People v. E.G. (In re E.G.)

• Decision Date: 14 December 2016
• Docket Number: A146287
• Citation: 211 Cal.Rptr.3d 580,6 Cal.App.5th 871
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: IN RE E.G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. The People, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. E.G., Defendant and Appellant.

6 Cal.App.5th 871

211 Cal.Rptr.3d 580

IN RE E.G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.The People, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.E.G., Defendant and Appellant.

A146287

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 5, California.

Filed December 14, 2016

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing January 13, 2017

James S. Donnelly, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Donna M. Provenzano and Christina Vom Saal, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

SIMONS, J.

The juvenile court denied a motion by appellant, E.G., to reduce his battery offense from a felony to a misdemeanor pursuant to Penal Code section 17, subdivision (b)(3) (hereafter, section 17(b)(3) ), concluding the provision does not apply in juvenile proceedings.¹ Section 17(b)(3) provides that a "wobbler" offense² is a misdemeanor when "the court grants probation to a defendant without imposition of sentence and at the time of granting probation, or on application of the defendant or probation officer thereafter, the court declares the offense to be a misdemeanor." We conclude this provision applies in juvenile proceedings, and remand to allow the juvenile court to exercise its discretion under section 17(b)(3).

BACKGROUND

In 2013, an amended petition filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleged appellant committed four offenses.³ Appellant pled no contest to two of them—battery causing serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d)) and grand theft from the person (§ 487, subd. (c))—and the remaining two were dismissed on the prosecutor's motion. The offenses appellant pled no contest to were wobblers, and the amended petition alleged them as felonies.

At the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court declared appellant a ward of the court, placed him on probation, and committed him to the Orin Allen Youth Rehabilitation Facility for nine months. Appellant appealed, and this court concluded the record did not demonstrate the juvenile court exercised its discretion to declare the offenses misdemeanors or felonies as required by Welfare and Institutions Code section 702. (In re E.G. (Nov. 8, 2013, No. A138253) 2013 WL 5965312 [nonpub. opn.].) We remanded for the court to exercise this discretion and otherwise affirmed. (Id. ) The remittitur issued in January 2014.⁴

In July 2015, appellant made a motion before a different bench officer to have his offenses reduced to misdemeanors under section 17, subdivision (b), arguing his conduct on probation demonstrated he was rehabilitated.⁵ Appellant's counsel stated that the juvenile court had already declared the offenses to be felonies and the People did not dispute this statement, although the record on appeal does not indicate this declaration was made following our remand. The juvenile court denied the motion on the ground that section 17(b)(3) did not apply in juvenile proceedings.

The court also stated no declaration as to the classification of the offense had been made as required by this court's opinion, and directed the parties to schedule a hearing before the bench officer who presided over the disposition hearing. In August 2015, that bench officer stated he had already declared the offenses to be felonies at disposition and did so again.⁶ The juvenile court then terminated appellant's wardship and probation.

DISCUSSION

Section 17(b)(3) provides a wobbler offense is a misdemeanor "[w]hen the court grants probation to a defendant without imposition of sentence and at the time of granting probation, or on application of the defendant or probation officer thereafter, the court declares the offense to be a misdemeanor."⁷ The parties dispute whether this provision applies solely in adult criminal cases, or whether it also applies in juvenile proceedings.

"When interpreting statutory provisions enacted by voter initiative or legislative action, our primary purpose is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the enactors. [Citation.] To determine this intent, we consider the plain, commonsense meaning of the language used, and construe the language in the context of the overall enactment. [Citations.] When multiple statutory schemes are relevant, we evaluate each scheme and seek to harmonize them to carry out their evinced intent." (Alejandro N. v. Superior Court (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1209, 1223–1224, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 907 (Alejandro N. ).)

Section 17(b)(3) uses language that is generally not applicable to juvenile proceedings–specifically, "defendant" and "sentence." "[J]uvenile offenders are not defendants" and "their cases are resolved by dispositions, not sentences." (Alejandro N., supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at p. 1219, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 907 ; see generally Welf. & Inst. Code, § 203 ["An order adjudging a minor to be a ward of the juvenile court shall not be deemed a conviction of a crime for any purpose, nor shall a proceeding in the juvenile court be deemed a criminal proceeding."].) However, our Supreme Court has directed that the presence of such language in a criminal statute "cannot be dispositive of the question whether the [criminal statute] applies to juvenile wards." (In re Jovan B. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 801, 812, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 428, 863 P.2d 673 (Jovan B. ) [holding criminal statute using terms "convictions" and "sentences" applies in juvenile proceedings].) Instead, courts must look, if applicable, to the "broader context to expand upon the clear language chosen by the Legislature." (In re Derrick B. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 535, 543, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 13, 139 P.3d 485 (Derrick B. ) [distinguishing Jovan B. because no such broader context was present]; accord, Alejandro N., at p. 1225, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 907 ["Considered in its broader context, [criminal statute's] use of adult criminal terminology does not reflect an intent to exclude juvenile offenders from its provisions."].)

Jovan B. and Alejandro N. are instructive. In Jovan B. , the criminal statute at issue was an enhancement applicable when a defendant is " ‘released from custody on bail or on his or her own recognizance [ (O.R.) ]’ " pending felony charges, commits a second felony, and is subsequently " ‘convicted’ " of both offenses. (Jovan B., supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 808, fn. 3, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 428, 863 P.2d 673 [quoting § 12022.1].) The Supreme Court considered the statutory language in the broader context of Welfare and Institutions Code section 726, which provides juvenile court commitment orders "must specify that [the minor] ‘may not be held ... for a period in excess of the maximum term of imprisonment which could be imposed upon an adult convicted of the offense,’ " and defined " ‘maximum term of imprisonment,’ " for a felony offense, as "the longest adult term for that offense, as described in Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (a)(2), ‘plus enhancements which must be proven if pled.’ " (Id. at p. 810, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 428, 863 P.2d 673 [quoting Welf. & Inst. Code, § 726 ].) The court concluded: "If [the statute's] use of this adult terminology [i.e., " ‘convictions' " and " ‘sentences' "] were enough to prevent these enhancements from applying to juvenile wardship matters, [the quoted language] of Welfare and Institutions Code section 726 would be meaningless." (Id. at p. 812, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 428, 863 P.2d 673.) Instead, "the ‘maximum term of imprisonment’ described in Welfare and Institutions Code section 726 incorporates, to the extent therein indicated, the ‘system or body of laws' known as the DSA [Determinate Sentencing Act]." (Id. at p. 816, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 428, 863 P.2d 673.)

The court continued: " Welfare and Institutions Code section 726 obviously intends that, for purposes of calculating a juvenile ward's maximum confinement or commitment, the DSA's enhancement scheme should be applied fully except insofar as the focus of a particular enhancement is manifestly at odds with the principles of juvenile law. This requires a close analysis of each disputed enhancement to determine whether its internal references to adult criminal procedures indicate a purpose manifestly inconsistent with juvenile application." (Jovan B., supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 813, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 428, 863 P.2d 673.) The purposes of the on bail enhancement—" ‘ " ‘to meet public concern over offenders who are arrested [and] then allowed back on the street a short time later to commit more crimes,’ " ' ‘ "to deter the commission of new felonies by persons released from custody on an earlier felony," ’ and to recognize such an offender's ‘ "breach of the terms of his special custodial status " ’ "—"apply equally to juvenile and adult offenses." (Ibid. ) The Supreme Court concluded the criminal enhancement's "use of adult procedural terms such as ‘conviction’ does not evidence an intent manifestly incompatible with its application to juvenile offenses." (Ibid . )

The court proceeded to construe the adult procedural terms in the juvenile context. Although "a juvenile is not entitled to bail, and is never released on his ‘own’ recognizance, as specified in ... section 12022.1, but rather is freed, if at all, to the custody of a parent or guardian," the court concluded that "for purposes of Welfare and Institutions Code section 726 and ... section 12022.1, the minor's pretrial ‘house arrest’ release in this case was the functional equivalent of O.R. release in an adult proceeding." (Jovan B., supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 814–815, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 428, 863 P.2d 673.) "Like adult O.R. release, ... a juvenile's conditional ‘home supervision’ release places substantial responsibility, faith, and trust in the released person himself.... [H]is defiant commission of a new felony while released on this ‘special custodial status' is a personal breach of the juvenile court's trust. It is exactly the kind of opportunistic recidivism which warrants enhanced punishment under section ... 12022.1. We conclude that by...