People v. Evans

Decision Date30 October 1980
Docket NumberCr. 36071
Citation112 Cal.App.3d 607,169 Cal.Rptr. 240
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Mattie Belinda EVANS, aka Mattie Belinda McDowell, Defendant and Appellant.

Abelson, Harris & Brunon and Robert N. Harris, Beverly Hills, for defendant and appellant.

George Deukmejian, Atty. Gen., Robert H. Philibosian, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Criminal Division, S. Clark Moore, Asst. Atty. Gen., Edward T. Fogel, Jr., and Richard L. Walker, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

RICKS, * Associate Justice.

Appellant Mattie Belinda Evans (Evans) appeals from a jury trial conviction of grand theft (Pen.Code, § 487), embezzlement by a public officer (Pen.Code, § 424, subd. 1), and falsification of public records (Gov.Code, § 6200).

Probation was denied and Evans was sentenced to state prison for the term prescribed by law on the grand theft conviction. The sentences for embezzlement and falsification of public records were stayed pending service of the grand theft sentence.

CONTENTIONS

Evans contends that the trial court (1) failed to inquire adequately as to Evans' capacity to represent herself at trial; (2) improperly instructed the jury; and (2) improperly instructed the jury; and (3) failed to stay the sentences for embezzlement and falsification of public records pending service of her grand theft sentence.

We find these contentions to be without merit for the reasons stated below.

FACTS

Evans was employed as an eligibility worker for the Los Angeles County Department of Public Social Services from the middle of 1976 to early 1977. Her duties included interviewing clients and reviewing documents and information to determine the eligibility of clients for public assistance programs. Additionally, Evans determined the amount of each client's eligibility.

In appropriate cases Evans was responsible for completing emergent aid requisitions for qualified clients, thereby initiating the procedure for the issuance of welfare checks. Evans also had the responsibility of completing overpayment forms. Evans was assigned to the El Monte office and had a caseload of between 120 and 140 cases.

Karen Sampson (Sampson) was receiving public assistance from the County of Los Angeles in December 1976. Evans interviewed Sampson at the El Monte district office, completed an emergent aid requisition form for Sampson, and initiated the issuance of two checks. At Evans' request, Sampson signed the checks and returned them to Evans.

Evans was also assigned to Thelma Buchanan (Buchanan) in January 1977. Evans informed Buchanan that she had been overpaid $516 and therefore would have to repay that amount. Buchanan was further informed that if she did not make repayment a warrant would be issued for her arrest. Buchanan obtained and delivered $511 to Evans.

Additionally, Evans was assigned to Susie Garcia (Garcia) in December 1976. Evans informed Garcia that she had been overpaid $301. Garcia responded that she did not have $301. Evans then left the room and returned with two checks totaling $301. Evans had Garcia endorse each check and retained both of them.

Similar transactions occurred between Evans and aid recipients Rosie Roman, Mary Huerta, Henry Patino, Irene Mendoza, Jesusita Valero and Basa Jenkins. Valero sold her house to obtain the money requested by Evans.

Arthur Cutler (Cutler) was Evans' supervisor for approximately four months. Cutler reviewed the case filed of Sampson, Buchanan, Garcia, Rosie Roman, Mary Huerta, Henry Patino, Irene Mendoza, Jesusita Valero and Blasa Jenkins but found no evidence of overpayment in any of these cases.

Lois Polak,supervising clerk for Los Angeles County, examined the cashier's records and found that no monies for overpayments had been received by the County of Los Angeles for any of the above listed clients.

Defense

While Evans was Donna Hall's (Hall) social worker from September 1976 to January 1977, she cashed Hall's welfare and social security checks. Hall did not have the proper identification necessary to cash the checks herself. Evans always gave Hall the correct amount of money and never told her that she had been overpaid or owed the county money.

Evans was given two round-trip tickets to Hawaii and approximately $2,500 by her son,Mitchell McDowell (McDowell), in December 1976 or January 1977. McDowell had obtained the money by signing a record deal.

DISCUSSION

Evans initially contends that the trial court failed to obtain an express waiver of counsel, neglected to advise her of the possible punishment for the charge crimes, and failed to tell her that she would not be able to claim incompetency of representation on appeal if she chose to represent herself. Additionally, Evans contends that the trial court did not make adequate inquiries into her capacity to represent herself and failed to inform her that she had a right to retained or appointed counsel. We disagree.

"A defendant in a criminal proceeding has a federal constitutional right to represent [herself] without counsel if, upon timely motion [citation], the trial court determines that [she] voluntarily and intelligently elects do so so [citation. If these conditions are satisfied, the trial court must permit an accused to represent [herself] without regard to the apparent lack of wisdom of such a choice and even though the accused may conduct [her] own defense ultimately to [her] own detriment. [Citation.]" (Ferrel v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 888, 891, 144 Cal.Rptr. 610, 576 P.2d 93; see People v. Wilks (1978) 21 Cal.3d 460, 467-468, 146 Cal.Rptr. 364, 578 P.2d 1369.)

Our Supreme Court in People v. Teron (1979) 23 Cal.3d 103, 113, 151 Cal.Rptr. 633, 588 P.2d 773, has also stated: "Before granting defendant leave to represent [herself], the trial court must determine 'whether the defendant has the mental capacity to waive [her] constitutional right to counsel with a realization of the probable risks and consequences of [her] action.' [Citations.] It is not, however, essential that defendant be competent to serve as counsel in a criminal proceeding [citation]; '[her] technical legal knowledge, as such, [is] not relevant to an assessment of [her] knowing exercise of the right to defend [herself].' (Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. 806, 836, [95 S.Ct. 2525, 2541, 45 L.Ed.2d 562]....) [p] In Faretta, the Supreme Court ... observed that 'The record affirmatively shows that Faretta was literate, competent, and understanding, and that he was voluntarily exercising his informed free will.' (422 U.S. at p. 835, ....)" Evans has the burden of establishing that she did not competently and intelligently waive her right to counsel. (People v. Barlow (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 351, 372-373, 163 Cal.Rptr. 664; People v. Perkins (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 593, 599, 86 Cal.Rptr. 585.)

The trial court in the case at bar specifically observed that Evans "appear[ed] to be a woman of considerable intelligence and education." As an eligibility worker for the Department of Social Services of the County of Los Angeles, Evans' duties included interviewing clients and reviewing documents and information to determine public assistance eligibility. It is also noteworthy that Evans was representing herself in other criminal matters. 1 When Evans was interrogated at length by the court, 2 she gave no indication that she was not competent to waive counsel. The trial court carefully and repeatedly warned her of the risks of self-representation; she acknowledged those risks and persisted in her desire to represent herself.

The trial court's determination as to Evans' competence to waive counsel involves an exercise of discretion which in the absence of abuse will not be disturbed on appeal. (People v. Teron, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 114, 151 Cal.Rptr. 633, 588 P.2d 773; People v. Rhinehart (1973) 9 Cal.3d 139, 147-148, 107 Cal.Rptr. 34, 507 P.2d 642, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Bolton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 208, 213, 152 Cal.Rptr. 141, 589 P.2d 396; Curry v. Superior Court, (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 221, 227, 141 Cal.Rptr. 884.)

The trial court is not required to use specific words in making its inquiry.

"... while it is true that in Lopez by way of dicta we sought to provide certain guidance for future cases in the form of what course of inquiry might be pursued in search of the answer to the ultimate question, such guidance by no means was intended to cast in concrete the requirement that the trial court use such language in ever case or suffer the pain of a brand of reversible error."

(People v. Barlow, supra, 103 Cal.App.3d at p. 370, 163 Cal.Rptr. 664; People v. Lopez (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 568, 571, 138 Cal.Rptr. 36.)

We do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the motion for self-representation.

Evans next contends that the trial court improperly instructed the jury that Penal Code section 424 applies to a county eligibility worker and that the issuance of an emergency aid request by such a worker constitutes disbursement of public monies within the meaning of that section. 3 She argues that by giving this instruction the court effectively directed the jury to enter a guilty verdict as to the embezzlement charge. We find this contention to be without merit.

The trial court must instruct the jury as to the "general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence" (People v. Saddler (1979) 24 Cal.3d 671, 681, 156 Cal.Rptr. 871, 597 P.2d 130; People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 715, 112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684-685, 160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1).

In an emergency situation, an eligibility worker, such as Evans, could complete an emergent aid requisition and a check would be issued to a client in the office. The purpose of this procedure is to issue a check to clients who cannot wait...

To continue reading

Request your trial
11 cases
  • People v. Longwith
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • 9 Noviembre 1981
    ...U.S. 155, 161-162 (2 L.Ed.2d 167, 172); People v. Barlow, supra, 103 Cal.App.3d at p. 373, 163 Cal.Rptr. 664; People v. Evans (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 607, 614, 169 Cal.Rptr. 240.) The court in People v. Lopez (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 568, 572-574, 138 Cal.Rptr. 36, in some detail, suggested three......
  • Stark v. the Superior Court of Sutter County
    • United States
    • California Supreme Court
    • 1 Agosto 2011
    ...who had authority to certify her own time record was a person charged with disbursement of public funds]; People v. Evans (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 607, 169 Cal.Rptr. 240 [county aid worker with authority to complete emergency check requisitions for clients was a person charged with disbursemen......
  • People v. White
    • United States
    • California Superior Court
    • 8 Mayo 1981
    ...60 Cal.Rptr. 457, 430 P.2d 15; People v. Barlow, supra, 103 Cal.App.3d, at pp. 372-373, 163 Cal.Rptr. 664; People v. Evans (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 607, 612-613, 169 Cal.Rptr. 240.) The docket of the prior case reflects that defendant was advised of his right to counsel and made a knowing and ......
  • People v. Billings
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • 8 Octubre 1981
    ...duty to instruct the jury as to the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence. (People v. Evans (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 607, 169 Cal.Rptr. 240.) Otherwise stated, it is clear that in criminal cases, even in the absence of a request by counsel, the trial court mus......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT