People v. Hannagan

• Decision Date: 25 January 1967
• Docket Number: Cr. 11670
• Citation: 248 Cal.App.2d 107,56 Cal.Rptr. 429
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Edward HANNAGAN, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 429

56 Cal.Rptr. 429

248 Cal.App.2d 107

The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Edward HANNAGAN, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 11670.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California.

Jan. 25, 1967.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 24, 1967.

Hearing Denied March 22, 1967.

Henry P. Crabtree, Long Beach, for appellant. ^*

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Howard J. Bechefsky, Deputy Atty. Gen.

ROTH, Presiding Justice.

On January 11, 1962, appellant pleaded guilty to one of two counts of an information charging violations of section 11501 of the Health and Safety Code. On January 31, 1962, the criminal proceedings were suspended. Pursuant to then Penal Code, section 6451 (now Welfare & Inst. Code, § 3051) appellant was referred to department 95 of the superior court to determine his suitability for commitment to the narcotics rehabilitation program. On February 7, 1962, appellant was certified for further proceedings in accordance with Welfare & Inst. Code, section 3051.

The court said: 'Mr. Hannagan, I have been advised that there are facilities available in the Department of Corrections for you if I certify you to Department 95 for further proceedings. I am going to do that. I am going to certify you * * * pursuant to Section 6451 of the Penal Code for examination on the question of narcotic addiction. The order is signed and you are certified over there.'

The minute order reflecting the proceedings includes the statement '* * * criminal proceedings are now adjourned.'

Appellant spent the next three and one-half years in various levels of treatment under the narcotics rehabilitation program. On July 26, 1965, a letter signed 'Roland W. Wood, Superintendent,' of the Department of Corrections, California Rehabilitation Center at Corona was addressed to and received by the presiding judge of department 95 of the superior court, Los Angeles County. In pertinent part, the letter states:

'Pursuant to the provisions of Penal Code Section 6453 and the authority granted me by the Director of Corrections under Penal Code Section 5055, I hereby certify that Edward Hannagan is not a fit subject for confinement or treatment in the California Rehabilitation Center. This referral to the Court is based on his continuing acts of violence as outlined below and apparent inability to benefit from this program.'

On September 15, 1965, criminal proceedings were reinstituted at the point at which they were adjourned on February 7, 1962. Appellant was sentenced to state prison.

Appellant contends on this appeal that:

1) the trial court was without power to reassume criminal jurisdiction;

2) his rejection from the narcotics program was improper;

3) failure to give him a judicial hearing on his rejection violated due process. He asks that he be returned to the superior court for appropriate commitment under the rehabilitation program or, in the alternative that the criminal proceedings be dismissed.

Section 3051 of the Welfare & Institutions Code ¹ provides that upon conviction of a defendant for any crime, if it appears that he may be addicted to, or in imminent danger of addiction to narcotics, the trial judge 'shall adjourn the proceedings or suspend the imposition of the sentence' in order that it may be determined whether a defendant is addicted and suitable for treatment in a narcotic detention facility.

Section 3053 provides that if at any time after 60 days following receipt of a defendant at a narcotics facility the Director of Corrections determines that a defendant is not a fit subject for confinement or treatment in such facility, he may return defendant to the court in which the case originated for such further proceedings on the criminal charges as that court may deem warranted.

This procedure was followed here. Appellant contends, however, that since the specific reference to either 'adjourning' or 'suspending' criminal proceedings appears in the minute order only and does not appear in the statement of the trial judge as heretofore excerpted from the reporter's transcript, the original trial court could not reassume criminal jurisdiction even after a justifiable return of appellant, as contemplated by section 3053. As we understand appellant's point, it is that the words 'criminal proceedings are now adjourned' which are contained in the minute order, were not uttered by the trial judge, and because of this omission, the proceedings are so defective that the court has lost jurisdiction.

People v. Moreno, 235 Cal.App.2d 386, 45 Cal.Rptr. 243, fn. 1, holds that an order adjourning or suspending criminal proceedings divests the criminal court of jurisdiction of a case, but only until such time as the defendant is properly returned to that court under section 3053. To retain jurisdiction, the incantation of statutory language by a trial judge is not important. It is important for the record to make clear that the statutory procedure is being followed. The statement of the court, the minute order, and the proceedings which followed, demonstrate what the court Did. Appellant was not prejudiced by the failure of the judge to use statutory language when orally indicating that he was making a reference as permitted by section 3051. The provisions for rehabilitative treatment of narcotic offenders are intended to provide, where possible, a corrective alternative to confinement in prison; they make no change in the law which makes possession or sale of narcotics a criminal offense.

Appellant also challenges the validity of his rejection from the rehabilitation program. He contends first that the statutory standard for rejection referred to in the letter, to wit: 'because of excessive criminality or for other relevant reason,' is unconstitutionally vague. ² The letter, however, does not merely use the phrase. It consists of three pages and sets forth probative facts which fully justify the quoted phrase in characterizing appellant's fitness for the program.

The quoted phrase does not give unbounded discretion to the Director to reject a person from the program. The 'other reason,' to be 'relevant,' must relate to his fitness for 'confinement or treatment in such * * * rehabilitation facility.' (See In re Swearingen, 64 Cal.2d 519, 521, 50 Cal.Rptr. 787, 789, 413 P.2d 675, 677.) In In re Rascon, 64 Cal.2d 523, 528, 50 Cal.Rptr. 790, 413 P.2d 678, both the previous failure of a defendant to profit from a similar narcotics program and his 'apparent lack of motivation for change' were sustained as other relevant reasons for his rejection.

The latest judicial interpretation of 'relevant reason' appears in People v. Marquez, 245 A.C.A. 269, 53 Cal.Rptr. 854. The court says at pp. 272, 273, 53 Cal.Rptr. at p. 857:

'But whether or not any given defendant can be treated with success is a fact which, in the last analysis, must be determined not by judges but by people trained in that field and actually engaged in the treatment process. Hence, out of practical necessity, the statute leaves to the professional experts the final decision on whether or not treatment should be begun or be continued.

'While the program is partly for the protection of the addict, its primary purpose is 'the prevention of contamination of others and the protection of the public.' (Welf. & Inst.Code § 3000, formerly Pen.Code § 6399.) It follows that the Legislature could validly leave to the decision of the informed experts the final determination of the question of whether or not the treatment process could be continued with profit. Since a defendant has no absolute right to treatment under the program, the Legislature may make continuance of treatment conditional on any reasonable criterion, determined by such agency as it may reasonably select.

'By section 6453 of the Penal Code, as that section read at the time herein involved, the Director of Corrections was authorized to return a person to the court conducting criminal proceedings whenever he concludes 'that the person, because of excessive criminality or for other relevant reason, is not a fit subject for confinement or treatment in' the program. The court, for the reasons just discussed, may not review a return based on a ground which, in law, is relevant. In the case at bench, the return was based, as the record discloses, on the failure of defendant when released on out-patient status, on his marginal intelligence, and on his unwillingness or inability to participate either in the educational or the therapeutic programs at the rehabilitation center. These reasons obviously are 'relevant' within the meaning of the statute; whether or not they were so serious as to require rejection from the program was, as we have said, for the director and not for the court.'

'Excessive criminality' is one basis for a finding of unsuitability. 'Other relevant reason,' clearly, is a distinct and broader additional basis and does not, as appellant contends, merely modify 'excessive criminality.' (See People v. Pate, 234 Cal.App.2d 273, 274, 44 Cal.Rptr. 462.)

The statute in question does not deal with speed limits or other traffic violations which can frequently be defined with mathematical certainty. In situations such as the one before us there is a need for standards flexible enough to allow effective operation of the...