People v. Geiselmann

• Decision Date: 22 August 1960
• Citation: 204 N.Y.S.2d 272,26 Misc.2d 34
• Parties: PEOPLE of The State of New York, Respondent, v. Gladys Ruth GEISELMANN, Appellant.
• Court: New York County Court

Page 272

204 N.Y.S.2d 272

26 Misc.2d 34

PEOPLE of The State of New York, Respondent, v. Gladys Ruth GEISELMANN, Appellant.

Ulster County Court.

Aug. 22, 1960.

George A. Beck, Kingston, for appellant Gladys Ruth geiselmann.

Raymond J. Mino, Dist. Atty., Kingston, for the People; James J. Murray, Asst. Dist. Atty., Ellenville, of counsel.

LOUIS G. BRUHN, Judge.

This is an appeal from a conviction for a violation of Section 1174(a) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law of the State of New York, rendered by the Hon. Warren McDowell, Justice of the Peace of the Town of Gardiner, after a trial without a jury. The case had been transferred to said Justice by this Court following an application pursuant to Section 702-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The Appellant predicates her relief on two grounds.

In the first place, she claims that to sustain a conviction for a violation of the Section in question the People must prove strict compliance with Subdivision Twenty of Section Fifteen of the Vehicle & Traffic Law.

This Court cannot agree that such quantum of proof is now necessary for a conviction.

The question of whether or not strict compliance was a necessary requisite most frequently arose in cases involving interpretations of Section 54 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law.

It is quite true that the rule of strict compliance had been invoked for a long time in such cases. People v. Wadsworth, 200 Misc. 1049, 108 N.Y.S.2d 224; People v. Longo, 9 Misc.2d 171, 172 N.Y.S.2d 633.

There appears little question that now the rule of strict compliance has yielded to one of substantial compliance.

In the case of People v. Burmann, 307 N.Y. 871, 122 N.E.2d 752, the defendant unsuccessfully argued 'that the placing of a sign on Franklin Avenue about 500 feet within the village limits instead of on the boundary line, as provided in Section 54 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, prohibited enforcement of the village ordinance limiting speed.'

Still more recently in the case of People v. Lathrop, 3 N.Y.2d 551, at page 553, 170 N.Y.S.2d 326, at page 327, the Court of Appeals stated:----

'There is ample evidence in the record to establish that section 54 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, Consol.Law, C. 71 was substantially complied with by the placement of speed signs in such a manner and at such locations as to afford this defendant fair notice of the limits of speed within the village (see People v. Burmann, 307 N.Y. 871, 122 N.E.2d 752).' (Italics supplied).

The Appellant places almost complete reliance to sustain her position on the case of People v. Belfer, Co.Ct., 141 N.Y.S.2d 124 which reversed a conviction reported in Police Ct., 133 N.Y.S.2d 179 for a violation of Section 81 subdivision 24 now covered by Section 1174.

She argues that the Burmann and Lathrop cases, supra, should be limited in their applications to violations of Section 54 and not to violations involving Section 1174 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law.

Such argument quickly dissipates since the Court in the Belfer case, supra, predicated its holding of compliance on the basis of People v. Resciniti, 191 Misc. 719, 81 N.Y.S.2d 338; People v. Wadsworth, 200 Misc. 1049, 108 N.Y.S.2d 224; People v. Schrader, 172 Misc. 246, 16 N.Y.S.2d 424 and People v. Hirshon, Co.Ct., 43 N.Y.S.2d 764, all of which involved violations of Section 54.

Obviously, the Belfer case, in predicating its determination on the basis of cases involving Section 54 violations, itself did not make the distinction urged by the Appellant, but, on the contrary, did the exact opposite and, therefore, should no longer be recognized as any authority whatever in view of the Burmann and Lathrop cases, supra.

Incidentally, in the Hirshon case, supra, 43 N.Y.S.2d at page 768, the Court stated:----

'and it is here contended, and apparently conceded from the proof, that, due to the fact that the signs could not all be placed exactly upon the boundary line of the City, one or more of them were placed at a distance or distances of approximately twenty feet therefrom. It is not contended that the signs would, in any way, fail to apprize the approaching motorist of the fact that he was entering the City and of the speed limit fixed by the City Ordinance. The fact that one or...