People v. Guzman

• Decision Date: 01 May 1990
• Citation: 556 N.Y.S.2d 7,555 N.E.2d 259,76 N.Y.2d 1
• Parties: , 555 N.E.2d 259 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Heriberto GUZMAN, Also Known as Herberto Guzman, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 7

556 N.Y.S.2d 7

76 N.Y.2d 1, 555 N.E.2d 259

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Heriberto GUZMAN, Also Known as Herberto Guzman, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

May 1, 1990.

Steven A. Feldman, New York City, and Arza R. Feldman, for appellant.

Robert M. Morgenthau, Dist. Atty. (Joseph J. Dawson, New York City, and Phyllis A. Monroe, of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

WACHTLER, Chief Judge.

The question presented in this case is whether a hearing-impaired person is, by reason of that impairment, disqualified from service as a juror. We agree with the courts below, based on their factual determinations concerning the abilities of the prospective juror and the interpreter assigned to assist him, that the prospective juror's deafness did not render him "incapable of performing in a reasonable manner the duties of a juror" (Judiciary Law § 510[3].

I.

Defendant was tried and convicted on a charge of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree (Penal Law § 220.39) for selling $20 worth of cocaine to an undercover police officer. The events relevant to this appeal, however, occurred before the presentation of any evidence and the central character is one who took no part in the trial. Alec Naiman was, at the time of trial, 29 years old, a student at New York University and a resident of New York County. He was summoned for jury duty and appeared as part of the pool of prospective jurors for defendant's trial. Mr. Naiman speaks English, reads English and writes English, but he cannot hear. ¹ Although he is able to read lips, he was assisted during jury selection by a court-appointed sign language interpreter. He explained that, through lip-reading, "I can see everything about the person, I can feel the tone, I can see the tone, the inflection of the person, but I can never get full verbatim. That is why I prefer to use the interpreter." Mr. Naiman and the interpreter communicated using signed English, a signing technique that transmits the speaker's words literally, without any intervening translation. ² The interpreter assured the court that she was familiar with and would abide by the code of ethics for sign language interpreters and that she would limit her role to that of a "communications facilitator."

Defendant challenged the prospective juror for cause, asserting among other reasons that the juror's hearing impairment would prevent him from judging the witnesses' credibility and that the interpreter's presence in the jury room would inhibit deliberations and violate the confidentiality of the deliberative process. Supreme Court rejected the challenge, concluding that the juror's deafness would not prevent him from performing the duties of a juror in a reasonable manner and that the concerns about the interpreter's presence in the jury room were unfounded (see, People v. Guzman, 125 Misc.2d 457, 478 N.Y.S.2d 455).

Defendant nevertheless excluded the prospective juror by exercising a peremptory challenge. He exhausted his remaining peremptory challenges before jury selection was complete and thus preserved for appellate review his challenge to the court's ruling (see, CPL 270.20[2]; People v. Blyden, 55 N.Y.2d 73, 76, 447 N.Y.S.2d 886, 432 N.E.2d 758). As noted, the ensuing trial resulted in a guilty verdict.

The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, 148 A.D.2d 350, 538 N.Y.S.2d 986, adopting the reasons stated by Supreme Court with respect to the juror qualification issue. That is the only issue raised on appeal to this court.

II.

Under prior law, which required among other qualifications that a juror "[b]e in the possession of his natural faculties" (Judiciary Law former § 504[3]; § 596[3]; § 662[3] [repealed L.1977, ch. 316, § 1], a profound sensory impairment automatically disqualified a juror (see, Matter of Lewinson v. Crews, 28 A.D.2d 111, 282 N.Y.S.2d 83, affd. on opn. below 21 N.Y.2d 898, 289 N.Y.S.2d 619, 236 N.E.2d 853, appeal dismissed 393 U.S. 13, 89 S.Ct. 46, 21 L.Ed.2d 12). In 1977, juror qualification requirements were consolidated in Judiciary Law § 510 (L.1977, ch. 316, § 2) but, although the language of the statute was otherwise changed, the reference to "natural faculties" was retained (Judiciary Law former § 510[3]. In 1983, however, that requirement was replaced by the current language of section 510(3) (L.1983, ch. 474, § 1). The statute now provides that a juror must "[n]ot have a mental or physical condition, or combination thereof, which causes the person to be incapable of performing in a reasonable manner the duties of a juror."

The avowed purpose of the amendment was to end the automatic exclusion of disabled persons by "shifting the emphasis from pre-determination to the capability of the individual to perform the duties of a juror in a reasonable manner" (see, Legislative Mem., an act to amend the Judiciary Law in relation to qualifications for jury duty--purpose of the bill, Bill Jacket, L.1983, ch. 474). The amendment was prompted in part by a concern that the exclusion of disabled persons from jury service contravened Federal regulations implementing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 794), which prohibits handicap-based discrimination in programs and activities that receive Federal financial assistance.

Thus, there is no longer a blanket statutory prohibition against jury service by those, such as the juror in this case, whose hearing is impaired to a profound degree. The question in each case, assuming that the prospective juror is otherwise qualified, must be whether the individual is capable of doing what jurors are supposed to do. The statute requires no more; defendant's constitutional rights to a fair trial and to trial by jury demand no less.

At a minimum, a juror must be able to understand all of the evidence presented, evaluate that evidence in a rational manner, communicate effectively with the other jurors during deliberations, and comprehend the applicable legal principles, as instructed by the court. In addition, any accommodation that may be necessary to allow the juror to fulfill these duties--in this case, for example, the presence of a sign language interpreter during the trial and deliberations--must not itself interfere with defendant's fundamental trial rights. In short, although the citizens of this State have a civil right to serve as jurors (see, People v. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d 638, 555 N.Y.S.2d 647, 554 N.E.2d 1235), this right is conditioned on the individual's ability to carry out the primary function of the jury--to provide a fair trial. We conclude that the juror's impairment was not in that respect a disability.

III.

As with most juror qualification questions, the determination whether a hearing-impaired person can provide reasonable jury service in a given case must be left largely to the discretion of the trial court, which can question and observe the prospective juror and the interpreter during the voir dire (see, People v. Williams, 63 N.Y.2d 882, 885, 483 N.Y.S.2d 198, 472 N.E.2d 1026). Here, in light of the juror's ability to speak English fluently, read lips and communicate readily in signed English, the trial court concluded that he would "do as fine a job or better than many of the...