People v. Gutierrez
Decision Date | 06 March 2003 |
Docket Number | No. S102162.,S102162. |
Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Raul Gomez GUTIERREZ, Defendant and Appellant. |
Court | California Supreme Court |
Tracy J. Dressner, La Crescenta, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Maureen J. Shanahan, Malibu, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner and Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Marc E. Turchin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Robert F. Katz, Karla Cottis and David C. Cook, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Certiorari Denied October 14, 2003. See 124 S.Ct. 406.
In a noncapital felony case, Penal Code1 section 1043, subdivision (b)(2), permits a trial court to continue with trial in a defendant's absence, after the trial has commenced in the defendant's presence, if the defendant is "voluntarily absent." We must decide here whether a defendant in custody who refuses to leave a court lockup facility to attend his trial is "voluntarily absent," and if, under these circumstances, the trial court must obtain the defendant's express waiver of the right to be present. Contrary to the Court of Appeal majority, we conclude that the defendant here was "voluntarily absent," and that his express waiver was not necessary.
Defendant Raul Gomez Gutierrez, along with codefendant Elisaldo Abrego, was charged in connection with the April 7, 2000, robbery of Anabel Bustamante and Adan Sanchez. Their trial began on August 21, 2000. On the second day of the three-day trial, defense counsel informed the court that defendant refused to leave the court lockup. Meanwhile, Abrego pleaded guilty to the charges.
On August 22, defense counsel, along with a court reporter, bailiff, and court-appointed Spanish interpreter, went to the lockup to speak to defendant about his refusal to leave the lockup, and his request for a new attorney his family purportedly hired.2 The following conversation took place:
Returning to the courtroom without defendant, defense counsel recounted his conversation to the trial judge outside the presence of the jury. The bailiff confirmed that defense counsel's summary was "exactly the way I saw it and heard it as well." The judge asked the bailiff if he was "satisfied also that [defendant] is freely and voluntarily and of his own will refusing to make an appearance in the courtroom." The bailiff responded "yes." Relying on the authority of People v. Parento (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1378, 1 Cal. Rptr.2d 444, the trial judge ruled that the trial would proceed in defendant's absence. Defense counsel objected that "despite it being my client's wishes, I believe it will have a severe, adverse—very severe, adverse impact on the jury"; counsel also lodged a continuing objection. Defense counsel did not waive defendant's right to presence.
The trial judge admonished the jury not to consider or speculate about defendant's absence: "It must not affect your verdict or be considered by you in the course of your deliberations." At the start of the afternoon session, the bailiff spoke to defendant, who stated he did not wish to return to the courtroom. The record reflected that defendant told the bailiff that "he wanted to stay in the lockup." At that time, the judge informed defense counsel that "[w]e'll keep ordering him out and keep inquiring of him." During defendant's absence, defense counsel cross-examined victim Bustamante, and victim Sanchez and two police officers testified.
After a one-day absence, defendant returned to the courtroom for closing arguments. Defense counsel, on the record, stated: The trial judge replied:
The jury found defendant guilty of second degree robbery of Sanchez, and attempted second degree robbery of Bustamante. Defendant appealed, arguing that, among other things, the trial court erred by concluding defendant voluntarily absented himself from trial without questioning defendant personally about his desire to be absent.
The Court of Appeal majority reversed the trial court's judgment. It concluded the trial court denied defendant's rights to confrontation and due process "[b]y failing to make any effort to obtain a waiver from" him. Relying on federal authority, the majority concluded that because defendant was in custody in the court's lockup, he was "present" in court and did not "voluntarily absent" himself. The majority also determined the error prejudiced defendant because it was likely that defendant's one-day absence from the courtroom influenced the jury's attitude towards him. Also, defendant's presence was critical to his defense because defendant could have assisted counsel during cross-examination of prosecution witnesses.
The dissenting justice, however, believed that defendant was trying to "manipulate the court" by refusing to leave the lockup to speak with the trial judge, and that defendant "voluntarily absented" himself. "By refusing to appear in the courtroom, [defendant] deliberately attempted to bring a halt to his trial and force the trial judge to start proceedings again with new counsel." The dissenting justice disagreed with the majority that the trial judge should have sought, or made attempts to seek, a waiver from defendant personally.
We granted the People's petition for review, limiting the issue to whether a custodial defendant who refuses to leave the court lockup to attend his trial is "voluntarily absent" under section 1043, subdivision (b)(2), and whether the defendant's express waiver of the right to presence is required under the circumstances.
"An appellate court applies the independent or de novo standard of review to a trial court's exclusion of a criminal defendant from trial, either in whole or in part, insofar as the trial court's decision entails a measurement of the facts against the law." (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 741, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46.)
A criminal defendant's right to be present at trial is protected under both the federal and state Constitutions. (U.S. Const, 6th & 14th Amends.; United States v. Gagnon (1985) 470 U.S. 522, 526, 105 S.Ct. 1482, 84 L.Ed.2d 486; Cal. Const, art. I, § 15; People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 741, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46.) "The constitutional right to presence is rooted to a large extent in the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, [citation], but we have recognized that this right is protected by the Due Process Clause in some situations where the defendant is not actually confronting witnesses or evidence against him." (United States v. Gagnon, supra, 470 U.S. at p. 526, 105 S.Ct. 1482.) Our state Constitution guarantees that "[t]he defendant in a criminal cause has the right ... to be personally present with counsel, and to be confronted with the witnesses against the defendant." (Cal. Const, art. I, § 15.)
Sections 977 and 1043 implement the state constitutional protection. (People v. Douglas (1990) 50 Cal.3d 468, 517, 268 Cal.Rptr. 126, 788 P.2d 640, disapproved on another point in People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 933, fn. 4, 269 Cal. Rptr. 269, 790 P.2d 676.) Section 977, subdivision ...
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...and 1043, which similarly mandate the defendant's presence at trial unless a waiver is submitted. (See People v. Gutierrez (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1196, 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 917, 63 P.3d 1000.) Despite the statutory mandate in sections 977 and 1043, we have regularly applied a harmless-error analysis ......
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...following his assault on counsel, to attend on those days that he did not wish to do so. (See People v. Gutierrez (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1196, 1208, 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 917, 63 P.3d 1000.)9 Defendant further maintains that, no matter what statutory law may provide, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to ......
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...and at " all other proceedings" unless he or she has properly executed a written waiver. (See People v. Gutierrez (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1196, 1203, 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 917, 63 P.3d 1000.)The question here involves the interplay, if any, between section 1305(a) and section 977(b)(1) : If a defendant......
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...and at " all other proceedings" unless he or she has properly executed a written waiver. (See People v. Gutierrez (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1196, 1203, 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 917, 63 P.3d 1000.)The question here involves the interplay, if any, between section 1305(a) and section 977(b)(1) : If a defendant......