People v. Farwell, S231009

• Decision Date: 21 June 2018
• Docket Number: S231009
• Citation: 5 Cal.5th 295,234 Cal.Rptr.3d 434,419 P.3d 913
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Randolph D. FARWELL, Defendant and Appellant.

5 Cal.5th 295

419 P.3d 913

234 Cal.Rptr.3d 434

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.Randolph D. FARWELL, Defendant and Appellant.

S231009

Supreme Court of California.

Filed June 21, 2018

Jonathan B. Steiner, Los Angeles, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Jasmine Patel, San Francisco, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Michael R. Johnsen, Shawn McGahey Webb and Gary A. Lieberman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Kent S. Scheidegger and Kymberlee C. Stapleton for Criminal Justice Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.

CORRIGAN, J.

Defendant, Randolph Farwell, entered a stipulation through his counsel that admitted all of the elements of a charged crime, making it tantamount to a guilty plea. The question is how to assess the validity of the stipulation when Farwell was neither advised of, nor expressly waived, his privilege against self-incrimination, or his rights to jury trial and confrontation. People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315 ( Howard ) held that a plea is valid notwithstanding the lack of express advisements and waivers "if the record affirmatively shows that it is voluntary and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances." ( Id . at p. 1175, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315.) Some appellate courts have concluded, however, that the Howard test only applies to "incomplete" advisements but not to "silent records," where there is a total absence of advisements and waivers. We hold that the totality of the circumstances test applies in silent record cases as well. Applying that test, the record fails to affirmatively show that Farwell understood his counsel’s stipulation had the effect of waiving his constitutional trial rights. The stipulation was the only basis for the jury’s misdemeanor verdict. We reverse the Court of Appeal’s judgment affirming that conviction.

I. BACKGROUND

Farwell was charged with gross vehicular manslaughter as a felony in count 1, and, in count 2, misdemeanor driving when his driver’s license was suspended or revoked.¹ Before trial, defense counsel stated Farwell was willing to plead no contest to the misdemeanor charge. Alternatively, he moved to bifurcate the trial on that allegation. The prosecutor objected to both requests. The court did not accept a change of plea and denied the bifurcation motion.

After defense counsel had cross-examined the first witness, the parties entered into the following stipulation, which was read to the jury: "[O]n June 21st, 2013, Randolph Farwell was driving a motor vehicle while his license was suspended for a failure to appear, and ... when he drove, he knew his license was suspended." The stipulation encompassed all of the elements of Vehicle Code section 14601.1, subdivision (a), as alleged in count 2. (See CALCRIM No. 2220.) The court instructed the jury that it must accept the stipulated facts as true. When the stipulation was entered, the court did not advise Farwell of the constitutional rights implicated by a guilty plea or the stipulation. Nor did it solicit a personal waiver of those rights.

The jury found Farwell guilty as charged. He was sentenced to 13 years in prison for vehicular manslaughter, with a concurrent term of six months for the misdemeanor conviction.

A divided Court of Appeal rejected Farwell’s challenge to his conviction for driving with a suspended license. Acknowledging that the stipulation was tantamount to a guilty plea, the majority applied the totality of the circumstances test from Howard , supra , 1 Cal.4th 1132, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315. Considering Farwell’s criminal history, the trial court’s instructions to the panel during jury selection, and the fact that Farwell was in the midst of a jury trial when the stipulation was entered, the court held that "defendant knew of and waived his constitutional rights when he and his counsel made the strategic decision to enter the stipulation." Writing in dissent, Justice Mosk concluded that a " ‘totality of the circumstances’ " review could not be performed in a "silent record" case, which he defined as a circumstance where there "was no express advisement to, or waiver by, defendant of his constitutional rights at the time of the stipulation." Relying on People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 262, 92 P.3d 841 ( Mosby ), Justice Mosk concluded that "[i]n silent record cases, a reviewing court cannot infer that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights to trial, to remain silent, and to confront witnesses." Accordingly, he would hold that "reversal [was] required ... without a harmless error analysis."

II. DISCUSSION

"Several federal constitutional rights are involved in a waiver that takes place when a plea of guilty is entered in a state criminal trial." ( Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 ( Boykin ).) These include the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confrontation. ( Ibid . ) The effect of a stipulation for purposes of Boykin "is defined by the rights a defendant surrenders." ( People v. Robertson (1989) 48 Cal.3d 18, 40, 255 Cal.Rptr. 631, 767 P.2d 1109.) A stipulation that admits all of the elements of a charged crime necessary for a conviction is tantamount to a guilty plea. ( People v. Little (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 766, 776–778, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 446 ; cf. People v. Cross (2015) 61 Cal.4th 164, 171, 174–175, 187 Cal.Rptr.3d 139, 347 P.3d 1130( Cross ); In re Mosley (1970) 1 Cal.3d 913, 924–925, 83 Cal.Rptr. 809, 464 P.2d 473.) Accordingly, the record must demonstrate that the defendant voluntarily and intelligently waived his constitutional trial rights. ( North Carolina v. Alford (1970) 400 U.S. 25, 31, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 ; Boykin , at p. 244, 89 S.Ct. 1709 ; Howard , supra , 1 Cal.4th at p. 1175, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315.)

Farwell’s stipulation conclusively established the stipulated facts as true and completely relieved the prosecution of its burden of proof on count 2. While the jury was still required to return a verdict on that count, its limited function did not amount to a jury trial in the constitutional sense. As we explained in People v. Adams (1993) 6 Cal.4th 570, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 831, 862 P.2d 831 ( Adams ) involving an enhancement: "It is true ... that such evidentiary stipulations are not an admission that the allegation is true. When a defendant stipulates to the existence of a fact in controversy, however, the jury is instructed that it must regard the fact as conclusively proved. (See CALJIC No. 1.02.) Therefore, while the jury or court must still find the allegation is true, we presume that the instruction will be followed, that the jury will consider the facts conclusively proved, and that the jury will find the allegation true. [¶] That being the case, when the stipulation admits every element of the enhancement that is necessary to imposition of the additional penalty, for purposes of Boykin - Tahl^{[2 ]} analysis we see no meaningful distinction between an admission of the truth of an enhancement allegation and an admission of all of the elements necessary to imposition of the additional punishment authorized by the enhancement." ( Adams , at p. 580, fn. 7, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 831, 862 P.2d 831.)

By entering the stipulation, Farwell effectively surrendered his privilege against self-incrimination, his right to confrontation, and his right to a jury trial on count 2. The People do not contend otherwise.

Boykin held that "[w]e cannot presume a waiver of these three important federal rights from a silent record." ( Boykin , supra , 395 U.S. at p. 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709.) The defendant there was charged with multiple counts of robbery with a possible punishment of death. At arraignment, he pleaded guilty to all charges. The Supreme Court observed that "the judge asked no questions of petitioner concerning his plea, and petitioner did not address the court." ( Id . at p. 239, 89 S.Ct. 1709.) The defendant received a jury trial on the question of punishment and was sentenced to death. ( Id . at p. 240, 89 S.Ct. 1709.) The Supreme Court held that "[w]hat is at stake for an accused facing death or imprisonment demands the utmost solicitude of which courts are capable in canvassing the matter with the accused to make sure he has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence. When the judge discharges that function, he leaves a record adequate for any review that may be later sought...." ( Id . at pp. 243–244, 89 S.Ct. 1709, fn.omitted.) The court found "reversible error ‘because the record d[id] not disclose that the defendant voluntarily and understandingly entered his pleas of guilty.’ " ( Id . at p. 244, 89 S.Ct. 1709.)

In Howard , supra , 1 Cal.4th 1132, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315, we interpreted the scope of Boykin ’s mandate. There the defendant personally admitted the truth of a prior felony conviction. Before doing so, the court admonished him that he had a right to a jury determination of the allegation and a right to confront prosecution witnesses, but did not mention the privilege against self-incrimination. ( Id . at pp. 1179–1180, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315.) On review, we noted early California authority had held that "the failure to obtain explicit waivers of each of the three Boykin / Tahl rights required reversal regardless of prejudice." ( Id . at p. 1177, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315.) Nonetheless, we concluded that "the overwhelming weight of authority no longer supports the proposition that the federal Constitution requires reversal when the trial court has failed to give explicit admonitions on each of the so-called Boykin rights." ( Id . at p. 1175, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, 824...