People v. J.W. (In re J.W.)

• Decision Date: 23 October 2020
• Docket Number: B303310
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: IN RE J.W., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. The People, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. J.W., Defendant and Appellant.

56 Cal.App.5th 355

270 Cal.Rptr.3d 461

IN RE J.W., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.The People, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.J.W., Defendant and Appellant.

B303310

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California.

Filed October 23, 2020

Lynette Gladd Moore, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Deputy Attorney General, and Chung L. Mar, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

HOFFSTADT, J.

Under the "routine booking question" exception to Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 ( Miranda ), Miranda warnings need not be given before a suspect being booked into custody is asked about his "name, address, height, weight, eye color, date of birth, and current age." ( Pennsylvania. v. Muniz (1990) 496 U.S. 582, 601-602, 110 S.Ct. 2638, 110 L.Ed.2d 528 ( Muniz ) (plur. opn. of Brennan, J.).) But what if any of these core "booking questions"—in this case, the suspect's age and date of birth—is an element of the crime with which he is ultimately charged? Does the routine booking question exception still apply, or is the suspect's answer subject to exclusion because asking the question in that particular case was "reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect" ( Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 ( Innis ))? Consistent with our Supreme Court's recent decision in People v. Elizalde (2015) 61 Cal.4th 523, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 518, 351 P.3d 1010 ( Elizalde ), we hold that the routine booking question exception categorically applies to all of the core "booking questions" enumerated in Muniz and authorizes the admission of the defendant's answers to those specific questions into evidence "without [the need to] assess[ ] th[ose questions’] incriminatory nature on a case-by-case basis." ( Id. at p. 535, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 518, 351 P.3d 1010.) We accordingly affirm the juvenile adjudication in this case.¹

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. Facts

A. The crime

On November 15, 2019, 16-year-old J.W. (minor) took off running after he made eye contact with two Los Angeles Police Department officers who encountered him on the street. The officers gave chase. As he fled, minor discarded a backpack he had been wearing. After catching up to minor in a laundromat, the officers retrieved the backpack. The backpack contained a loaded, semi-automatic handgun, with one round in the chamber. As he was being handcuffed, minor spontaneously told the officers that he was carrying the gun for protection.

B. Post-arrest

The officers transported minor to the station house to be booked. As part of the booking process, minor was asked his age and date of birth. He replied that he was 16 and provided his birthdate. Minor was read his Miranda rights, waived them, and repeated that he was carrying the gun for protection.

II. Procedural Background

The People filed a petition asking the juvenile court to declare minor a "ward" based on the allegation that he had committed the felony crime of being a minor in possession of a firearm ( Pen. Code, § 29610 ).

The matter proceeded to trial in December 2019. After the prosecutor rested the People's case-in-chief, minor pointed out that the People had not introduced any evidence of minor's age, which is an element of the sole offense alleged in the petition. Over minor's objections based on hearsay, lack of foundation, and Miranda , the juvenile court allowed the prosecutor to recall one of the arresting officers to testify that (1) he asked minor his age and date of birth, which minor provided during the booking process, (2) the officer subsequently "verified" minor's age and date of birth by running "department resources," and (3) the officer also verified that information with the California Department of Justice.

The juvenile court sustained the petition, designated the sustained offense as a felony, ordered that minor be placed at home on probation, and directed that minor live in his father's home in Glendale, Arizona.

Minor filed this timely appeal.

DISCUSSION

Minor argues that there is insufficient evidence to support his adjudication as a ward because (1) the statements he made to the booking officer about his age and date of birth are inadmissible under Miranda , and (2) without those statements, the People did not prove that he was a minor in possession of a firearm. Minor is correct that the People are required to prove every element of offenses against juveniles beyond a reasonable doubt ( In re Miguel L. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 100, 105, 185 Cal.Rptr. 120, 649 P.2d 703 ), and that a defendant's status as a minor is certainly an element of being a minor in possession of a firearm ( Pen. Code, § 29610 ); ( In re I.A. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 767, 778, 262 Cal.Rptr.3d 234 ). Consequently, the validity of the juvenile court's order sustaining the allegations against minor turns on whether Miranda bars admission of the statements he made about his age and date of birth during the booking process.² We independently review the legal contours of Miranda ’s rule as well as whether Miranda applies to the particular statement in a case. ( People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 901, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 23, 15 P.3d 243 [meaning of constitutional law]; People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 385, 106 Cal.Rptr.3d 771, 227 P.3d 342 [application of Miranda ].)

" Miranda established the now-familiar rule that prosecutors may not admit a suspect's statements in their case-in-chief against the suspect-defendant unless: (1) the defendant was advised that (a) ‘he has a right to remain silent,’ (b) anything he says ‘may be used as evidence against him,’ (c) ‘he has a right to the presence of an attorney,’ and (d) the defendant will be provided an attorney if he cannot afford one; (2) the defendant waived those rights, either expressly (by affirmatively indicating a waiver) or implicitly (by answering questions); and (3) prior to making the statements to be admitted, the defendant did not invoke either his right to remain silent or his Miranda right to an attorney." ( People v. Orozco (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 802, 811, 244 Cal.Rptr.3d 337, quoting Miranda , supra , 384 U.S. at pp. 444-445, 473-474, 476, 86 S.Ct. 1602 ; People v. Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 338-339, 205 Cal.Rptr.3d 386, 376 P.3d 528 ( Jackson ).) Miranda ’s protections apply to juveniles as well as adults. ( In re Roderick P. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 801, 810-811, 103 Cal.Rptr. 425, 500 P.2d 1.)

Miranda ’s protections only apply, however, to statements made in the course of "custodial interrogation." ( Miranda , supra , 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602.) There is no doubt that minor was in police "custody" when he was being booked, so the critical question is whether the questions put to him by the booking officer constituted "interrogation." For purposes of Miranda , "interrogation" means (1) "express questioning," or (2) "any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." ( Innis , supra , 446 U.S. at p. 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682.) What matters most is " ‘the perceptions of the suspect,’ " not " ‘the intent of the police.’ " ( Ibid. ; Muniz , supra , 496 U.S. at p. 601, 110 S.Ct. 2638 (plur. opn. of Brennan, J.).)

Not all responses to express questioning by law enforcement are barred by Miranda . As is most pertinent here, the United States Supreme Court in Muniz held that a suspect's answers to express questions during the booking process regarding the suspect's "name, address, height, weight, eye color, date of birth , and current age " are not barred by Miranda , even when not preceded by the above described Miranda warnings. ( Muniz , supra , 496 U.S. at pp. 586, 601, 110 S.Ct. 2638 (plur. opn. of Brennan, J.), italics added; id. at p. 608, 110 S.Ct. 2638 (conc. & dis. opn. of Rehnquist, J.).) Muniz referred to this as the " ‘routine booking question’ exception" to Miranda . ( Id. at p. 601, 110 S.Ct. 2638 (plur. opn. of Brennan, J.).)

Because in this case some of the booking questions were used to prove an element of the offense alleged against minor, this case squarely presents the following question: Does the routine booking question exception to Miranda still apply when the questions posed—here, date of birth and current age—fall squarely within Muniz ’s core definition of "booking questions" but, on the facts of the specific case, are nevertheless "reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect" ( Innis , supra , 446 U.S. at p. 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682 )?

There is a split of authority on how to answer this question.

In Elizalde , our Supreme Court strongly suggested that the routine booking question exception still applies. There, the issue was whether a suspect's answers to booking questions regarding his gang affiliation fell within the exception. The court held they did not. ( Elizalde , supra , 61 Cal.4th at p. 538, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 518, 351 P.3d 1010.) In reaching this conclusion, the court drew a distinction between "the basic biographical data contemplated in Muniz " (that is, the seven questions bearing on "basic identifying biographical data" specifically identified in Muniz ) and other "questions asked during booking that are reasonably related to administrative concerns." ( Id. at pp. 535-536, 538, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 518, 351 P.3d 1010.) Elizalde held answers to booking questions regarding the categories of biographical data listed in Muniz "may be admitted without assessing their incriminatory nature on a case-by-case basis," while answers to other booking questions could be admitted only if the questions fell outside the usual test for " ‘interrogation’ "—that is, if the questions were not " ...