People v. Garcia

Decision Date29 July 1999
Docket NumberNo. S059302,S059302
Citation980 P.2d 829,21 Cal.4th 1,87 Cal.Rptr.2d 114
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court
Parties, 21 Cal.4th 511A, 980 P.2d 829, 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6033, 1999 Daily Journal D.A.R. 7715 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Edwin Gilmore GARCIA, Defendant and Appellant

Steven J. Carroll, Public Defender, Karsten Boone, Beth Shoesmith, Laura Copsey and Gary R. Nichols, Deputy Public Defenders, for Defendant and Appellant.

Daniel E. Lungren and Bill Lockyer, Attorneys General, George Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Robert M. Foster, Megan J. Beale and David Delgado-Rucci, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

WERDEGAR, J.

This case presents the question of statutory interpretation we left "for another day" in People v. Davis (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1096, 1103, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 879, 938 P.2d 938: Under the provisions of the "Three Strikes" law allowing certain prior juvenile adjudications to be counted for sentencing purposes as prior felony convictions (Pen.Code, §§ 667, subd. (d)(3), 1170.12, subd. (b)(3)), 1 does a prior juvenile adjudication for an offense that would qualify as a prior felony conviction (a strike) if it were the subject of an adult conviction (§§ 667, subds. (d)(1), (d)(2), 1170.12, subds. (b)(1), (b)(2)) qualify as a strike if the offense is not also listed in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b)? We conclude such a prior adjudication does qualify as a strike if, in the prior juvenile proceeding, "[t]he juvenile was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court ... because the person committed an offense listed in subdivision (b) of Section 707 of the Welfare and Institutions Code." (§§ 667, subd. (d)(3)(D), 1170.12, subd. (b)(3)(D).)

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Defendant was charged with and convicted in a jury trial of one count each of residential burglary (§§ 459, 460) and possession of burglar's tools (§ 466). 2 Four prior juvenile adjudications for residential burglary, alleged pursuant to section 667, subdivisions (b) through (i), were tried to the court in a bifurcated proceeding. The trial court found all four priors true. In addition, the court, rejecting defendant's argument that juvenile adjudications could not be used for Three Strikes purposes because residential burglary is not an offense listed in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b) (hereafter Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(b)), found the priors valid as strikes. On the prosecutor's motion, the court dismissed three of the four prior adjudication allegations. The court then sentenced defendant to the middle term of four years for the current burglary, doubled to eight years under the Three Strikes law's second strike provision (§ 667, subd. (e)(1)).

The Court of Appeal affirmed, rejecting, as had the trial court, defendant's contention his prior juvenile adjudication did not qualify as a strike under section 667, subdivision (d)(3)(D), because residential burglary is not an offense listed in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(b). The Court of Appeal, following People v. Griggs (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 557, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 174, held that the Legislature's failure to include a reference to "serious and violent" offenses in section 667, subdivision (d)(3)(D) was a "drafting oversight" that should be judicially corrected. We granted review on defendant's petition.

DISCUSSION

Section 667, subdivision (d)(3) provides as follows: 3

"A prior juvenile adjudication shall constitute a prior felony conviction for purposes of sentence enhancement if:

"(A) The juvenile was 16 years of age or older at the time he or she committed the prior offense.

"(B) The prior offense is listed in subdivision (b) of Section 707 of the Welfare and Institutions Code or described in paragraph (1) [subdivision (d)(1) of section 667] or (2) [subdivision (d)(2) of section 667] as a felony.[ 4]

"(C) The juvenile was found to be a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the juvenile court law.

"(D) The juvenile was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court within the meaning of Section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code because the person committed an offense listed in subdivision (b) of Section 707 of the Welfare and Institutions Code."

For convenience, we will refer below to the four paragraphs of section 667, subdivision (d)(3) simply as paragraphs (A), (B), (C) and (D).

Paragraph (B) disjunctively cross-references three statutory lists of offenses: the list in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(b), which establishes a rebuttable presumption of unfitness for treatment under the juvenile court law for juveniles charged with such offenses (see Welf. & Inst.Code, § 707, subd. (c)); the list of "serious" offenses in section 1192.7, subdivision (c); and the list of "violent" offenses in section 667.5, subdivision (c). The latter two lists delineate, through cross-referencing in subdivisions (d)(1) and (d)(2) of section 667, the set of offenses that qualify as strikes when they are the subject of a prior adult conviction.

Paragraph (D), by contrast, refers only to a single statutory list: that contained in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(b).

Because the two sets of offenses referenced in paragraph (B) (Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(b) offenses, and "serious" or "violent" offenses) are not identical, section 667, subdivision (d)(3) would contain an internal conflict if the lists in paragraphs (B) and (D) were both understood as defining the set of juvenile offenses qualifying as strikes. Under paragraph (B) a given juvenile offense would qualify if it were listed in section 707(b) or if it were serious or violent; under paragraph (D), however, an offense would qualify only if it were listed in section 707(b). Because burglary of an inhabited dwelling is listed as "serious" (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(18)), but is not listed in section 707(b), defendant's prior juvenile adjudication for residential burglary would qualify under paragraph (B), but not under paragraph (D). 5

The parties' briefs, lower court opinions and our own research have disclosed a number of possible resolutions of this postulated internal conflict, all based on the premise the distinction between paragraphs (B) and (D) of section 667, subdivision (d)(3) is a result of "drafting error." As we demonstrate later, however, each such resolution would require the court to disregard one of the two assertedly conflicting paragraphs or to rewrite some of their provisions. Although we may properly decide upon such a construction or reformation when compelled by necessity and supported by firm evidence of the drafters' true intent (see, e.g., People v. Skinner (1985) 39 Cal.3d 765, 775, 217 Cal.Rptr. 685, 704 P.2d 752), we should not do so when the statute is reasonably susceptible to an interpretation that harmonizes all its parts without disregarding or altering any of them. "It is fundamental that legislation should be construed so as to harmonize its various elements without doing violence to its language or spirit." (Wells v. Marina City Properties, Inc. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 781, 788, 176 Cal.Rptr. 104, 632 P.2d 217.)

Rather than rewrite the statute in any way, therefore, we adopt an interpretation that harmonizes paragraphs (B) and (D), without doing violence to the language or spirit of section 667, subdivision (d)(3). In brief, we interpret paragraph (B) as setting out the list of prior juvenile offenses that will qualify as strikes and paragraph (D) as requiring, in addition, that in the prior juvenile proceeding giving rise to the qualifying adjudication the juvenile have been adjudged a ward of the court because of a Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(b) offense, whether or not that offense is the same as the offense currently alleged as a strike.

Our interpretation depends upon a close reading of the statutory language exactly as written. As indicated in its introductory clause, section 667, subdivision (d)(3) delineates the circumstances under which a "prior juvenile adjudication" qualifies as "a prior felony conviction" for Three Strikes purposes. Each paragraph sets forth a necessary circumstance.

Paragraph (A) requires that the juvenile was 16 years old or older "at the time he or she committed the prior offense." (§ 667, subd. (d)(3)(A).) Paragraph (A)'s reference to "the prior offense," in context, can only mean the offense that was the subject of a "prior juvenile adjudication" currently alleged as a "prior felony conviction," i.e., the prior offense currently alleged as a strike.

Paragraph (B), like paragraph (A), sets out a circumstance relating to "[t]he prior offense," requiring such offense to be listed in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(b) or to be a "serious" or "violent" felony. (§ 667, subd. (d)(3)(B).) Again, "[t]he prior offense" must, in context, be understood to mean the prior offense currently alleged as a strike.

Paragraph (C), unlike paragraphs (A) and (B), does not set forth a circumstance relating to "the prior offense." Instead, it requires that the juvenile "was found" to be fit for juvenile court proceedings. (§ 667, subd. (d)(3)(C).) In context, paragraph (C) requires that the fitness finding, although not necessarily limited to any particular prior offense, must have occurred in the proceeding that led to the prior juvenile adjudication currently alleged as a strike. In this context, had the Legislature intended that the fitness finding could have occurred at any time, and not necessarily in the proceeding that led to the prior juvenile adjudication currently alleged as a strike, it would have used language so indicating.

Paragraph (D), like paragraph (C) and unlike paragraphs (A) and (B), does not set forth a circumstance relating to "the prior offense." Instead, it requires that the juvenile "was adjudged" a ward under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602...

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