People v. Higgins

• Decision Date: 08 January 2015
• Citation: 124 A.D.3d 929,1 N.Y.S.3d 424
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Steven HIGGINS, Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

124 A.D.3d 929

1 N.Y.S.3d 424

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant,

v.Steven HIGGINS, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Jan. 8, 2015.

Joel E. Abelove, District Attorney, Troy (Kelly L. Egan of counsel), for appellant.

Adam C. Eggleston, Albany (Kevin O'Brien of counsel), for respondent.

Before: McCARTHY, J.P., GARRY, LYNCH, DEVINE and CLARK, JJ.

GARRY, J.

(1) Appeal from an order of the County Court of Rensselaer County (Young, J.), entered August 8, 2014, which, among other things, granted defendant's motion to suppress certain evidence, and (2) motion to strike appendix.

On October 8, 2013, defendant was observed driving in an erratic manner and was stopped by an officer of the East Greenbush Police Department in the Town of East Greenbush, Rensselaer County. Upon approaching the vehicle, the officer observed that defendant smelled of alcohol and had slurred speech and bloodshot, glassy eyes. The officer administered three field sobriety tests, all of which defendant failed. Defendant was arrested, transported to the police station for booking, and ultimately indicted on numerous violations of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, including felony driving while intoxicated and refusing to submit to a breath test. Defendant thereafter served an omnibus motion seeking, among other things, Mapp, Dunaway and Huntley hearings and the suppression of certain evidence including, as relevant here, defendant's statements to police. The People consented to a Huntley hearing, and County Court granted defendant's request for a Mapp/Dunaway hearing. At the joint hearing, defendant argued that he had invoked his right to counsel almost immediately upon the start of the booking process and that any statements he made thereafter should be suppressed, including those depicted in a video of the booking process (hereinafter the video).¹ Following the hearing, the court determined that defendant had invoked his right to counsel at the onset of the booking process, that the police had failed to honor his request for counsel, and that defendant's statements thereafter should be suppressed. As a result, the court suppressed the video in its entirety. The People appeal.²

Initially, we wholly reject the People's contention that County Court erred in granting defendant's request for a Mapp/Dunaway hearing. Although a defendant seeking a suppression hearing must make sworn factual allegations supporting his or her motion, CPL 710.60 "does not mandate summary denial of defendant's motion even if the factual allegations are deficient" ( People v. Mendoza, 82 N.Y.2d 415, 429, 604 N.Y.S.2d 922, 624 N.E.2d 1017 [1993] ; see CPL 710.60[3] ).

Here, the People had consented to a Huntley hearing "grounded in the same facts involving the same police witnesses" ( People v. Mendoza, 82 N.Y.2d at 429, 604 N.Y.S.2d 922, 624 N.E.2d 1017 ). Principles of judicial economy clearly weighed in favor of conducting any related suppression hearings, and we cannot find any error in so proceeding.

The People further contend that County Court erred in suppressing all of defendant's statements during the booking process as well as the video depicting them. The court found that defendant had invoked his right to counsel when he stated at the outset of the booking process—specifically at 3:23 a.m.—that he wanted to speak to his attorney before he would sign anything. A defendant's request for an attorney will invoke his or her indelible right to counsel if the request is unequivocal, an inquiry which "is a mixed question of law and fact that must be determined with reference to the circumstances surrounding the request including the defendant's demeanor, manner of expression and the particular words found to have been used by the defendant" ( People v. Glover, 87 N.Y.2d 838, 839, 637 N.Y.S.2d 683, 661 N.E.2d 155 [1995] ; accord People v. Jemmott, 116 A.D.3d 1244, 1246, 984 N.Y.S.2d 443 [2014] ; see People v. Phoenix, 115 A.D.3d 1058, 1059, 981 N.Y.S.2d 851 [2014], lv. denied 23 N.Y.3d 1024, 992 N.Y.S.2d 806, 16 N.E.3d 1286 [2014] ; see also People v. Harris, 93 A.D.3d 58, 67, 936 N.Y.S.2d 233 [2012], affd. 20 N.Y.3d 912, 956 N.Y.S.2d 478, 980 N.E.2d 527 [2012] ). Generally, remarks that are subject to numerous objective interpretations or a defendant's mere "suggestion that counsel might be desired ... will not suffice" ( People v. Mitchell, 2 N.Y.3d 272, 276, 778 N.Y.S.2d 427, 810 N.E.2d 879 [2004] ; see People v. Fridman, 71 N.Y.2d 845, 846, 527 N.Y.S.2d 737, 522 N.E.2d 1035 [1988] ; People v. Wade, 296 A.D.2d 720, 720, 745 N.Y.S.2d 306 [2002] ). Here, considering the circumstances existing at the time of the statement, defendant's request to speak to his attorney before signing anything was prospective, as he had not been asked to sign anything. An objective officer could interpret the statement as merely a forewarning of a possible, contingent desire to confer with counsel rather than an unequivocal statement of defendant's present desire to do so (compare People v. Porter, 9 N.Y.3d 966, 967, 848 N.Y.S.2d 583, 878 N.E.2d 998 [2007] ). Accordingly, defendant's statement at 3:23 a.m. did not suffice to invoke his right to counsel (see People v. Engelhardt, 94 A.D.3d 1238, 1240–1241, 941 N.Y.S.2d 808 [2012], lv. denied 19 N.Y.3d 960, 950 N.Y.S.2d 112, 973 N.E.2d 210 [2012] ; People v. Isaac, 224 A.D.2d 993, 994, 637 N.Y.S.2d 827 [1996], lv. denied 88 N.Y.2d 937, 647 N.Y.S.2d 170, 670 N.E.2d 454 [1996] ; People v. Thompson, 153 A.D.2d 456, 464, 551 N.Y.S.2d 488 [1990], lv. denied 76 N.Y.2d 867, 560 N.Y.S.2d 1006, 561 N.E.2d 906 [1990] ).

However, defendant's statement at 3:41 a.m., requesting that he be allowed to call his attorney, was sufficiently unequivocal to invoke his right to counsel (see People v. Jones, 21 A.D.3d 429, 429, 799 N.Y.S.2d 783 [2005], lv. denied 6 N.Y.3d 755, 810 N.Y.S.2d 423, 843 N.E.2d 1163 [2005] ; compare People v. Glover, 87 N.Y.2d at 839, 637 N.Y.S.2d 683, 661 N.E.2d 155 ). The officers agreed to allow defendant to contact his attorney, but never provided him with the means to do so. Thus, any testimonial statements that were elicited from defendant after this point were properly subject to suppression (see People v. Dashnaw, 85 A.D.3d 1389, 1390–1391, 925 N.Y.S.2d 262 [2011], lv. denied 17 N.Y.3d 815, 929 N.Y.S.2d 803, 954 N.E.2d 94 [2011] ; see also People v. Pinzon, 44 N.Y.2d 458, 464, 406 N.Y.S.2d 268, 377 N.E.2d 721 [1978] ; compare People v. Jabaut, 111 A.D.3d 1140, 1141–1142, 976 N.Y.S.2d 262 [2013], lv. denied 22 N.Y.3d 1139, 983 N.Y.S.2d 498, 6 N.E.3d 617 [2014] ). The People argue, however, that County Court's order was not limited to testimonial statements, but also improperly suppressed defendant's responses to pedigree questions, spontaneous declarations, physical appearance and refusal to submit to chemical testing.

Initially, although a defendant's responses to routine booking questions that are "reasonably related to ... administrative concerns" are not subject to suppression ( People v. Rodney, 85 N.Y.2d 289, 293, 624 N.Y.S.2d 95, 648 N.E.2d 471 [1995] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted] ), neither the parties' arguments nor the video discloses any such pedigree questions or responses following defendant's valid invocation of his right to counsel at 3:41 a.m. As for spontaneous declarations, it is established law that, even after the right to counsel has attached, a defendant's statements are not subject to suppression if they were "not the result of inducement, provocation, encouragement or acquiescence, no matter how subtly employed" ( People v. Maerling, 46 N.Y.2d 289, 302–303, 413 N.Y.S.2d 316, 385 N.E.2d 1245 [1978] ; accord People v. Burns, 281 A.D.2d 704, 705, 722 N.Y.S.2d 76 [2001], lvs. denied 96 N.Y.2d 826, 729 N.Y.S.2d 446, 754 N.E.2d 206 [2001], 96 N.Y.2d 831, 729 N.Y.S.2d 452, 754 N.E.2d 212 [2001] ). It is well established that the police bear no obligation "to silence a chatterbox" ( People v. Taylor, 1 A.D.3d 623, 624, 766 N.Y.S.2d 266 [2003], lv. denied 1 N.Y.3d 602, 776 N.Y.S.2d 233, 808 N.E.2d 369 [2004] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citation omitted] ). "The test is not whether defendant, through hindsight, claims that the police intended to provoke an incriminating response; rather, County Court, using an objective standard, must determine whether defendant's statement can be said to have been triggered by police conduct that should reasonably have been anticipated to evoke a statement from defendant" ( People v. Payne, 233 A.D.2d 787, 788, 650 N.Y.S.2d 833 [1996] [citation omitted] ).

With a few exceptions, the video reveals that defendant's statements in the period preceding the reading of his Miranda rights were made without any triggering words or conduct by the police. As the officers played no role in soliciting them, these statements constitute spontaneous declarations and should not have been subject to suppression (see People v. Wilhelm, 34 A.D.3d 40, 53, 822 N.Y.S.2d 786 [2006] ; People v. Sturdivant, 277 A.D.2d 607, 607–608, 714 N.Y.S.2d 839 [2000], lv. denied 95 N.Y.2d 970, 722 N.Y.S.2d 488, 745 N.E.2d 408 [2000] ). However, at three points following defendant's successful invocation of his right to counsel, officers asked him questions that should reasonably have been anticipated to elicit responses. The first such exchange occurred between 03:47:49 a.m. and 03:48:10 a.m., when defendant responded after an officer asked him what he thought would occur as a result of refusing a chemical test. The second occurred between 03: 50:01 a.m. and 03:50:09 a.m., when defendant confirmed his last drinking location in response to a question by one of the officers. The third occurred between 04:01:05 a.m. and 04:06:23 a.m., when an officer asked defendant several questions about chemical testing and the events of the evening. Defendant's responses to these inquiries cannot be said to be spontaneous. Thus, his...