People v. Isom, No. 284857 (Mich. App. 4/8/2010), No. 284857.
| Decision Date | 08 April 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 284857. |
| Parties | PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DONALD JAMAL ISOM, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Appeal from Saginaw Circuit Court, LC No. 07-028598-FC.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Fort Hood and Gleicher, JJ.
UNPUBLISHED
Defendant appeals by right from his convictions of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, MCL 750.157a; MCL 750.529, attempted armed robbery, MCL 750.92; MCL 750.529, felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, carrying a concealed weapon (CCW), MCL 750.227, and four counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. Defendant was sentenced to 60 to 90 years in prison for the second-degree murder and conspiracy convictions, five to ten years' imprisonment for the attempted armed robbery, felon in possession, and CCW convictions, and two years' imprisonment for each felony-firearm conviction. We affirm.
Defendant's convictions arose out of the attempted robbery of Raychan Williams and the shooting death of Darnell Eiland. The evidence at trial indicated that on the night of the crimes, defendant and Prophet Phillips were driving around with Doretha Ransom. The men went together to Williams's apartment, where Phillips tried to convince Williams to open the door by stating that he wanted to buy drugs. When Williams refused to open the door, defendant pointed a gun at him. Williams jumped away, and defendant and Phillips returned to the car. Shortly thereafter, the three drove to another home, ostensibly to buy drugs. Defendant and Phillips went to the house while Ransom waited in the car. Ransom heard gunshots, and then defendant and Phillips returned to the car. Defendant had been shot in the hand. Defendant gave Phillips a gun, and then Phillips left. Ransom took defendant to the hospital. While defendant was being treated, Eiland's body was found. When the police came to the hospital to investigate defendant's gunshot wound and to determine if the Eiland death was related, defendant fled, but was apprehended shortly thereafter.
Defendant first argues that his constitutional right to equal protection was violated when the plaintiff used peremptory challenges to excuse two African-American jury panel members. See Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79; 106 S Ct 1712; 90 L Ed 2d 69 (1986). The trial court found that defendant failed to make a prima facie showing of discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, and further found that plaintiff had demonstrated a race-neutral reason for the challenges. We review for clear error the trial court's factual finding concerning the prima facie showing. People v Knight, 473 Mich 324, 345; 701 NW2d 715 (2005) (Opinion by Corrigan, J.).
The purpose of Batson is to prevent discriminatory exclusions of veniremembers on the basis of race or gender. Knight, 473 Mich at 351. A defendant is not entitled to a jury of a particular racial composition provided that no racial group is systematically and intentionally excluded. Id.
To make a prima facie showing of a Batson violation, a defendant must establish three factors:
(1) he is a member of a cognizable racial group; (2) the proponent has exercised a peremptory challenge to exclude a member of a certain racial group from the jury pool; and (3) all the relevant circumstances raise an inference that the proponent of the challenge excluded the prospective juror on the basis of race. [Knight, 473 Mich at 336, citing Batson, 476 US at 96.]
The trial court must consider all relevant circumstances to determine whether a prima facie showing has been established. People v Bell, 473 Mich 275, 283; 702 NW2d 128, mod 474 Mich 1201 (2005) (Opinion by Corrigan, J).
Once the opponent of the challenge makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the challenging party to come forward with a neutral explanation for the challenge. The neutral explanation must be related to the particular case being tried and must provide more than a general assertion in order to rebut the prima facie showing. If the challenging party fails to come forward with a neutral explanation, the challenge will be denied.
Finally, the trial court must decide whether the non-challenging party has carried the burden of establishing purposeful discrimination. Since Batson, the Supreme Court has commented that the establishment of purposeful discrimination "comes down to whether the trial court finds the ... race-neutral explanations to be credible." The Court further stated, "Credibility can be measured by, among other factors, the ... [challenger's] demeanor; by how reasonable, or how improbable, the explanations are; and by whether the proffered rationale has some basis in accepted trial strategy. If the trial court finds that the reasons proffered were a pretext, the peremptory challenge will be denied. [Id. (internal citations omitted.)]
The trial court held that defendant failed to make a prima facie showing. However, for purposes of completeness, the prosecutor explained that his dismissal of the jurors in question involved their understanding of legal principles and education level, and the trial court found that the explanation was valid. The prosecutor further stated that his officer-in-charge, also an African-American male, requested the dismissal of one of the jurors based on his answers to questions. The factual circumstances do not support defendant's claim of discrimination. It is the province of the trial court to make determinations of credibility and demeanor regarding the basis of the strike of a jury by the prosecutor, and we must defer to the trial court's resolution of these issues. Snyder v Louisiana, 552 US 472, 477; 128 S Ct 1203; 170 L Ed 2d 175 (2008). Therefore, a trial court's ruling on the issue of discriminatory intent must be sustained unless it is clearly erroneous. Id. Based on the record, we cannot conclude that the trial court's rulings were clearly erroneous.
Defendant next contends that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of conspiracy to commit armed robbery of the murder victim. A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is reviewed de novo. People v Martin, 271 Mich App 280, 340; 721 NW2d 815 (2006). When reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, this Court reviews the record in the light most favorable to the prosecutor to determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Contempt of Henry, 282 Mich App 656, 677; 765 NW2d 44 (2009). Appellate review of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is deferential. People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000). The reviewing court must draw all reasonable inferences and examine credibility issues that support the jury verdict. Id. When assessing a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence, the trier of fact, not the appellate court, determines what inferences may be fairly drawn from the evidence and the weight to be accorded those inferences. People v Hardiman, 466 Mich 417, 428; 646 NW2d 158 (2002). This Court must not interfere with the jury's role as the sole judge of the facts when reviewing the evidence. People v Meshell, 265 Mich App 616, 619; 696 NW2d 754 (2005). "Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising therefrom may constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of the offense." People v Velasquez, 189 Mich App 14, 16; 472 NW2d 289 (1991). When challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the focus is on whether the evidence justifies submitting the case to the jury or requires judgment as a matter of law. Id.
Defendant contends that evidence of a conspiracy to rob the murder victim was virtually non-existent because witness Ransom was unable to testify regarding any agreement to rob. Furthermore, the attempt to rob Williams before the murder should have been excluded from trial because the prosecutor did not file a motion to admit similar acts evidence pursuant to MRE 404(b).1 Therefore, the only evidence, that the men fired their weapons at the scene of the murder, is insufficient to prove a conspiracy. We disagree. To establish a conspiracy, the prosecutor had the burden of establishing that defendant intended to combine with Phillips to accomplish an illegal objective. See People v Mass, 464 Mich 615, 629; 628 NW2d 540 (2001). Although defendant claims that the prosecutor was required to establish that defendant and Phillips conspired specifically to commit an armed robbery at the home of the murder victim, the record substantiates the prosecutor's theory of the case that the men engaged in a conspiracy to rob local drug dealers on the night in question. Defendant's attempt to exclude the evidence surrounding the attempt to rob Williams is without merit. A jury is entitled to hear the "complete story" surrounding the matter in issue. People v Sholl, 453 Mich 730, 742; 556 NW2d 851 (1996). Evidence of other criminal events are admissible when so blended or connected to another crime of which the defendant is accused such that proof of one incidentally involves or explains the circumstances of the other. Id. There was sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the conspiracy conviction.
Defendant also alleges that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of second-degree murder.2 We disagree. A defendant may be guilty of second-degree murder if the defendant aids or abets a principal in the commission of a murder with knowledge of the principal's intent. See People v Robinson, 475 Mich 1, 15; 715 NW2d 44 (2006). The Robinson Court held:
[A] defendant must possess the criminal intent to aid, abet, procure, or counsel the commission of an offense. A defendant is criminally liable for the offenses the defendant specifically intends to aid or abet, or has knowledge of, as well as those crimes that are the natural and probable consequences of the offense he...
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