People v. Grant

• Decision Date: 13 July 1978
• Citation: 408 N.Y.S.2d 429,380 N.E.2d 257,45 N.Y.2d 366
• Parties: , 380 N.E.2d 257 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Nathaniel GRANT, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 429

408 N.Y.S.2d 429

45 N.Y.2d 366, 380 N.E.2d 257

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Nathaniel GRANT, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

July 13, 1978.

Paul F. McAloon and William E. Hellerstein, New York City, for appellant.

Robert M. Morgenthau, Dist. Atty. (Norman W. Barclay, Robert M. Pitler and Richard Hamburger, New York City, of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

WACHTLER, Judge.

The defendant, after being arrested and advised of his rights, requested the assistance of counsel. Ten minutes later, without having consulted an attorney, he was readvised of his rights, waived them and made a statement because, in the interim, the arresting officer had given him a fuller "explanation" or "understanding" by advising him of the strength of the case against him. A pretrial motion to suppress the confession was denied and, after the People had rested their case at trial, the defendant pleaded guilty to the murder count of an indictment charging him with murder and possession of a weapon.

On this appeal the defendant claims that the confession was obtained in violation of standards established in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, and thus should have been suppressed. He claims that the Miranda case establishes a per se rule prohibiting the police from resuming the interrogation, in the absence of counsel, once the defendant has requested an attorney's assistance. In the alternative he claims that the relinquishment of his rights was not voluntary, under Miranda standards, because the arresting officer disregarded his request for counsel and engaged in conduct which undermined, and was calculated to undermine, his decision to consult an attorney before answering questions. The People, in addition to disputing these points, urge that the denial of the motion, if erroneous, was harmless in light of the other evidence of defendant's guilt presented at trial prior to his plea of guilty.

On June 16, 1974 Earl Stokes was shot to death in a Manhattan apartment. Approximately one week later (June 24) a New York City police officer, Detective Campbell, arrested the defendant for the killing. At the time of the arrest a handgun, found in the defendant's room, was also seized. Detective Campbell took the defendant to the police station and, before advising him of his rights, asked the defendant if he was willing to talk to the District Attorney. The defendant said that he was. The officer then called an Assistant District Attorney who came to the station house accompanied by a stenographer. At 8:33 p. m. the defendant was taken before the prosecutor who advised him of his rights for the first time. When the defendant was informed of his right to have an attorney present during the questioning, he requested the assistance of counsel. The questioning was terminated and the defendant was taken from the room. Nothing, however, was done to assist the defendant in obtaining counsel. Instead Detective Campbell asked the prosecutor not to leave because he was going to speak to the defendant again.

As Detective Campbell was escorting the defendant from the interrogation room they passed the defendant's girlfriend who was proceeding toward the room. Then, according to the officer's testimony at the hearing, "I asked Mr. Grant why he agreed for the District Attorney to come down, and when he came down he didn't * * * now he doesn't want to speak to him, and I also explained to him that we had several witnesses against him, one being his girlfriend. There were two others that were playing cards at the scene, and I explained this to him. At this point he said that he wants to go see the District Attorney, he wants to speak to the District Attorney."

At 8:47 p. m. the defendant reappeared before the prosecutor and was readvised of his rights. When he was asked whether he was willing to answer questions without the presence of a lawyer the defendant responded "Yes, I'm willing to answer questions". The questioning continued as follows:

"Q. You indicated to me before you didn't want to talk to me without a lawyer.

"A. That's because I didn't fully understand.

"Q. Do you understand what I just said to you now?

"A. I understand.

"Q. Are you willing to talk to me even though you told me before you didn't want to talk to me.

"A. I didn't understand and the detective explained to me.

"Q. Did the detective explain anything different to you than I just explained.

"A. Not exactly, no. More or less what he said confirms what you said, but just that I didn't have the right knowledge of it."

Thus within approximately 10 minutes after requesting an attorney's assistance, the defendant waived his rights and confessed to the killing.

At the conclusion of the suppression hearing the court held the confession admissible on the ground that the defendant had knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights. Ruling from the Bench the court stated that the prosecutor had properly terminated the questioning when the defendant requested the assistance of counsel. The court held, however, that questioning could resume if the defendant changed his mind provided that did "not come about through coercion or abuse of official power." With respect to the comments made by Detective Campbell which led the defendant to waive the rights he had previously asserted the court concluded "that there was no coercive interrogation, that there were no threats, that there were no specific promises or inducements of any kind other than an opportunity for Mr. Grant to reconsider his position."

At trial the People submitted the confession in evidence and called three eyewitnesses who identified the defendant as the killer. The prosecutor also called a ballistics expert who testified that a bullet found under the victim's body was fired from the gun taken from the defendant's room. When the People rested the defendant offered to change his plea and, as noted, pleaded guilty to the murder count of the indictment. He was sentenced to 18 years to life imprisonment.

The Appellate Division affirmed, without opinion. Two Justices concurred in result holding that the confession should have been suppressed but that the error was harmless considering the other evidence submitted by the People at the aborted trial (59 A.D.2d 661, 398 N.Y.S.2d 279).

In the Miranda case the Supreme Court adopted "safeguards" to insure that statements obtained as a result of custodial interrogation are "truly the product of free choice" (Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. p. 457, 86 S.Ct. p. 1619). It is also basic, but important to emphasize at the outset in this case, that if the authorities to not observe these safeguards the resulting statement is not admissible in evidence even though it may not be said "to have been involuntary in traditional terms" (Miranda v. Arizona, supra, p. 457, 86 S.Ct. p. 1618; Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 445, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 41 L.Ed.2d 182; Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 99-100, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313).

In Miranda the court established two different types of safeguards. First it prescribed the now familiar Miranda warnings which the authorities must give to all persons held in custody before interrogation commences (see Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. p. 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602). Secondly the court established the less familiar procedures the police must follow if an individual asserts his rights by requesting counsel or electing to remain silent.

With respect to the right to remain silent the court stated: "If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked" (Miranda v. Arizona, supra, pp. 473-474, 86 S.Ct. p. 1628). In a footnote, however, the court suggested that "If an individual indicates his desire to remain silent, but has an attorney present, there may be some circumstances in which further questioning would be permissible. In the absence of evidence of overbearing, statements then made in the presence of counsel might be free of the compelling influence of the interrogation process and might fairly be construed as a waiver of the privilege for purposes of these statements" (Miranda v. Arizona, supra, p. 474, n. 44, 86 S.Ct. p. 1627).

With respect to a request for counsel the court was apparently more specific: "If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease Until an attorney is present. At that time, the individual must have an opportunity to confer with the attorney and to have him present during any subsequent questioning. If the individual cannot obtain an attorney and he indicates that he wants one before speaking to police, they must respect his decision to remain silent" (Miranda v. Arizona, supra, p. 474, 86 S.Ct. p. 1628 (emphasis added)).

In Miranda and the companion cases the court suppressed all the statements because it found that none of the defendants had been given adequate warnings. It thus had no occasion to consider the application of the procedures it had indicated should be followed when a defendant asserts his rights. It was not until the recent case of Michigan v. Mosley (423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313, Supra ) that the court was presented with a claim that the police had violated the second level safeguards by renewing interrogation after the defendant asserted his rights.

In Mosley the defendant was arrested for two robberies and was advised of his rights. He stated that he did not want to...