 332

80 Misc.2d 608

PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Ruben ESTRADA.

Supreme Court, Criminal Term, Kings County, Part 25.

Jan. 27, 1975.

Gabriel I. Levy, Asst. Atty. Gen., Sanford Lurie, Asst. Dist. Atty., Kings County, Robert Dublirer, Criminal Law Investigator, Dist. Atty., Kings County, for the People.

James M. Fergal, Stephen L. Barrett, Legal Aid, New York City, for Ruben Estrada.

MEMORANDUM

LUIGI R. MARANO, Justice.

Each of these three-count indictments accuses the defendant of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the second decree (P.L. 220.41, a Class A--II felony), criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree (P.L. 222.16, a Class A--III felony) and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree (P.L. 220.09, a Class C felony). These indictments were consolidated for trial purposes and the defendant was convicted on all six counts after jury trial. The defendant, now before the court for sentence, has moved orally for consideration as a youthful offender and contends that C.P.L. 720.10(2), which denies youthful offender eligibility to a defendant indicted for a Class A felony, is unconstitutional as a denial of both due process and equal protection.

Since 1944 New York has denied eligibility for youthful offender consideration to youths who have committed the most serious crimes. C.C.P. 913--e excluded youths who had committed crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment or who had been convicted of a felony and this exclusion was sustained in People v. Geeter, 6 Misc.2d 865, 165 N.Y.S.2d 811. C.P.L. 720.10(2) makes no significant change with respect to eligibility and provides as follows:

"Eligible youth' means a youth who is eligible to be found a youthful offender. Every youth is so eligible unless he (a) is indicted for a class A felony, or (b) has previously been convicted of a felony.'

As regards due process, the defendant contends that the exclusion of youths indicted for class A felonies is a presumption that such youths are unworthy of youthful offender treatment. He further contends that this is an irrebuttable presumption which is immune from any evidence which would demonstrate its incorrectness and is therefore repugnant to due process. As regards equal protection, the defendant contends that C.P.L. Article 720's use of indictments for Class A felonies to define ineligibility for youthful offender consideration is arbitrary and irrational. He further contends that the exclusion bears no fair and substantial relation to the goals of the youthful offender procedure and concludes that since the exclusion is based on the crime charged, not that for which the defendant was convicted, it is violative of equal protection.

The Attorney General and the District Attorney in opposing this motion contend, Inter alia, that this is not an appropriate proceeding in which to test the constitutionality of C.P.L. 720.10(2), and that the defendant lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute since not only was he indicted for Class A felonies, but was also convicted of Class A felonies rather than of some lesser crime. They conclude that if there should be a denial of equal protection where a defendant convicted of a lesser crime is denied youthful offender consideration because he originally was indicted for a Class A felony, there is no such infirmity here because the defendant was convicted of the crimes charged.

In considering this challenge to the constitutionality of CPL 720.10(2) the court is aware that all legislative enactments are 'supported by a presumption of validity so strong as to demand of those who attack them a demonstration of invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt' (Matter of Van Berkel v. Power, 16 N.Y.2d 37, 40, 261 N.Y.S.2d 876, 878, 209 N.E.2d 539, 541; Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 79, 31 S.Ct. 337, 55 L.Ed. 369; Matter of Fay, 291 N.Y. 198, 206, 207, 52 N.E.2d 97, 98, 99, 'and the courts strike them down only as a last unavoidable result'; Matter of Van Berkel v. Power, Supra; Matter of Ahern v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 303 N.Y. 545, 555, 104 N.E.2d 898, 903, aff'd 344 U.S. 367, 73 S.Ct. 340, 97 L.Ed. 395; Matter of Roosevelt Raceway v. Monaghan, 9 N.Y.2d 293, 213 N.Y.S.2d 729, 174 N.E.2d 71, app. dismissed 368 U.S. 12, 82 S.Ct. 123, 7 L.Ed.2d 75). 'Particularly courts of first instance should not exercise transcendent power of declaring an act of the Legislature unconstitutional except in rare cases where life and liberty is involved and the invalidity of the act is apparent on its face' (National Psychological Assn. v. University of the State of New York, 18 Misc.2d 722, 725--726, 188 N.Y.S.2d 151, 156, aff'd 10 A.D.2d 688, 199 N.Y.S.2d 423, aff'd 8 N.Y.2d 197, 203 N.Y.S.2d 821, 168 N.E.2d 649, appeal dismissed 365 U.S. 298, 81 S.Ct. 691, 5 L.Ed.2d 688). Courts of original jurisdiction should not set aside a statute as unconstitutional unless that conclusion is inescapable. (People v. Elkin, 196 Misc. 188, 80 N.Y.S.2d 525; Bohling v. Corsi, 204 Misc. 778, 127 N.Y.S.2d 597, aff'd 306 N.Y. 815, 118 N.E.2d 823). The tendency is to leave such questions to appellate tribunals (In re City of New Rochelle v. Echo Bay Waterfront Corp., 182 Misc. 176, 46 N.Y.S.2d 645, aff'd 268 App.Div. 182, 49 N.Y.S.2d 673, aff'd 294 N.Y. 678, 60 N.E.2d 838).

There is also the presumption that the legislature has investigated a matter and found facts necessary to support the legislation challenged (I.L.F.Y. Co. v. Temporary State Housing Rent Commission, 10 N.Y.2d 263, 219 N.Y.S.2d 249, 176 N.E.2d 822; Lincoln Bldg. Assoc. v. Barr,1 N.Y.2d 413, 153 N.Y.S.2d 633, 135 N.E.2d 801). The defendant herein alleges that he has been a victim of discriminatory treatment. Upon such a claim he must demonstrate conscious, intentional discrimination (People v. Goodman, 31 N.Y.2d 262, 338 N.Y.S.2d 97, 290 N.E.2d 139; Matter of DiMaggio v. Brown, 19 N.Y.2d 283, 279 N.Y.S.2d 161, 225 N.E.2d 871). If there is some reasonable basis for a legislative classification, it cannot be held to be special and unconstitutional, but must be given effect by the courts (Farrington v. Pinckney 1 N.Y.2d 74, 150 N.Y.S.2d 585, 133 N.E.2d 817). Where an enactment affects one group differently than another group, it will not be set aside if any state of facts can be conceived to support it (Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491). The Fourteenth Amendment allows the state legislatures to enact laws so as to affect some individuals or groups differently than others. The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification is based on grounds which are wholly irrelevant to the objective of the challengedstatute (McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393). The Constitution bars irrational discrimination between groups of persons as they are affected by a statute, but it does not require that situations which are different in fact are to be treated as though they were the same (Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 69 S.Ct. 198, 93 L.Ed. 163). Nor may a discriminatory purpose be presumed: there must be a showing of clear and intentional discrimination (Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 64 S.Ct. 397, 88 L.Ed. 497).

C.P.L. Article 720 differentiates among youths in several different ways. C.P.L. 720.20(1)(b) mandates youthful offender treatment for a youth convicted in a local criminal court who had not previously been convicted of a crime or found to have been a youthful offender. C.P.L. 720.10(2), as do the statutes of a number of jurisdictions, uses the gravity of the crime charged as they standard for exclusion from eligibility for youthful offender consideration. The pertinent portions of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (Title 18 U.S.C. Chapter 403, §§ 5031--5037), provide as follows:

'* * * a 'juvenile' is a person who has not attained his eighteenth birthday, and 'juvenile delinquency' is the violation of a law of the United States committed by a juvenile and not punishable by death or life imprisonment (Title 18 U.S.C. § 5031),

and

'A juvenile alleged to have committed one or more acts in violation of a law of the United States not punishable by death or life imprisonment, * * * shall be proceeded against as a juvenile delinquent if he consents to such procedure, unless the Attorney General, in his discretion, has expressly directed otherwise (Title 18 U.S.C. § 5032).'

In United States v. Quin ones, (D.C.P.R.) 353 F.Supp....