People v. Hadfield

• Decision Date: 24 July 2014
• Citation: 990 N.Y.S.2d 341,2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 05462,119 A.D.3d 1224
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Adam M. HADFIELD, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

119 A.D.3d 1224

990 N.Y.S.2d 341

2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 05462

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.Adam M. HADFIELD, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

July 24, 2014.

John A. Cirando, Syracuse, for appellant.

Alexander Lesyk, Special Prosecutor, Norwood, for respondent.

Before: STEIN, J.P., McCARTHY, EGAN JR., LYNCH and CLARK, JJ.

LYNCH, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of St. Lawrence County (Richards, J.), rendered October 7, 2011, convicting defendant following a nonjury trial of the crime of assault in the second degree.

Defendant was convicted, after a nonjury trial, of assault in the second degree. The charge stemmed from his conduct, while incarcerated at the St. Lawrence County Correctional Facility, in kicking another inmate in the face during a game in the recreational yard.¹ When questioned by Correction Sergeant Jeffrey Bercume, defendant admitted that he had kicked the victim in the face because he was annoyed with him, but asserted that it had been accidental. The incident was recorded by facility cameras, and a video thereof was played and admitted into evidence at trial. Upon his conviction, defendant was sentenced as a second felony offender to a prison term of seven years with three years of postrelease supervision, to be served concurrently to the aggregate 53–year prison term imposed on the same date for unrelated convictions. Defendant now appeals.

Contrary to defendant's claims, the verdict is supported by legally sufficient evidence and is not contrary to the weight of the credible evidence ( see People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 [1987];see also People v. Cahill, 2 N.Y.3d 14, 57–58, 777 N.Y.S.2d 332, 809 N.E.2d 561 [2003] ). To prove that defendant committed the crime of assault in the second degree as charged, the People were required to establish that, while incarcerated after having been charged or convicted of a crime, defendant intentionally caused physical injury to another person ( seePenal Law § 120.05[7] ). Defendant conceded that, at the time of the incident, he was incarcerated and had been charged with numerous sex offenses and other crimes; he challenges only the evidence of his intent and of the victim's physical injuries. Viewing the evidence, particularly the video of the assault, in the light most favorable to the People and affording them the benefit of every favorable inference, as we must on a legal sufficiency review ( see People v. Cabey, 85 N.Y.2d 417, 420, 626 N.Y.S.2d 20, 649 N.E.2d 1164 [1995];People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932 [1983] ), we find that the People established beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant intentionally caused physical injury to the victim ( see People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d at 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672). His intent was readily inferable from the deliberate, forceful and unprovoked conduct itself and the surrounding circumstances, all of which were clearly captured on the video ( see People v. Rodriguez, 17 N.Y.3d 486, 489, 933 N.Y.S.2d 631, 957 N.E.2d 1133 [2011];People v. Bracey, 41 N.Y.2d 296, 301, 392 N.Y.S.2d 412, 360 N.E.2d 1094 [1977];People v. Johnson, 107 A.D.3d 1161, 1163, 967 N.Y.S.2d 217 [2013],lv. denied21 N.Y.3d 1075, 974 N.Y.S.2d 324, 997 N.E.2d 149 [2013];People v. Ford, 90 A.D.3d 1299, 1300, 935 N.Y.S.2d 368 [2011],lv. denied18 N.Y.3d 994, 945 N.Y.S.2d 648, 968 N.E.2d 1004 [2012] ).The People proved that the victim had sustained “physical injury” with evidence that he remained crouched down for several minutes after the assault and was later found disoriented and injured in his cell with a swollen face and cut lip, experiencing a high level of pain. The victim had no memory of the incident or of the surrounding time period, and the medical evidence established that he had sustained a concussion ( seePenal Law § 10.00[9]; People v. Hines, 9 A.D.3d 507, 511, 780 N.Y.S.2d 419 [2004],lv. denied3 N.Y.3d 707, 785 N.Y.S.2d 34, 818 N.E.2d 676 [2004];People v. Mack, 301 A.D.2d 863, 755 N.Y.S.2d 437 [2003],lv. denied100 N.Y.2d 540, 763 N.Y.S.2d 6, 793 N.E.2d 420 [2003] ). As “there is a[ ] valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could lead a rational person to the conclusion reached by the [factfinder] on the basis of the evidence at trial” ( People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d at 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672), we find that the evidence was legally sufficient.

Upon our independent review of the weight of the credible evidence, we find that, in light of the video of the assault unmistakably demonstrating defendant's intent to cause physical injury to the victim, a different verdict would have been unreasonable ( see People v. Johnson, 24 A.D.3d 803, 804, 806 N.Y.S.2d 251 [2005];People v. Clark, 284 A.D.2d 725, 727, 728 N.Y.S.2d 528 [2001] ). Even if a different verdict would have been reasonable ( see People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d at 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672;see also People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 643, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902 [2006] ), viewing the probative force of the conflicting evidence in a neutral light and according deference to the credibility determinations of County Court, as factfinder, given its ability to view the witnesses firsthand, we are satisfied that the verdict was not contrary to the weight of the evidence ( see People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d at 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672;see also People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 348, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 [2007];People v. Mitchell, 57 A.D.3d 1308, 1309–1310, 871 N.Y.S.2d 445 [2008] ). The court rationally rejected as incredible defendant's explanation that his actions in kicking the victim in the face were accidental or part of the game, as his conduct can only reasonably be viewed as intentional.

Contrary to defendant's claims, his statement to Bercume was not the result of a custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings. While Bercume admittedly did not administer such warnings prior to questioning defendant about the incident, Miranda warnings are only required prior to questioning an inmate in a prison setting where “the circumstances of the detention and interrogation ... entail added constraint that would lead a prison inmate reasonably to believe that there has been a restriction on that person's freedom over and above that of ordinary confinement in a correctional facility” ( People v. Alls, 83 N.Y.2d 94, 100, 608 N.Y.S.2d 139, 629 N.E.2d 1018 [1993],cert. denied511 U.S. 1090, 114 S.Ct. 1850, 128 L.Ed.2d 474 [1994];see People v. Passino, 53 A.D.3d 204, 205–206, 861 N.Y.S.2d 168 [2008],affd.12 N.Y.3d 748, 876 N.Y.S.2d 700, 904 N.E.2d 837 [2009] ). At the Huntley hearing, Bercume testified that he viewed the video recording of the incident, and then went to defendant's single cell around 10:40 p.m., after the inmates had been locked down for the night. He entered the cell, which remained unlocked, and asked defendant “if he had any idea what occurred in the rec yard” to the victim. Defendant initially denied any knowledge of the incident but, when Bercume told him that he had viewed a video of the incident, defendant stated that he had become agitated with the victim and had asked him to stop doing something, and, when the victim continued to annoy him, defendant kicked him in the face. The entire conversation lasted about five minutes, defendant was not transported to an isolated location, handcuffed or restrained, Bercume was unarmed and no one else was present. We find that the interaction was “analogous to the relatively brief, generally public, or otherwise on-the-scene investigatory detentions in nonprison settings found not custodial for Miranda purposes” ( People v. Alls, 83 N.Y.2d at 100, 608 N.Y.S.2d 139, 629 N.E.2d 1018). As the record is devoid of any proof of “added constraint ... over and above that of ordinary confinement in a correctional facility,” the questioning was not custodial for purposes of Miranda, and Miranda warnings were not required ( People v. Alls, 83 N.Y.2d at 100, 608 N.Y.S.2d 139, 629 N.E.2d 1018;see People v. Passino, 53 A.D.3d at 205–206, 861 N.Y.S.2d 168;compare People v. Gause, 50 A.D.3d 1392, 1393, 856 N.Y.S.2d 287 [2008];People v. Van Patten, 48 A.D.3d 30, 33–34, 850 N.Y.S.2d 213 [2007],lv. denied10 N.Y.3d 845, 859 N.Y.S.2d 404, 889 N.E.2d 91 [2008] ).

Defendant further argues that his indelible right to counsel was violated when he was questioned in jail about this assault at a time when he was represented by counsel on pending charges for which he was incarcerated, and that his statement should have been suppressed. “Under New York's indelible right to counsel rule, a defendant in custody in connection with a criminal matter for which he [or she] is represented by counsel may not be interrogated in the absence of his [or her] attorney with respect to that matter or an unrelated matter unless he [or she] waives the right to counsel in the presence of his [or her] attorney” ( People v. Lopez, 16 N.Y.3d 375, 377, 923 N.Y.S.2d 377, 947 N.E.2d 1155 [2011] ). Relevant to this inquiry is whether the correction officer knew or should be charged with the knowledge of defendant's representation by counsel on the unrelated charge ( see id. at 382, 923 N.Y.S.2d 377, 947 N.E.2d 1155). While defendant raised this issue in his stipulation in lieu of motions, he did not pursue it at the suppression hearing and his request to reopen the hearing was denied. However, “a claimed deprivation of the State...