People v. Fletcher

• Court: New York Supreme Court Appellate Division
• Citation: 15 N.Y.S.3d 797,2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 06366,130 A.D.3d 1063
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Cliffton FLETCHER, appellant.
• Decision Date: 29 July 2015

130 A.D.3d 1063
15 N.Y.S.3d 797
2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 06366

The PEOPLE, etc., respondent
v.
Cliffton FLETCHER, appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

July 29, 2015.

15 N.Y.S.3d 798

Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Dina Zloczower of counsel), for appellant.

Kenneth P. Thompson, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove, Morgan J. Dennehy, and Phyllis Mintz of counsel), for respondent.

PETER B. SKELOS, J.P., L. PRISCILLA HALL, SANDRA L. SGROI, SYLVIA O. HINDS–RADIX, and COLLEEN D. DUFFY, JJ.

Opinion

130 A.D.3d 1063

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Garnett, J.), rendered September 12,

15 N.Y.S.3d 799

2012, convicting him of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing (Carroll, J.), of that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence.

130 A.D.3d 1064

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

On a motion by a defendant to suppress physical evidence, the People have the burden of going forward to show the legality of the police conduct in the first instance (see People v. Whitehurst, 25 N.Y.2d 389, 391, 306 N.Y.S.2d 673, 254 N.E.2d 905 ; People v. Spann, 82 A.D.3d 1013, 1014, 918 N.Y.S.2d 588 ; People v. Thomas, 291 A.D.2d 462, 463, 738 N.Y.S.2d 357 ). “Implicit in this concept is that the testimony offered by the People in first presenting their case must be credible” (People v. Quinones, 61 A.D.2d 765, 766, 402 N.Y.S.2d 196, citing People v. Berrios, 28 N.Y.2d 361, 367–368, 321 N.Y.S.2d 884, 270 N.E.2d 709 ). Once the People establish the legality of the police conduct by credible evidence, the defendant bears the burden of establishing that the arrest was not based on probable cause or that the police conduct was otherwise illegal (see People v. Spann, 82 A.D.3d at 1014, 918 N.Y.S.2d 588 ; People v. Thomas, 291 A.D.2d at 463, 738 N.Y.S.2d 357 ; cf. Matter of Robert D., 69 A.D.3d 714, 892 N.Y.S.2d 523 ). A hearing court's determination as to witness credibility is accorded great weight on appeal, as it saw and heard the witnesses, and its determination will not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the evidence (see People v. Wheeler, 2 N.Y.3d 370, 374, 779 N.Y.S.2d 164, 811 N.E.2d 531 ; People v. Prochilo, 41 N.Y.2d 759, 761, 395 N.Y.S.2d 635, 363 N.E.2d 1380 ; People v. Cole, 85 A.D.3d 1198, 1199, 926 N.Y.S.2d 163 ; People v. Barley, 82 A.D.3d 996, 997, 919 N.Y.S.2d 86 ).

Here, the People met their burden of demonstrating the legality of the police conduct at issue. Officer Mourad testified that he had extensive experience with firearms arrests, having been involved in 40 or 50 gun arrests, and having personally made 10 of those arrests. Mourad also stated that he received training in recognizing the behavior of people carrying firearms, and that the most common area to carry a firearm is the waistband. With respect to the subject arrest, Mourad consistently testified that, as he rode in a police van that drove slowly past the defendant, he made eye contact with the defendant who then made a movement to adjust his waistband. Mourad further testified that, as a consequence of this movement, the defendant's jacket was pushed aside, thereby revealing to Mourad a “rectangular shape” under the defendant's clothing which he believed could be the “outline” of a firearm handle. Although it was dark at the time, the area was lit by a building light and a street lamp. Moreover, Mourad testified that he was in an elevated position in the van and that, as he looked back, diagonally, through the middle driver side window, he could clearly see the defendant on the sidewalk about 10–15 feet away. When viewed in its entirety, Mourad's testimony was not incredible, and we perceive no basis for disturbing the hearing court's decision to credit such testimony (see People v.

130 A.D.3d 1065

Durgey, 186 A.D.2d 899, 901, 589 N.Y.S.2d 631 ; cf. People v. Lebron, 184 A.D.2d 784, 785, 585 N.Y.S.2d 498 ).

“In determining whether an individual's actions rise to the level of reasonable suspicion, police officers are permitted to interpret the behavior in light of their training and experience” (

15 N.Y.S.3d 800

People v. Solano, 46 A.D.3d 1223, 1224, 848 N.Y.S.2d 431 ; see People v. Nichols, 277 A.D.2d 715, 716–717, 715 N.Y.S.2d 783 ). Here, in contrast to the opinion of our dissenting colleague, the factual circumstances described by Mourad, coupled with the officer's experience and training, were sufficient to permit him to request information from the defendant (see People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 352 N.E.2d 562 ). The decision to make inquiry of the defendant did not stem from mere “whim or caprice,” but was objectively based upon observation of the defendant's actions as filtered through the officer's experience (People v. Hollman, 79 N.Y.2d 181, 190, 581 N.Y.S.2d 619, 590 N.E.2d 204 ; cf. People v. McIntosh, 96 N.Y.2d 521, 526, 730 N.Y.S.2d 265, 755 N.E.2d 329 ). Officer Mourad specifically testified that he believed the shape of the concealed object which he observed under the defendant's clothing was the outline of a gun (see People v. Henderson, 85 A.D.3d 663, 925 N.Y.S.2d 827 ). Mourad explained that the defendant moved in a way that he recognized, from experience, as typical of attempts to adjust a firearm kept in a waistband (see People v. Henderson, 85 A.D.3d at 663, 925 N.Y.S.2d 827 ), and further testified that the defendant began to increase his pace after the officers exited their vehicle and announced their presence (see generally People v. Anderson, 91 A.D.3d 789, 789, 937 N.Y.S.2d 109 ). Accordingly, there was reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk the defendant (see Matter of George G., 73 A.D.3d 624, 900 N.Y.S.2d 862 ; People v. Quan, 182 A.D.2d 506, 582 N.Y.S.2d 190, lv. denied 80 N.Y.2d 836, 587 N.Y.S.2d 921, 600 N.E.2d 648 ).

Contrary to the defendant's contention, trial counsel was not ineffective because she failed to challenge the prosecutor's explanations for using peremptory challenges against two potential jurors. “A defendant is not denied effective assistance of trial counsel merely because counsel does not make a motion or argument that has little or no chance of success” (People v. Stultz, 2 N.Y.3d 277, 287, 778 N.Y.S.2d 431, 810 N.E.2d 883 ; see People v. Caban, 5 N.Y.3d 143, 152, 800 N.Y.S.2d 70, 833 N.E.2d 213 ). In addition, when viewed as a whole, the record demonstrates that the defendant received the...