People v. Evans
| Citation | 220 Ill.Dec. 332,673 N.E.2d 244,174 Ill.2d 320 |
| Decision Date | 19 September 1996 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 80158,80159,s. 80158 |
| Parties | , 220 Ill.Dec. 332 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Billie J. EVANS, Appellee. The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Michael MEEKS, Appellee. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Illinois |
James E. Ryan, Attorney General, Springfield, Charles Garnati, State's Attorney, Marion, and James Creason, State's Attorney, Salem (Barbara Preiner, Solicitor General, Arleen C. Anderson and Paul J. Chevlin, Assistant Attorneys General, Chicago, and Norbert J. Goetten, Stephen E. Norris and Gerry R. Arnold of the Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Mt. Vernon, of counsel), for the People.
Daniel M. Kirwan, Deputy Defender, and E. Joyce Randolph, Assistant Defender of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, Mt. Vernon, for appellees.
These two, consolidated appeals concern how Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (145 Ill.2d R. 604(d)) applies to negotiated guilty pleas.
In People v. Meeks, the State originally charged defendant Michael Meeks with reckless homicide, robbery, and first degree murder. Meeks' defense counsel and an assistant State's Attorney negotiated a plea agreement. Under its terms, Meeks would plead guilty to the reckless homicide charge; in exchange, the State would (1) move to dismiss the other two charges, (2) dismiss several additional charges pending against Meeks in other cases, and (3) recommend a sentence of 10 years' imprisonment.
On March 11, 1994, the circuit court of Marion County conducted a proceeding attended by Meeks, his defense counsel, and an assistant State's Attorney. Defense counsel orally presented the terms of the negotiated plea agreement to the circuit court. The circuit court then carefully complied with Supreme Court Rule 402 (134 Ill.2d R. 402) by, inter alia, admonishing and examining Meeks, determining that the plea was knowingly and voluntarily made, and determining that a factual basis existed for the plea. Meeks executed a written guilty plea and waiver form, which was presented to the court. At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court concurred in the negotiated plea agreement and sentenced Meeks to the recommended sentence of 10 years in prison.
On April 11, 1994, Meeks filed a written pro se motion to reduce his sentence. Subsequently, his defense counsel filed an amended motion requesting that the court reduce Meeks' sentence or, in the alternative, place him in a rehabilitation facility. The circuit court conducted a hearing on the amended motion. Defense counsel explained that the motion did not seek to disturb Meeks' guilty plea; rather, it sought only to reduce the length of Meeks' sentence so that he could begin substance abuse treatment. Because the sentence was the product of a negotiated plea agreement, the circuit court declined to reduce it.
Meeks appealed. The appellate court held that, under Rule 604(d), the circuit court was required to exercise discretion when considering Meeks' motion to reduce his sentence. Consequently, the appellate court reversed and remanded the cause to the circuit court. No. 5-94-0583 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal (155 Ill.2d R. 315; 134 Ill.2d R. 612(b)) and consolidated this case with People v. Evans.
In People v. Evans, the State initially charged defendant Billie J. Evans with residential burglary, armed violence, and aggravated unlawful restraint. Evans' defense counsel and an assistant State's Attorney negotiated a plea agreement. Under its terms, Evans would plead guilty to the armed violence and aggravated unlawful restraint charges; in exchange, the State would (1) move to dismiss the residential burglary On February 3, 1992, the circuit court of Williamson County conducted a hearing attended by Evans, his defense counsel, and an assistant State's Attorney. The assistant State's Attorney orally presented the terms of the negotiated plea agreement to the circuit court. The circuit court then carefully complied with Rule 402 by, inter alia, admonishing and examining Evans, determining that the plea was knowingly and voluntarily made, and determining that a factual basis existed for the plea. Evans presented his signed written guilty plea and waiver form to the court. At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court concurred in the negotiated plea agreement and sentenced Evans to the recommended prison terms.
[220 Ill.Dec. 334] charge, and (2) recommend concurrent sentences of 11 and 5 years' imprisonment for the armed violence and aggravated unlawful restraint charges, to be served concurrently with sentences previously imposed in another county.
A short time later, Evans' defense counsel filed a motion to withdraw Evans' guilty pleas, asserting that Evans did not understand the plea negotiation process. The circuit court denied the motion after a full hearing. Evans appealed. On grounds not relevant here, the appellate court affirmed the convictions, vacated the sentences, and remanded the cause for a new sentencing hearing. Following remand, the circuit court conducted a new sentencing hearing in compliance with the appellate court's order. The circuit court again sentenced Evans according to the terms of the negotiated plea agreement.
Evans' defense counsel next filed a written motion for reconsideration of Evans' sentences. The motion asserted that Evans' sentences are excessive and should be reduced, mainly because he is a young man with mental disabilities. Following a full hearing, the circuit court denied the motion and declined to reduce Evans' sentences. The circuit court determined, for the third time, that Evans should serve the prison sentences to which he had agreed in his plea agreement with the State.
Evans took a second appeal. The appellate court found that Evans' defense counsel failed to file a Rule 604(d) certificate. As a result, the appellate court reversed in part and remanded the cause to the circuit court for a new hearing. No. 5-94-0100 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal (155 Ill.2d R. 315; 134 Ill.2d R. 612(b)) and consolidated this case with Meeks' case.
The common issue in these consolidated appeals is how Supreme Court Rule 604(d) applies to negotiated guilty pleas, as opposed to open guilty pleas.
In each of these cases, the defendant and the State entered into a negotiated plea agreement in which the defendant pleaded guilty to certain charges in exchange for the State's agreement to dismiss other charges and recommend a specific sentence. The trial courts accepted the negotiated plea agreements and sentenced the defendants to the recommended prison terms. Following the trial courts' entry of judgment, each defendant then sought to reduce his sentence by filing a motion for sentence reconsideration under Rule 604(d).
The State challenges the defendants' efforts to reduce their sentences. The State contends that it is fundamentally unfair for the defendants to agree to a negotiated plea agreement, obtain the benefits of that bargain (especially the dismissed charges), and then separately seek reconsideration of their negotiated sentences. According to the State, problems concerning plea bargaining arrangements should be addressed using contract law principles. The State claims that, where a defendant pleads guilty in accordance with a negotiated plea agreement, the guilty plea and the sentence "go hand in hand" as material elements of the plea agreement. Consequently, the State maintains, for a defendant to challenge only a sentence imposed as part of a negotiated plea agreement, the defendant should be required to withdraw his guilty plea, thereby returning the parties to the status quo. In this regard, the State asks us to hold that the motion-to- We agree with the State's argument for several reasons. A review of plea bargaining, guilty pleas, and Rule 604(d) is conducted while we explain the basis for our agreement.
[220 Ill.Dec. 335] reconsider-sentence provisions of Rule 604(d) do not apply to negotiated guilty pleas.
Plea bargaining was once a questionable practice, often not acknowledged in open court. See 3 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice § 14-65 (2d ed. 1980) (). Since the 1970s, however, the plea bargaining process and the negotiated plea agreements that result have been recognized not only as constitutional, but also as vital to and highly desirable for our criminal justice system. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363-64, 98 S.Ct. 663, 668, 54 L.Ed.2d 604, 611 (1978); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260-61, 92 S.Ct. 495, 498, 30 L.Ed.2d 427, 432 (1971). Accordingly, this court has stated that "plea bargaining, when properly administered, is to be encouraged." People v. Boyt, 109 Ill.2d 403, 416, 94 Ill.Dec. 438, 488 N.E.2d 264 (1985).
The typical plea bargain contains an agreement by the defendant to plead guilty to a certain charge or charges. In contrast to some past practices, trial courts now accept guilty pleas "only with care and discernment" (Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1468, 25 L.Ed.2d 747, 756 (1970)). See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) (); 134 Ill.2d R. 402 (...
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...The contract theory of fully negotiated plea agreements was announced by the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Evans, 174 Ill.2d 320, 220 Ill.Dec. 332, 673 N.E.2d 244 (1996), where the defendants were convicted and sentenced pursuant to negotiated pleas but then filed motions to reduce th......
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...in this case is defendant's choice to plead guilty. Entering a guilty plea is a "`grave and solemn act.'" People v. Evans, 174 Ill.2d 320, 326, 220 Ill.Dec. 332, 673 N.E.2d 244 (1996), quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1468, 25 L.Ed.2d 747, 756 (1970). It is ......
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