People v. Haveman

• Decision Date: 30 May 2019
• Docket Number: No. 344825,344825
• Citation: 938 N.W.2d 773,328 Mich.App. 480
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Terra Lee HAVEMAN, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

328 Mich.App. 480

938 N.W.2d 773

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Terra Lee HAVEMAN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 344825

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted May 1, 2019, at Grand Rapids.

Decided May 30, 2019, at 9:00 a.m.

Dana Nessel, Attorney General, Fadwa A. Hammoud, Solicitor General, Julie A. Nakfoor Pratt, Prosecuting Attorney, and Joshua Carter, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.

The Maul Law Group, PLLC (by Gabriel S. Sanchez, Grand Rapids and Kristen S. Wolfram) for defendant.

Before: Gleicher, P.J., and Ronayne Krause and O’Brien, JJ.

Per Curiam.

At issue in this case is whether MCL 750.135a(1), which proscribes leaving children "unattended in a vehicle for a period of time that poses an unreasonable risk of harm or injury to the child or under circumstances that pose an unreasonable risk of harm or injury to the child," is a strict-liability or general-intent offense. The absence of specific language identifying the intent necessary to violate the statute does not relegate the offense to the realm of strict liability. Rather, considering the language of the statute in context, MCL 750.135a(1) describes a general-intent offense. We reverse the circuit court’s order to the contrary and remand to the district court for further proceedings under the correct legal principles.

I. BACKGROUND

On July 31, 2017, defendant allegedly parked her car in a Walmart parking lot and went inside to shop for one hour, leaving her three- and five-year-old children and two dogs inside the vehicle with one window rolled down. An employee noticed the children in the vehicle and called 911. The children were unharmed. Defendant told the responding officers that she had been inside the store for only 10 to 15 minutes; she later claimed that she did not realize that she had remained inside the store for an hour because of the effects of medication she had taken.

The Barry County Prosecutor charged defendant with two misdemeanor counts of leaving a "child unattended in a vehicle for a period of time that poses an unreasonable risk of harm or injury to the child or under circumstances that pose an unreasonable risk of harm or injury to the child." MCL 750.135a(1) and (2)(a). Before trial in the district court, defendant argued that MCL 750.135a is a general-intent offense and that she should be permitted to defend against the charges with evidence of lack of criminal intent. In the event that the court deemed the offense to sound in strict liability, defendant requested a special jury instruction that her medication rendered her incapable of voluntarily leaving her children in the car for an extended period—the "voluntariness" defense. The district court denied both requests, reasoning that the statute created a strict-liability offense and that defendant’s voluntariness defense was no different than diminished capacity, a defense no longer recognized in Michigan to negate intent. See People v. Yost , 278 Mich. App. 341, 355, 749 N.W.2d 753 (2008).

Defendant filed an interlocutory application for leave to appeal the district court’s order to the circuit court. Although the circuit court took some procedural twists and turns, it ultimately affirmed the district court’s conclusion that MCL 750.135a is a strict-liability statute. The circuit court ruled that defendant could present evidence before the district court to support that her actions were not voluntary and that the district court could then determine whether there was sufficient evidence to present a voluntariness defense to the jury.

We granted defendant’s interlocutory application for leave to appeal these rulings. People v. Haveman , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered December 13, 2018 (Docket No. 344825). Defendant’s trial has been on hold in the meantime.

II. GUIDING LEGAL PRINCIPLES

"Whether the Legislature intended a statute to impose strict liability or intended it to require proof of criminal intent is a matter of statutory interpretation," which we review de novo. People v. Janes , 302 Mich. App. 34, 41, 836 N.W.2d 883 (2013). As described in Janes , 302 Mich. App. at 41, 836 N.W.2d 883 :

Under Michigan’s common law, every conviction for an offense required proof that the defendant committed a criminal act (actus reus ) with criminal intent (mens rea ). Criminal intent can be one of two types: the intent to do the illegal act alone (general criminal intent) or an act done with some intent beyond the doing of the act itself (specific criminal intent). Thus, when a statute prohibits the willful doing of an act, the act must be done with the specific intent to bring about the particular result the statute seeks to prohibit. [Cleaned up.]¹

Stated differently, "the distinction between specific intent and general intent crimes is that the former involve a particular criminal intent beyond the act done, while the latter involve merely the intent to do the physical act." People v. Beaudin , 417 Mich. 570, 573-574, 339 N.W.2d 461 (1983).

In contrast, a strict-liability offense is one in which the prosecution need only prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the prohibited act, regardless of the defendant’s intent and regardless of what the defendant actually knew or did not know .... [W]hether the Legislature intended to enact a strict-liability offense is generally a matter of statutory interpretation. In determining whether the Legislature intended to dispense with criminal intent, our Supreme Court has adopted the analytical framework first stated by the United States Supreme Court in Morissette v. United States , 342 U.S. 246, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952). [ Janes , 302 Mich. App. at 41-42, 836 N.W.2d 883 (cleaned up).]

The Michigan Supreme Court adopted the Morissette analysis in People v. Quinn , 440 Mich. 178, 487 N.W.2d 194 (1992). Under this framework, "where the criminal statute is a codification of the common law, and where mens rea was a necessary element of the crime at common law," courts will interpret the statute as including "knowledge as a necessary element," even when the Legislature failed to include such language. Id. at 185-186, 487 N.W.2d 194. On the other hand,

where the offense in question does not codify a common-law offense and the statute omits the element of knowledge or intent, the United States Supreme Court examines the intent of the Legislature to determine whether it intended that knowledge be proven as an element of the offense, or whether it intended to hold the offender liable regardless of what he knew or did not know. [ Id. at 186, 487 N.W.2d 194.]

Strict liability is a necessary basis for sanction because "public policy requires that certain acts or omissions to act be punished regardless of the actor’s intent." Id. at 186-187, 487 N.W.2d 194. A strict-liability statute "regulates conduct under the state’s police power to promote the social good, a course the Legislature may elect without requiring mens rea." Id. at 187, 487 N.W.2d 194. Dispensing with mens rea "also comports with the purpose of public welfare regulation to protect those who are otherwise unable to protect themselves by placing ‘the burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in responsible relation to a public danger.’ " Id. , quoting United States v. Dotterweich , 320 U.S. 277, 281, 64 S.Ct. 134, 88 L.Ed. 48 (1943). Ultimately,

the United States Supreme Court, in interpreting legislative intent regarding the element of fault, has applied an analytical frame-work that considers each separate element of the statute. Statutes creating strict liability regarding all their elements are not favored. However, where a statute requires a criminal mind for some but not all of its elements, it is not one of strict liability.... In such a case, the Legislature is not imposing liability without any fault at all; instead, it has determined that regarding that element, responsibility for the protection of the public should be placed on the person who can best avoid the harm sought to be prevented—the actor himself. [ Quinn , 440 Mich. at 187-188, 487 N.W.2d 194 (cleaned up).]

Strict liability for a criminal offense is disfavored, however, based on the axiom that "wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal." People v. Tombs , 472 Mich. 446, 454, 697 N.W.2d 494 (2005) (opinion by KELLY , J.) (citation and quotation marks omitted). See also Rambin v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 495 Mich. 316, 327, 852 N.W.2d 34 (2014) ; 472 Mich. 446, 697 N.W.2d 494 (2005) ; Quinn , 440 Mich. at 185, 487 N.W.2d 194. That principle explains why "courts will infer an element of criminal intent when an offense is silent regarding mens rea unless the statute contains an express or implied indication that the legislative body intended that strict criminal liability be imposed." People v. Kowalski , 489 Mich. 488, 499 n. 12, 803 N.W.2d 200 (2011).

But "true strict liability crimes are proper under some circumstances...." Quinn , 440 Mich. at 188, 487 N.W.2d 194. "Examples of strict liability offenses include narcotics laws, traffic laws, adulterated food or drug laws, criminal nuisances, and liquor control laws." People v. Pace , 311 Mich. App. 1, 8, 874 N.W.2d 164 (2015). MCL 750.165, proscribing failure to financially support one’s child when required by court order, has been declared a strict-liability offense, People v. Likine , 492 Mich. 367, 392, 823 N.W.2d 50 (2012), as has Michigan’s statutory-rape statute, MCL 750.520d(1)(a), People v. Cash , 419 Mich. 230, 242, 351 N.W.2d 822 (1984). The following considerations are relevant to determining whether the Legislature intended to impose strict liability for an offense:

(1) whether the statute is a codification of common law; (2) the statute’s legislative history or its title; (3) guidance to interpretation provided by other statutes; (4) the severity of the punishment provided; (5) whether the statute defines a public-welfare offense, and the severity of

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