People v. Ferguson
Decision Date | 10 March 1977 |
Citation | 395 N.Y.S.2d 330,90 Misc.2d 467 |
Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Joseph FERGUSON, Defendant. |
Court | New York Supreme Court |
Robert M. Morgenthau by Warren Murray, New York City, for the People.
William Gallagher by Helen Sadow, New York City, for defendant.
This is a Huntley hearing brought on by the defendant to suppress statements made to his parole officer at Rikers Island.
The defendant was arrested for robbery, was arraigned and had counsel assigned on May 12, 1976. He was indicted on May 17, 1976. On June 18, 1976, he was visited at the Rikers Island House of Detention for Men by his parole officer. He was questioned without benefit of the Miranda warnings and without the presence of counsel and made statements.
It is clear at this stage in the development of our law that a custodial interrogation of an indicted defendant by an agent of the state, without warnings as to that defendant's Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination and Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and absent his previously assigned counsel, is not to be permitted, and that the fruits of such interrogation must be suppressed.
Indeed, we have gone far beyond this statement as regards a defendant's right to counsel in self incrimination situations. Our State preceded and surpassed the Supreme Court of the United States in its protection of the right to counsel, not only in reliance upon the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, through the Fourteenth, but also on State Constitutional grounds.
See: People v. Di Biasi, 7 N.Y.2d 544, 200 N.Y.S.2d 21, 166 N.E.2d 825, People v. Waterman, 9 N.Y.2d 561, 216 N.Y.S.2d 70, 175 N.E.2d 445, People v. Meyer, 11 N.Y.2d 162, 227 N.Y.S.2d 427, 182 N.E.2d 103, People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841, 193 N.E.2d 628, People v. Gunner, 15 N.Y.2d 226, 257 N.Y.S.2d 924, 205 N.E.2d 852.
See also: People v. Ramos, 40 N.Y.2d 610, 389 N.Y.S.2d 299, 357 N.E.2d 955, People v. Townes, 41 N.Y.2d 97, 390 N.Y.S.2d 893, 359 N.E.2d 402, People v. Roberson, 41 N.Y.2d 106, 390 N.Y.S.2d 900, 359 N.E.2d 408.
This case is well within the ambit of the above authorities, with the exception of the relationship of the parties. The question here is, under these facts, does the status of the defendant as a parolee and of his interrogator as his parole officer diminish his constitutional rights in a new prosecution, so as to permit the admission into evidence of a statement taken in the absence of counsel and without the "Miranda " warnings?
People v. Ronald W. (1969), 24 N.Y.2d 732, 735, 302 N.Y.S.2d 260, 262, 249 N.E.2d 882, 884, held that a probation officer "is not a 'law enforcement' officer within the spirit or meaning of Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694)" and that the probation officers were not required to give the defendant the "Miranda " warnings.
However, Ronald W. dealt with a voluntary, non-custodial statement, and, most importantly for our purposes, with a probation revocation proceeding.
That case therefore is easily distinguishable from the one at bar, requiring this court to consider anew the question of the parolee's interrogation by his parole officer in a fresh prosecution. For this purpose, any distinctions between the parole and the probation status may be overlooked.
Unfortunately, this court has found no authority in this jurisdiction dealing with the precise question to be considered here. Indeed, authority is sparse throughout the country.
Almost every case on all fours with our fact pattern held that the parole status did not diminish the defendant's right to receive the constitutional warnings. Most did not discuss the right to have counsel present, as in People v. Arthur, supra, and People v. Hobson,supra. This right, in the opinion of this Court, once it attaches, is even superior to the right to the constitutional warnings.
These decisions distinguish between a probation or parole revocation proceeding and a new prosecution. In U. S. v. Deaton (5th Cir. 1972), 468 F.2d 541, 544, cert. den., 410 U.S. 934, 93 S.Ct. 1386, 35 L.Ed.2d 597, the court stated:
See also: State v. Gallagher (1974), 38 Ohio St.2d 291, 313 N.E.2d 396, cert. den. 425 U.S. 257, 96 S.Ct. 1438, 47 L.Ed.2d 722, which relies heavily on Deaton, supra, and reached the same result.
In a 1971 Florida case, Nettles v. State, Fla.App., 248 So.2d 259, the Court, relying primarily on People v. Ronald W., supra, held that the defendant waived his right to his constitutional Miranda warnings by his Probation Officer, when he accepted probation.
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Stanley C., Matter of
...his parole officer in the absence of such Miranda warnings are inadmissable at a subsequent criminal trial (see also People v. Ferguson, 90 Misc.2d 467, 395 N.Y.S.2d 330; People v. Moore, 79 A.D.2d 619, 433 N.Y.S.2d 473). This result is in accord with that of the majority of courts in other......
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People v. Parker
...and cooperation with his supervising parole officer." (People v. Alston, 77 A.D.2d 906, 907, 431 N.Y.S.2d 82; cf. People v. Ferguson, 90 Misc.2d 467, 395 N.Y.S.2d 330 Indeed, the parolee is duty bound to disclose to his parole officer an arrest while on parole on pain of revocation of parol......
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People v. Alston
...custodial interrogation by a law enforcement officer within the contemplation of Miranda v. Arizona, supra ; see People v. Ferguson, 90 Misc.2d 467, 395 N.Y.S.2d 330. Moreover, for the reasons which follow, we find that the warnings previously recited by the police did not serve "adequately......
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People v. Lipsky
...held in this state that a parole officer must advise a defendant when questioning him in jail concerning new charges People v. Ferguson, 90 Misc.2d 467, 395 N.Y.S.2d 330. Conversely statements made to police officers have been held to be admissible without being Mirandized if the defendant ......