People v. Garcia

• Citation: 217 Cal.Rptr. 783,171 Cal.App.3d 1187
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Decision Date: 06 September 1985
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Jose Maria GARCIA, Defendant and Respondent. Crim. 14061.

Page 783

217 Cal.Rptr. 783

171 Cal.App.3d 1187

PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Jose Maria GARCIA, Defendant and Respondent.

Crim. 14061.

Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

Sept. 6, 1985.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Eddie T. Keller, Supervising Deputy Atty. Gen., and Raymond L. Brosterhous II, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff and appellant.

Jerome S. Stanley, Inc., Sacramento, for defendant and respondent.

SIMS, Associate Justice.

The principal issue in this case is whether the following letter constitutes "a request that [defendant] be brought to trial" within the meaning of Penal Code section 1381.5: ¹

Jose Maria Garcia

Federal Correctional Institution

Post Office Box One Thousand

Oxford, Wisconsin 64952

6 March, 1983

Prosecuting Attorney

Municiple [sic ] Court

City of Sacramento

City Courthouse

Sacramento, California 95814

Re: STATE OF CALIFORNIA V JOSE MARIA GARCIA

Case Number: Unknown

Charge: Possession of Heroin & Firearm

Dear Sir:

According to the report of Mr. Harling, United States Probation Officer, Eastern District of California, your office has issued a warrant for my failure to appear in the above styled case. This letter, by Mr. Harling, is dated 2/11/82 and 3/24/82.

For further identification, this case is identified as BNE Case No. SAC 1089.

I will appreciate learning if this case has been dismissed because of my federal incarceration or if it is pending. Pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act (both State and Federal), there is a question if jurisdiction lies inasmuch as I have been available for trial for several months.

Your immediate acknowledgement to these questions and an early reply will be appreciated.

Respectfully,

Jose Maria Garcia

Upon receipt of the letter, the prosecutor "took no further action." A magistrate concluded the letter was an appropriate statutory request and dismissed a multi-count felony complaint for failure to bring defendant to trial in the time prescribed by the statute. The superior court thereafter denied the People's motion to reinstate the complaint ( § 871.5) and the People have appealed from the denial of the motion. ( §§ 871.5, subd. (f); 1238, subd. (a)(9).) We conclude the letter does not constitute a sufficient statutory request; accordingly, we shall reverse the superior court's order refusing to reinstate the complaint.

DISCUSSION

In resolving the issue before us under section 1381.5, we may look for guidance to cases construing section 1381. "Just as section 1381 governs the right of California prisoners to be brought to trial on pending charges within 90 days of request, its companion statute, section 1381.5, provides federal prisoners, such as defendant, with an analogous 90-day right. [Citations.] Accordingly, case law construing section 1381 is persuasive authority for interpreting section 1381.5." (People v. Vila (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 76, 81, 208 Cal.Rptr. 364.)

Because failure to comply with section 1381 results in "the drastic sanction of dismissal" ² (Reynolds v. Superior Court (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 510, 514, 169 Cal.Rptr. 868), courts have required defendants to comply strictly with statutory requirements. (Ibid.; see People v. Ruster (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 865, 873, 115 Cal.Rptr. 572.) "Any other rule would encourage resort to half-hearted, disingenuous gestures toward compliance calculated at most to start the 90-day period running and contrived in fact to achieve official default." (Ruster, supra, at p. 873, 115 Cal.Rptr. 572.)

It is apparent that, construed strictly, defendant's letter is not a request that he be brought to trial but is rather an inquiry with respect to whether his charges had been dismissed. The prosecutor who received the letter construed it as such, and we think reasonably so. The letter does not state or imply the essential ingredient of a statutory demand, i.e., a "desire to be brought to trial." (See People v. Manina, supra, 45 Cal.App.3d at p. 900, 120 Cal.Rptr. 51.) Indeed, the letter implies precisely the opposite: that, because of the passage of time without a trial, defendant's case has been or will be dismissed. The letter does not constitute a request to be brought to trial within the meaning of section 1381.5 and the magistrate and the superior court erred in concluding to the contrary. ³

We do not condone the prosecutor's failure to respond to the letter. He had a clear duty to do so. (People v. Vila supra, 162 Cal.App.3d at p. 83, 208 Cal.Rptr. 364.) Such a failure could be a crucial factor impinging on defendant's constitutional rights to a speedy trial. (Id., at p. 86, 208 Cal.Rptr. 364.) In the instant case, however, defendant's motion to dismiss was based exclusively on statutory grounds and the magistrate dismissed the complaint solely for violation of the statute. Any denial of defendant's constitutional rights was never tendered to the lower courts and is not properly before us.

Upon remand, the superior court shall enter an order granting the People's motion to reinstate the complaint.

DISPOSITION

The order appealed from is reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REGAN, Acting P.J., and CARR, J., concur.

1 Section 1381.5, as it was in effect when defendant made his putative request thereunder, reads as follows: "Whenever a defendant has been convicted of a crime and has entered upon a term of imprisonment therefor in a federal correctional institution, and at the time of entry upon such term of imprisonment or at any time during such term of imprisonment there is pending in any court of this state any criminal indictment, information, complaint, or any criminal proceeding wherein the defendant remains to be sentenced the district attorney of the county in which such matters are pending, upon receiving from such defendant a request that he be brought to trial or for sentencing, shall promptly inquire of the warden or other head of the federal correctional institution in which such defendant is confined whether and when such defendant can be released for trial or for sentencing. If an assent from authorized federal authorities for release of the defendant for trial or sentencing is received by the district attorney he shall bring him to trial or sentencing within 90 days after receipt of such assent, unless the federal authorities specify a date of release after 90 days, in which event the district attorney shall bring the prisoner to trial or sentencing at such specified time, or unless the defendant requests, in open court, and receives, or, in open court, consents to, a continuance, in which event he may be brought to trial or sentencing within 90 days from such request or consent.

"If a defendant is not brought to trial or for sentencing as provided by this section, the court in which the action is pending shall, on motion or suggestion of the district attorney, or representative of the United States, or the defendant or his counsel, dismiss the action." (Stats.1971, ch. 1556, § 2, p. 3080.)

The statute has since been amended to restrict its application to federal correctional institutions "located in this state." (Stats.1983, ch. 793, § 1.1, p. ----.)

All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless indicated otherwise.

2 Consequences of a dismissal pursuant to section 1381 are summarized in People v. Manina (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 896, 120 Cal.Rptr. 51: "Such a dismissal, where the charge is a felony, is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense; it is res judicata of none of the issues of the action, and the defendant has not suffered prior jeopardy as a result. [Citations.] Nor does such a dismissal necessarily determine that the defendant has been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. For such a conclusion would be wholly...