People v. Davis
Decision Date | 03 July 1997 |
Docket Number | No. S053934,S053934 |
Citation | 938 P.2d 938,64 Cal.Rptr.2d 879,15 Cal.4th 1096 |
Parties | , 938 P.2d 938, 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5306, 97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8604 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Robert Vonroski DAVIS, Defendant and Respondent. |
Court | California Supreme Court |
Daniel E. Lungren, Atty. Gen., George Williamson, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Ronald A. Bass, Asst. Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Engler and Joan Killeen, Deputy Attys. Gen., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Janice M. Brickley, under appointment by the Supreme Court, San Leandro, for Defendant and Respondent.
Francis J. Bardsley, Public Defender (San Diego), Greg S. Maizlish, Deputy Public Defender, Loren Warboys and Susan L. Burrell, San Francisco, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.
We granted review in this case to consider (1) whether for a prior juvenile adjudication to qualify as a "strike," the juvenile court must have expressly found the juvenile "to be a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the juvenile court law" (PEN.CODE, § 6671, subd. (d)(3)(C)), and (2) whether a prior juvenile adjudication for residential burglary qualifies as a "strike" (§ 667, subd. (d)(3)). We conclude that no express finding of fitness is required, and that under the circumstances of this case we need not reach the issue of whether a prior juvenile adjudication for residential burglary qualifies as a "strike." Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
By information filed on June 8, 1994, the Contra Costa County District Attorney charged defendant Robert Vonroski Davis (defendant) with one count of murder (§ 187), and one count of attempted murder (§§ 187, 664) with allegations as to both counts that he personally used a handgun (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). In addition, three prior convictions were alleged under section 667, subdivisions (b)-(i) ( ): a 1990 juvenile adjudication of felony assault (§ 245); a 1991 juvenile adjudication of residential burglary (§ 459, former § 460.1 [now § 460, subd. (a) ] ); and a 1993 adult robbery conviction (§ 211). Defendant pled not guilty and denied the prior conviction allegations.
Defendant subsequently moved to strike the two prior juvenile adjudications in part on the ground that they did not satisfy the terms of section 667, subdivision (d)(3). The trial court granted the motion.
The People appealed. While the appeal was pending, a jury convicted defendant of murder and attempted murder. The prior robbery conviction allegation was found true. Defendant was sentenced to 35 years to life with a consecutive term of life plus 5 years.
The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order striking the prior juvenile adjudication for residential burglary and reversed the trial court's order striking the prior juvenile adjudication for felony assault. On that same day, the court affirmed in a separate opinion defendant's convictions for murder and attempted murder.
We granted both the Attorney General's and defendant's petitions for review limited to the issues stated above, and subsequently designated the Attorney General petitioner for purposes of briefing and oral argument.
(People v. Hazelton (1996) 14 Cal.4th 101, 104, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 443, 926 P.2d 423.) The statute's unambiguous purpose is to provide greater punishment for recidivists. (§ 667, subd. (b).)
Section 667, subdivision (d)(3), 2 lists the requirements for a prior juvenile adjudication to qualify as a "strike." It provides:
Defendant contends that neither his prior juvenile adjudication for residential burglary nor for felony assault meets the requirements of section 667, subdivision (d)(3)(C) (subdivision (d)(3)(C)), because there was no express finding of fitness. Defendant further contends that his prior juvenile adjudication for residential burglary does not meet the requirements of section 667, subdivision (d)(3)(D)), because that offense is not included in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b), as it existed on June 30, 1993 (former section 707(b)). 3 We first consider the meaning of subdivision (d)(3)(C)'s requirement that the juvenile was "found to be a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the juvenile court law." Defendant contends that an express finding of fitness is required; the Attorney General asserts that an implied finding is sufficient. We agree with the Attorney General.
Under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, "Any person who is under the age of 18 years when he violates any law of this state or of the United States or any ordinance of any city or county of this state defining crime other than an ordinance establishing a curfew based solely on age, is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, which may adjudge such person to be a ward of the court." A petition under this section "is the equivalent of a complaint in the adult court." (1 Cal. Juvenile Court Practice (Cont. Ed. Bar 1981) § 1.8, p. 22.) The prosecutor may, however, also file a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707 seeking a determination that the minor is unfit for treatment in the juvenile court system. (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 707, subds. (a), (c).) When the juvenile is charged with a crime falling within former section 707(b), and a Welfare and Institutions Code section 707 petition is filed, the minor is "presumed to be not a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the juvenile court law unless the juvenile court concludes ... that the minor would be amenable to the care, treatment, and training program available through the facilities of the juvenile court based upon an evaluation of" various criteria. (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 707, subd. (c).) If the juvenile court makes a finding of fitness, it makes "[a] determination that the minor is a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the juvenile court law...." (Ibid.)
Thus, the only circumstance under which an express finding of fitness occurs in juvenile court is when the prosecutor unsuccessfully seeks to have the juvenile tried in adult court. Defendant therefore contends that the "use of this precise language which is only used within the context of a [section] 707 petition must have been intended as a requirement that there have been a fitness hearing and evaluation with supporting findings."
We disagree. An express finding of fitness is necessary in the context of a ruling on a Welfare and Institutions Code section 707 petition based on a former section 707(b) offense because the minor is presumed to be unfit. (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 707, subd. (c).) Thus, the juvenile court must explain why the presumption of unfitness was rebutted in that particular case.
Subdivision (d)(3)(C), however, refers neither to a Welfare and Institutions Code section 707 petition nor to an express finding of fitness. Rather, it merely requires that the juvenile was "found to be a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the juvenile court law." This, of course, includes the situation where a Welfare and Institutions Code section 707 petition based on a former section 707(b) offense was denied. It also reasonably includes the situation where the prosecutor does not file a Welfare and Institutions Code section 707 petition. As the Court of Appeal recognized, "[p]roceedings under section 602 with the resulting adjudication of wardship and treatment of the minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court constitute[ ] an implied finding that the minor is a 'fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the juvenile court law.' " By its terms, subdivision (d)(3)(C) requires a finding, not an express finding, of fitness. Accordingly, nothing in the subdivision's language precludes the inclusion of implied as well as express findings of fitness. Moreover, the suitability requirement helps distinguish those offenses committed by minors 16 or over that are adjudicated in juvenile court rather than as adult offenses. Indeed, if Finally, a conclusion that subdivision (d)(3)(C) requires an express...
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