People v. Hunter

Citation307 P.3d 1083
Decision Date01 July 2013
Docket NumberSupreme Court Case No. 10SC146
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner v. James Henry HUNTER, Respondent.
CourtSupreme Court of Colorado

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals, Court of Appeals Case No. 08CA316

Attorneys for Petitioner: John W. Suthers, Attorney General, Rhonda L. White, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondent: Douglas K. Wilson, Public Defender, Joan E. Mounteer, Deputy Public Defender, Denver, Colorado

En Banc

JUSTICE RICE delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 This case involves Respondent James Henry Hunter's designation as a sexually violent predator (“SVP”) and requires we interpret the word “stranger” in the relationship criterion of the SVP statute. § 18–3–414.5(1)(a)(III), C.R.S. (2012). We hold that “stranger” in this statute means either the victim is not known by the offender or the offender is not known by the victim at the time of the offense.

¶ 2 After applying our interpretation of the word “stranger” in the relationship criterion of the SVP statute to the record in this case, we hold that the court of appeals erred when it reversed the trial court's ruling designating Hunter as an SVP. We therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶ 3 A jury convicted Hunter of second-degree burglary, sexual assault, sexual assault on a child, and a crime of violence. The evidence at trial showed that Hunter—who was wearing a mask during the assault and was otherwise unidentifiable by the victims—broke into his neighbor's home and sexually assaulted her and her five-year-old daughter. The trial court designated Hunter as an SVP under section 18–3–414.5(1)(a). Hunter appealed and the court of appeals affirmed his conviction, but reversed the trial court's SVP designation. People v. Hunter, No. 04CA699, slip op. at 15, 2007 WL 611882 (Colo.App. Mar. 1, 2007) (not selected for official publication) (Hunter I). The court of appeals remanded the case to allow the trial court to make specific findings as to whether either victim was a stranger to Hunter or whether he had established or promoted a relationship with either victim primarily for the purpose of sexual victimization, as required under the “relationship” criterion of the SVP statute, section 18–3–414.5(1)(a)(III). Hunter I, slip op. at 14–15.

¶ 4 On remand, Hunter argued that he was not a stranger to the victims. The trial court disagreed and designated Hunter as an SVP. The trial court found that Hunter's victims were strangers as neither knew Hunter during the assault.

¶ 5 Hunter appealed and the court of appeals reversed the trial court's SVP designation. SeePeople v. Hunter, 240 P.3d 424, 426 (Colo.App.2009) (selected for official publication) (Hunter II).It held that “nothing in the statute indicates that the [relationship] criterion is met when the victim knows the offender, but is unable to identify him, as was the case here.” Id. Judge Casebolt dissented and opined that the “majority's interpretation yields an anomalous, if not absurd, result”; he posited that the better interpretation “requires that we read ‘stranger to the offender’ as meaning either the victim is a stranger to the offender or the offender is a stranger to the victim, when analyzed at the time the offense was committed.” Id. at 427–28(Casebolt, J., dissenting). Judge Casebolt reasoned—based on the purpose of the SVP designation—that [t]he danger to the public that the perpetrator may reoffend exists in both settings, and [his] interpretation [therefore] gives effect to the entire statute.” Id. at 428(Casebolt, J., dissenting).

¶ 6 We granted certiorari to determine whether the court of appeals erred in holding that Hunter's victims were not strangers based on the circumstances of this case.1 We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and hold that Hunter met the relationship criterion of the SVP statute because his victims were “strangers” at the time of the offense.

II. Analysis
A. “Stranger”

¶ 7 The trial court ultimately determines whether an offender satisfies the four criteria of section 18–3–414.5(1)(a) and therefore qualifies for SVP designation. Allen v. People, 2013 CO 44, ¶1, 307 P.3d 1102, 2013 WL 3323904 (released concurrently). In this case, we interpret the term “stranger” in the relationship criterion of the SVP statute to determine whether the court of appeals erred in designating Hunter as an SVP. We defer to the trial court's factual determinations, but review de novo whether the trial court's factual findings support an SVP designation. SeePeople v. Tixier, 207 P.3d 844, 849 (Colo.App.2008).

¶ 8 Under the relationship criterion of the SVP statute, an offender is an SVP if the “victim was a stranger to the offender.” § 18–3–414.5(1)(a)(III) (emphasis added). Accordingly, we must determine the meaning of “stranger” in the SVP statute.

¶ 9 “In any statutory interpretation, our task is to determine and give effect to the intent of the General Assembly.” Welby Gardens v. Adams Cnty. Bd. of Equalization, 71 P.3d 992, 995 (Colo.2003) (citation omitted). We typically “afford the words of the statute their ordinary and common meaning and construe the statutory provisions as a whole, giving effect to the entirety of the statute.” Lombard v. Colo. Outdoor Educ. Ctr., Inc., 187 P.3d 565, 570 (Colo.2008).

¶ 10 Because the word “stranger” is not ambiguous, we begin and end our analysis by considering the term's plain meaning. In common parlance a stranger is an individual who is “a person not known or familiar to one.” Webster's New College Dictionary 1415 (2005). Similarly, Black's Law Dictionary defines the word stranger as [o]ne not standing toward another in some relation implied in the context.” Black's Law Dictionary 1556 (9th ed. 2004). Given the importance of the context of any given interaction to the definition of “stranger,” we agree with Judge Casebolt's dissent and understand “stranger” to mean the relationship criterion is satisfied where either the victim is not known by the offender or the offender is not known by the victim, at the time of the offense. Moreover, defining “stranger” by considering the context of the parties' relationship at the time of the offense is consistent with the community safety and notice purpose of the SVP designation because it ensures a proper designation for offenders likely to reoffend in both situations: where the victim is not known by the offender or the offender is not known by the victim. SeePeople v. Tuffo, 209 P.3d 1226, 1230 (Colo.App.2009) (noting that “the registration and notification requirements established in the SVP statute are intended to protect the community”); see also Allen, ¶ 7 (noting that the SVP designation's stated purpose is to protect the community (citation omitted)).

¶ 11 Similarly, the Sex Offense Management Board's (“SOMB's”) risk assessment screening instrument (the “Screening Instrument”) 2 defines “stranger” by considering the context of the victim and offender's relationship at the time of the assault. Specifically, the Screening Instrument notes, “the victim is a stranger to the offender when [the victim has] ... little or no familiar or personal knowledge of said offender.” SOMB Handbook: Sexually Violent Predator Assessment Screening Instrument (SVPASI) Background and Instructions 68 (August 2010) http://dcj.state.co.us/odvsom/sex_offender/SO_ Pdfs/SVPASI?ANDBOOK2¨010.pdf. Accordingly, our interpretation of “stranger” is consistent with the Screening Instrument's definition because, like the Screening Instrument, we determine that a “stranger” includes the situation where the offender is not known by the victim at the time of the offense.

¶ 12 We hold that “stranger” in the relationship criterion of the SVP statute means either the victim is not known to the offender or the offender is not known to the victim, at the time of the offense.3 We now apply our interpretation of “stranger” in the relationship criterion of the SVP statute to the facts of this case.

B. Application

¶ 13 The court of appeals erred when it reversed the trial court's decision designating Hunter as an SVP. Record evidence supports the trial court's finding that Hunter was a stranger to both victims at the time of the assault. Considering the mother's perspective first, she testified that her only meaningful interaction with Hunter occurred six months prior to the sexual assault when she joined Hunter and his wife for dinner. Besides the mother's limited interaction with Hunter, the sexual assault occurred in the mother's trailer, during the dead of night, and while the mother was “half-asleep.” And, immediately upon entering her trailer, Hunter struck the mother in her lip and then “bashed her in the eye,” further disorienting his victim. The mother also testified that Hunter obscured her vision during the assault by placing a blanket over her head at various intervals.

¶ 14 Moreover, during the assault Hunter often asked about “Carl.” The mother did not know any man named Carl. Hunter also expressed frustration about the lack of cash in the trailer because he claimed the mother “worked in a bank,” which she did not. These confusing statements likely undermined the mother's ability to identify her assailant. Though the mother testified at trial that she might have recognized Hunter's voice during the assault, on cross-examination Hunter's counsel introduced evidence of an earlier interview where the victim admitted “there was something about his voice that just really didn't sound like [Hunter].”

¶ 15 Additionally, the trial court found that Hunter—who was wearing a mask during the assault—“was not known to [the victims,] so he was there as a stranger when the assault started and throughout the assault.” The trial court also observed that Hunter's identification in this case was based on DNA evidence because neither victim affirmatively identified Hunter as the...

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    • United States
    • Colorado Bar Association C.R.S. on Family and Juvenile Law (2022 ed.) (CBA) Title 18 Criminal Code
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