People v. Jean-Charles, JEAN-CHARLE

• Decision Date: 01 April 1996
• Docket Number: A,JEAN-CHARLE
• Citation: 640 N.Y.S.2d 266,226 A.D.2d 395
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Woodyppellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 266

640 N.Y.S.2d 266

226 A.D.2d 395

The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Woody JEAN-CHARLES, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Second Department.

April 1, 1996.

Michelle Sheehan Prior, Great Neck, for appellant.

Denis Dillon, District Attorney, Mineola (Judith R. Sternberg and Robert A. Schwartz, of counsel), for respondent.

Before ROSENBLATT, J.P., and O'BRIEN, RITTER and GOLDSTEIN, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Nassau County (Wexner, J.), rendered October 21, 1993, convicting him of murder in the second degree (two counts), robbery in the first degree (two counts), criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of the branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress statements made by the defendant to law enforcement officials.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

The People established that the police had probable cause to arrest the defendant without a warrant. Probable cause may be supplied, in whole or in part, through hearsay information (People v. Parris, 83 N.Y.2d 342, 345, 610 N.Y.S.2d 464, 632 N.E.2d 870; People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417, 423, 497 N.Y.S.2d 630, 488 N.E.2d 451; People v. Cruz, 191 A.D.2d 507, 508, 594 N.Y.S.2d 342). Under the Aguilar- Spinelli rule (see, Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723; Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637), when probable cause is predicated in whole or in part upon the hearsay statement of an informant, it must be demonstrated that (1) the informant disclosed a sufficient basis for his or her knowledge, and (2) the informant was reliable (see, People v. Parris, supra ). Further, the basis-of-knowledge and veracity requirements of Aguilar- Spinelli are analytically independent and each must be satisfied separately (see, People v. Chase, 85 N.Y.2d 493, 626 N.Y.S.2d 721, 650 N.E.2d 379; People v. DiFalco, 80 N.Y.2d 693, 696, 594 N.Y.S.2d 679, 610 N.E.2d 352; People v. Bigelow, supra; People v. Brown, 205 A.D.2d 791, 613 N.Y.S.2d 690). "Information provided by an identified citizen accusing another individual of a specific crime is legally sufficient to provide the police with probable cause to arrest" (People v. Phillips, 120 A.D.2d 621, 502 N.Y.S.2d 229; see, People v. Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d 398, 403, 497 N.Y.S.2d 618, 488 N.E.2d 439; People v. Hicks, 38 N.Y.2d 90, 378 N.Y.S.2d 660, 341 N.E.2d 227).

In the instant case, the disclosed informant was an individual who admitted to using a credit card stolen by the defendant from one of the defendant's victims. Since his statement not only subjected him to a potential penalty for providing the police with fabricated information (see, Penal Law § 240.50; People v. McCain, 134 A.D.2d 623, 521 N.Y.S.2d 517; People v. Phillips, supra ) but also admitted his own criminal conduct (see, United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 29 L.Ed.2d 723; People v. Johnson, supra, at 402, 497 N.Y.S.2d 618, 488 N.E.2d 439; People v. Greene, 153 A.D.2d 439, 444, 552 N.Y.S.2d 640, cert. denied 498 U.S. 947, 111 S.Ct. 363, 112 L.Ed.2d 326), we find that the prosecution established this witness's veracity.

The "basis-of-knowledge" prong of the test may be satisfied upon a showing that the information furnished is so detailed as to make it clear that it must have been based upon personal knowledge (see, People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417, 424, 497 N.Y.S.2d 630, 488 N.E.2d 451; People v. Isaac, 206 A.D.2d 545, 616 N.Y.S.2d 46). In order to satisfy the "basis-of-knowledge" prong, it is not necessary that the informant have personally viewed the criminal activity (see, People v. Greene, supra, at 444, 552 N.Y.S.2d 640; United States v. Button, 8th Cir., 653 F.2d 319, 324, n. 6; United States v. Spach, 7th Cir., 518 F.2d 866; United States v. Romano, 5th Cir., 482 F.2d 1183, cert. denied sub. nom. Yassen v. United States, 414 U.S. 1129, 94 S.Ct. 866, 38 L.Ed.2d 753; United States v. Fiorella, 2nd Cir., 468 F.2d 688, cert. denied 417 U.S. 917, 94 S.Ct. 2622, 41 L.Ed.2d 222). This informant, who was with the defendant prior to and immediately after the crime, explained in detail how the defendant planned the crime, took a gun from where it had been secreted, left to commit the robbery, returned with the fruits of the robbery, and talked about the details of the robbery. The information provided by the informant was consistent with the details already learned...