People v. Jackson

Decision Date23 February 2021
Docket NumberF080236
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesTHE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CHRISTOPHER JACKSON, Defendant and Appellant.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

OPINION

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. W. Kent Hamlin, Judge.

Meredith Fahn, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Lisa Smittcamp, District Attorney, and Kelsey C. Peterson, Deputy District Attorney, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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INTRODUCTION

This appeal presents the question whether Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, pp. 1-5) (Senate Bill 1437 or Sen. Bill 1437) is constitutional. We follow the growing line of published appellate authority—including People v. Nash (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 1041 (Nash) from this court—in holding that it is. As such, we reverse the trial court's order dismissing defendant Christopher Jackson's petition under Penal Code section 1170.95 on the ground Senate Bill 1437 is unconstitutional, and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings.1

FACTUAL SUMMARY

In August 1994, an information was filed alleging defendant committed first degree murder (§ 187; count 1); robbery (§§ 211, 212.5, former subd. (b); count 2); and unlawful taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); count 3). As to the murder charge, a special circumstance enhancement was alleged that the murder was committed in the course of a robbery, and a firearm enhancement was also alleged. Count 3 was alleged to have occurred on April 14, 1991, and counts 1 and 2 were alleged to have occurred the day after, on April 15, 1991.

Defendant entered into a negotiated plea to having committed the lesser included offense of second degree murder (count 1), and robbery (count 2), with an admission that he personally used a firearm, in exchange for an aggregate sentence of 25 years to life (a determinate term of 10 years, followed by an indeterminate term of 15 years to life). It was stipulated that the factual basis of the plea was comprised of the preliminary examination hearing transcript and police reports. On November 28, 1994, defendant was sentenced in conformance with the plea agreement.2

On January 9, 2019, defendant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1170.95, enacted under Senate Bill 1437. The Fresno County District Attorney's Office (district attorney) moved to dismiss on the ground that Senate Bill 1437 was unconstitutional. District attorney also filed a merits-based opposition, arguing that while defendant was not the actual killer, he was still liable for murder despite the changes in the law because he aided and abetted the murder, and he acted with an intent to kill by being armed with and firing his gun. Moreover, district attorney argued, the record showed defendant was a "major participant" in the underlying robbery and he acted with reckless indifference to human life. (See § 189, subd. (e)(1)-(3).)

Defendant filed a reply brief that disputed Senate Bill 1437 was unconstitutional. Defendant also argued that district attorney's brief asserted facts that were not in evidence and that a hearing was necessary to establish the underlying facts.

A hearing on the petition was held on October 28, 2019, and a final order was filed the same day. The trial court dismissed the petition finding Senate Bill 1437 unconstitutional. The trial court concluded "the entire legislative enactment is unconstitutional, including the procedure described in section 1170.95 for those who 'could not be convicted of first or second degree murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.'" The court then expressly "decline[d] to address whether [defendant] has stated a prima facie case or would be likely to prevail on the merits. The petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1170.95 is dismissed." Defendant appealed.

DISCUSSION
I. Senate Bill 1437 is Constitutional

Senate Bill 1437, effective January 1, 2019, "amend[ed] the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure thatmurder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life." (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, p. 2, subd. (f).)

In relevant part, Senate Bill 1437 did the following: (1) it amended section 188 to include subdivision (a)(3), which provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise stated in subdivision (e) of Section 189, in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime"; (2) it added subdivision (e) to section 189, which provides that "[a] participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a felony listed in subdivision (a) [defining first degree murder] in which a death occurs is liable for murder only if one of the following is proven: [¶] (1) The person was the actual killer. [¶] (2) The person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree. [¶] (3) The person was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2"; and (3) it added section 1170.95, which permits a person convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory to file a petition in the trial court to have his or her murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts if certain conditions apply, including that he or she could not be convicted of murder under the changes made to sections 188 or 189 by Senate Bill 1437. (§ 1170.95, subd. (a).)

District attorney argues that Senate Bill 1437 is an unconstitutional amendment of Proposition 7 (Prop. 7, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 1978)), Proposition 115 (Prop. 115, The Crime Victims Justice Reform Act, as approved by voters, Primary Elec. (June 5, 1990)) and Proposition 9 (Prop. 9, The Victims' Bill of Rights Act of 2008: Marsy's Law, approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2008))—all ballot initiatives passed by voters. District attorney also argues the new lawimpermissibly infringes on powers vested in the judicial and executive branches of government, in violation of the separation of powers doctrine. District attorney urges this panel to adopt the dissenting opinions in Nash, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at pages 1084-1087, Poochigian, J., concurring and dissenting, and in People v. Lippert (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 304, 314-326, Ramirez, J., dissenting, review denied October 21, 2020, S264495 (Lippert).

In Nash, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at page 1053, this court rejected these arguments, joining a line of other Courts of Appeal who have considered and rejected some or all of the same claims. (See People v. Lamoureux (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 241, 246 [Sen. Bill 1437 does not violate Props. 7, 115 or 9, or separation of powers doctrine]; People v. Superior Court (Gooden) (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 270, 289 [Sen. Bill 1437 does not violate Props. 7 or 115]; People v. Solis (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 762, 784; People v. Cruz (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 740, 747; accord, People v. Lopez (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 589, 594; People v. Alaybue (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 207, 211; People v. Johns (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 46, 54-55; People v. Prado (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 480, 492; People v. Smith (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 85, 91-92, review granted July 22, 2020, S262835;3 People v. Bucio (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 300, 306.)

Since Nash was published, the Courts of Appeal have continued to conclude Senate Bill 1437 is constitutional. (See Lippert, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at pp. 313-314; People v. Lombardo (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 553, 562, 565; People v. Marquez (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 40, 47-51 [§ 1170.95 neither conflicts with Marsy's Law nor violates separation of powers doctrine].)

We are not persuaded to depart from Nash's analyses or conclusions. Nash provided a thorough and detailed explanation of its holding, and it is unnecessary for us to repeat that decision's analyses here. Rather, we incorporate by reference our analyses from Nash and conclude, for the reasons expressed therein, that Senate Bill 1437 is constitutionally sound, and the trial court erred in concluding it was not. Defendant is entitled to have his petition considered on its merits. The order dismissing defendant's section 1170.95 petition is reversed.

II. Remaining Issues

Upon a determination Senate Bill 1437 is constitutional, the parties dispute what procedures should occur on remand with respect to defendant's petition.

A. District Attorney's Motion to Augment the Record is Denied

In February 2020, before filing his opening brief, defendant filed a motion to augment the clerk's transcript with the transcript of the July 1994 preliminary examination, which defendant stated was held "on or around July 21-25, 1994." Defendant noted that in deciding Senate Bill 1437 was unconstitutional and expressly declining to reach the merits of defendant's section 1170.95 petition, the trial court recited facts taken from the preliminary examination hearings held in July 1994. Defendant explained he had no other way of verifying the accuracy of the trial court's summary of that preliminary examination testimony unless the transcript was included in the record on appeal. We granted defendant's...

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