People v. Hollins
| Decision Date | 21 March 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 42570,42570 |
| Citation | 280 N.E.2d 710,51 Ill.2d 68 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Jesse Lee HOLLINS, Appellant. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Charles O. Brizius, Chicago, for appellant.
William J. Scott. Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Edward V. Hanrahan, State's Atty., Chicago (James B. Zagel, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Robert A. Novelle and Paul P. Biebel, Jr., Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for the People.
Petitioner, Jesse Lee Hollins, appeals from the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County dismissing, without an evidentiary hearing, his petition filed under the provisions of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, ch. 38, par. 122--1 et seq.
On February 11, 1954, petitioner pleaded guilty to a charge of burglary. He was then 16 years of age and in accordance with the provisions of section 3 of the Sentence and Parole Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1953, ch. 38, par. 803), effective on January 1, 1954, he was committed to the Illinois Youth Commission, 'the duration of which commitment shall not exceed the maximum term provided by law for the offense.' In September, 1957, in accordance with section 3.1 of the Sentence and Parole Act, petitioner was transferred from the Sheridan School for Boys to the Illinois State Penitentiary. In August, 1959, he filed a petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, which was dismissed by the trial court because it had not been filed within the five-year-limitation period provided in the Act then in effect. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1959, ch. 38, par. 826.) This court denied his petition for a writ of error. (Memorandum Opinion 2975, June 6, 1962.) The instant post-conviction petition was filed on March 7, 1969. Petitioner's contention that the 20-year-limitation period enacted in 1965 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, ch. 38, par. 122--1) should be given retroactive effect has been considered by this court on several occasions and consistenly rejected (People v. Thomas, 45 Ill.2d 68, 256 N.E.2d 794; People v. Reed, 42 Ill.2d 169, 246 N.E.2d 238; People v. Lansing, 35 Ill.2d 247, 220 N.E.2d 218), and we adhere to that holding for the reasons stated in those opinions.
Petitioner contends next that he was denied a substantial constitutional right in that the imposition of sentence under the terms of a statute which was not in effect when the offense was committed violated the constitutional prohibition against the enactment of Ex post facto laws. He argues that in being sentenced under the provisions of the statute which became effective on January 1, 1954, without being advised of his right to elect to be sentenced in accordance with the statute in effect when the offense was committed, he was deprived of his opportunity to offer evidence in mitigation and the right to have the maximum period of the commitment fixed by the court, rather than the statute.
Prior to consideration of this contention we must determine whether failure to raise this issue in the petition for writ of error seeking reversal of the judgment dismissing his first post-conviction petition constituted waiver, thus precluding further review. Our examination of the record of the prior proceeding fails to disclose any effort by appointed counsel, in either the trial court or this court, to amend the Pro se petition or argue any issue other than to oppose the People's contention that the post-conviction petition was not timely filed. Under the circumstances shown, justice and fundamental fairness dictate relaxation of the principle of waiver. People v. frank, 48 Ill.2d 500, 272 N.E.2d 25; People v. Hamby, 32 Ill.2d 291, 205 N.E.2d 456.
The offense to which petitioner pleaded guilty was committed on December 13 1953. At that time section 3 of the Sentence and Parole Act required that in imposing sentence the court fix minimum and maximum limits,...
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Szabo v. Walls
...a second post-conviction petition. Prior to that decision, at least two decisions of the Supreme Court of Illinois, People v. Hollins, 51 Ill.2d 68, 280 N.E.2d 710 (1972), and People v. Slaughter, 39 Ill.2d 278, 235 N.E.2d 566 (1968), had suggested that, when post-conviction counsel had not......
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