People v. Flores

• Decision Date: 03 February 2020
• Docket Number: D075826
• Citation: 44 Cal.App.5th 985,258 Cal.Rptr.3d 205
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Fallon Lupe FLORES, Defendant and Appellant.

44 Cal.App.5th 985

258 Cal.Rptr.3d 205

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.Fallon Lupe FLORES, Defendant and Appellant.

D075826

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

Filed February 3, 2020

Rex Adam Williams, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Meredith White and Laura Baggett, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

McCONNELL, P. J.

IINTRODUCTION

In 2018, the Legislature passed and the Governor signed into law Senate Bill No. 1437, which restricted the circumstances under which a person can be liable for felony murder and abrogated the natural and probable consequences doctrine as applied to murder. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015.) It also established a procedure permitting qualified persons with murder convictions to petition to vacate their convictions and obtain resentencing if they were previously convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (Id. , § 4.) This appeal requires us to determine whether an otherwise-qualified person convicted of voluntary manslaughter, as opposed to murder, can invoke the resentencing provision of Senate Bill No. 1437.

Defendant Fallon Lupe Flores was charged with murder, but pleaded guilty to the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. Years later, she filed a petition to have her conviction vacated and to be resentenced under the resentencing provision of Senate Bill No. 1437. The trial court denied Flores's petition on grounds that the resentencing provision is available only to qualifying persons who were convicted of murder—not persons who were convicted of voluntary manslaughter. We agree with the trial court. Therefore, we affirm the order denying Flores's petition.

IIBACKGROUND

In 2013, Flores and five codefendants were each charged by information with one count of the murder of victim John Doe ( Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a) ),¹ while they were engaged in the commission or attempted commission of a robbery (§§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A), 211) and a kidnapping (§§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(B), 207). The information alleged Flores and her codefendants acted as principals during the commission of the murder (§ 12022.53, subd. (e)), and acted for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in criminal conduct by gang members (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A)). The information further alleged Flores suffered one prior prison term. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).)

Flores pleaded guilty to one count of voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)) as a lesser included offense of the murder charge and one count of kidnapping (§ 207). As part of her plea agreement, she admitted the allegations supporting the prior prison term enhancement, the gang enhancement, and a separate firearm enhancement (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). The sentencing court sentenced Flores to a stipulated aggregate term of 24 years eight months in prison.

In 2019, Flores filed a petition under the resentencing provision of Senate Bill No. 1437, which was codified as section 1170.95. On the petition, Flores checked a box next to a preprinted statement averring she had pleaded guilty to first or second degree murder in lieu of going to trial because she feared she could have been convicted of first or second degree murder at trial pursuant to the felony-murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine.

The People opposed Flores's petition for resentencing on two grounds. First, they argued Senate Bill No. 1437 was unconstitutional.² Second, they contended Flores was statutorily ineligible for relief under section 1170.95 because she was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, not murder. The People attached as an exhibit to their opposition brief a copy of Flores's plea agreement.

The trial court held a hearing and denied Flores's petition on grounds she was not convicted of murder and, therefore, was not entitled to relief under section 1170.95.

IIIDISCUSSION

ASenate Bill No. 1437

The Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437, effective January 1, 2019, for the expressed purpose of "amend[ing] the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life." (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) As the Legislature explained, "[r]eform [was] needed in California to limit convictions and subsequent sentencing so that the law of California fairly addresse[d] the culpability of the individual and assist[ed] in the reduction of prison overcrowding, which partially result[ed] from lengthy sentences that [were] not commensurate with the culpability of the individual." (Id. , subd. (e).)

To effectuate these legislative goals, Senate Bill No. 1437 amended section 188 (concerning the degrees of murder) and section 189 (concerning the definition of malice for purposes of murder). (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 2–3.) As amended, section 188 provides as follows: "Except as stated in subdivision (e) of Section 189, in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime." (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2, subd (a)(3).)

"New section 189, subdivision (e), in turn, provides with respect to a participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a felony listed in section 189, subdivision (a), in which a death occurs—that is, as to those crimes that provide the basis for the charge of first degree felony murder—that the individual is liable for murder ‘only if one of the following is proven: [¶] (1) The person was the actual killer. [¶] (2) The person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree. [¶] (3) The person was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.’ "³ ( People v. Lopez (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 1087, 1099, 252 Cal.Rptr.3d 33, review granted Nov. 13, 2019, S258175 ( Lopez ).)

Additionally, Senate Bill No. 1437 added section 1170.95, which permits a person with an existing conviction for felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine to petition the sentencing court to have the murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts if he or she could not have been convicted of murder as a result of the other legislative changes implemented by Senate Bill No. 1437. (§ 1170.95, subd. (a).) If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, the court must issue an order to show cause and, absent a waiver and stipulation by the parties, hold a hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder conviction, recall the sentence, and resentence the petitioner. (Id. , subds. (c) & (d)(1).)

BApplication of Section 1170.95

This appeal requires us to determine whether section 1170.95 permits persons who were convicted of voluntary manslaughter to have their convictions vacated and to be resentenced. "When we interpret statutes, our primary task is to determine and give effect to the Legislature's purpose in enacting the law." ( In re H.W. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1068, 1073, 245 Cal.Rptr.3d 51, 436 P.3d 941.) "If the language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend." ( Meza v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC (2019) 6 Cal.5th 844, 856, 243 Cal.Rptr.3d 569, 434 P.3d 564.) But, "[i]f the statutory language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the statute's purpose, legislative history, and public policy." ( Lopez v. Sony Electronics, Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 627, 634, 234 Cal.Rptr.3d 856, 420 P.3d 767 ( Sony ).) "Statutory interpretation is ‘an issue of law, which we review de novo.’ " ( Union of Medical Marijuana Patients, Inc. v. City of San Diego (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1171, 1183, 250 Cal.Rptr.3d 818, 446 P.3d 317.)

In accordance with these principles of statutory interpretation, we begin by examining the express language of section 1170.95. By its terms, section 1170.95 authorizes only a person who was "convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory [to] file a petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner's murder conviction vacated ...." (Id. , subd. (a), italics added.) If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that he or she is entitled to relief, the sentencing court must "hold a hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder conviction and to recall the sentence and resentence the petitioner on any remaining counts ...." (Id. , subd. (d)(1), italics added.) In lieu of a resentencing hearing, the parties may stipulate that "the petitioner is eligible to have his or her murder conviction vacated" and to be resentenced. (Id. , subd. (d)(2), italics added.)

Through its repeated and exclusive references to murder, the plain language of section 1170.95 limits relief only to qualifying persons who were convicted of murder. Section 1170.95 does not mention, and thus does not provide relief to, persons convicted of manslaughter, which, "while a lesser included offense of murder, is clearly a separate offense ...." ( People v. Strickland (1974) 11 Cal.3d 946, 960, 114 Cal.Rptr. 632, 523 P.2d 672.) Had the Legislature intended to make section 1170.95 available to defendants convicted of manslaughter, it easily...