People v. Gray, 4
| Decision Date | 30 October 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 4,4 |
| Citation | 393 Mich. 1,222 N.W.2d 515 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William Henry GRAY, Defendant-Appellant. 393 Mich. 1, 222 N.W.2d 515 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Donald A. Burge, (P 11399), Pros. Atty., by Stephen M. Wheeler, Chief of Appellate Div., Kalamazoo, for defendant-appellant.
State Appellate Defender Office, by Marshall S. Redman, Asst. Defender, Detroit, Judith K. Munger, Asst. Defender, Detroit, Mark Thiron, Research Asst., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before the Entire Bench.
Defendant appeals his conviction of uttering and publishing a forged check. 1 He makes five assertions of error.
One assertion of error has to do with the constitutionality of the uttering and publishing statute, and that subject is controlled by our decision in People v. Hall, 391 Mich. 175; 215 N.W.2d 166 (1974).
We granted leave in order to determine whether it is error to admit a statement made by a defendant which had been ruled inadmissible in a prior Walker hearing 2 held in connection with a different charge.
The facts which are necessary to consider in this regard are the following:
Defendant was arrested near a certain market where he had negotiated a check. Upon his arrest, after being advised of his rights according to the testimony of one of the arresting officers, the defendant stated that his name was 'Joses Anderson' the payee of the check which name the defendant had endorsed on the check in order to cash it in the store.
Defendant was taken to the sheriff's office in Kalamazoo County Building where, according to the police, he was again advised of his rights, and made a second statement in which he admitted cashing the check and told the officers where he had put the proceeds of the check. Approximately a half hour later when they could not find the money in the place described in the defendant's statement, the police questioned the defendant for the third time in a 'holdover' cell in the jail.
During this third interrogation the defendant appeared to be ill. He stated that he was a heroin addict and had methadone in his possession. He was taken to the hospital. Subsequently he was charged with unlawful possession of a narcotic. 3
In he prosecution on the narcotic charge, a Walker hearing was held, and the court determined that the last two statements were not voluntary and accordingly granted the motion to suppress them.
In the trial of the uttering and publishing charge the first two statements were admitted without objection on the part of defense counsel.
It is urged on appeal that to admit the second statement after it was determined to be not voluntary is error, for under the doctrine of collateral estoppel that issue can never be re-litigated.
The prosecutor maintains that a Walker hearing does not result in final determination of fact to which the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies.
We disagree with the prosecutor that a Walker hearing does not result in a final determination of fact. In People v. Robinson, 386 Mich. 551, 194 N.W.2d 709 (1972) we held that the determination of involuntariness at a Walker hearing was a factual determination. As such we are satisfied that it should be binding on the People for all purposes under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. We see no good purpose to be served by re-litigating the question of voluntariness when that matter has been fully and fairly presented to...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Goss, 97021
...Iowa L.R. 281, n 1 (1980).3 See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 1194, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970).4 See, e.g., People v. Gray, 393 Mich. 1, 4, 222 N.W.2d 515 (1974) (a prior determination of the issue of voluntariness of a confession is "binding on the people for all purposes u......
-
People v. Manning
...361 U.S. 199, 206, 80 S.Ct. 274, 4 L.Ed.2d 242 (1960). 31. People v. Gray, 45 Mich.App. 643, 644, 207 N.W.2d 161 (1973), aff'd. 393 Mich. 1, 222 N.W.2d 515 (1974). 32. People v. Leonard, 81 Mich.App. 86, 89, 264 N.W.2d 130 (1978). 33. Riverside Co., supra at 57, 111 S.Ct. 1661. 34. Cipriano......
-
Peterson v. Heymes
...is a factual determination of voluntariness, on the merits, and is binding for the purpose of collateral estoppel. People v. Gray , 393 Mich. 1, 222 N.W.2d 515, 517 (1974). Defendants conclude that vacating the judgment of conviction does not require the determination that a confession was ......
-
People v. Goss
...proceeding, did not necessarily determine that the defendant was not guilty of the offense charged; see also People v. Gray, 393 Mich. 1, 4, 222 N.W.2d 515 (1974), where the Supreme Court held that the determination of involuntariness at a hearing held pursuant to People v. Walker, 374 Mich......