People v. Jones
| Decision Date | 26 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | 356930 |
| Parties | PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CIYAN KYLA JONES, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
UNPUBLISHED
Tuscola Circuit Court LC No. 20-015271-FH
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Servitto and Rick, JJ.
Defendant appeals by leave granted[1] the circuit court's order denying her motion to quash the bindover on the charges of possession with intent to deliver less than 50 grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv), possession of methamphetamine MCL 333.7403(2)(b)(i), possession of less than 25 grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7403(2)(a)(v), possession of buprenorphine, MCL 333.7403(2)(b)(ii), possession of morphine, MCL 333.7403(2)(b)(ii), and possession of codeine, MCL 333.7403(2)(b)(ii). On appeal defendant argues that the circuit court erred when it denied her motion to quash the bindover because the physical evidence relied upon by the prosecution should have been suppressed such that there was not probable cause to believe that defendant committed the charged offenses. We reverse and remand to the circuit court for entry of an order granting the motion to quash.
On April 29, 2020, Sanilac County Deputy Sheriff Joshua Horst, who was part of the sheriff's office's Drug Task Force (DTF), was driving by an allegedly "known drug house," which was under surveillance by the DTF and other authorities. Deputy Horst testified that the sheriff's office had "received tips" and DTF had been surveilling the house because it was "known to be a drug house." Horst observed defendant exit the home and drive away in a silver vehicle. Horst was unaware how long defendant had been at the residence. He testified that his attention was drawn to the vehicle "[j]ust because it was at that residence." Deputy Horst followed defendant and contacted Michigan State Police Detective Sergeant Andrew Feehan of the Michigan State Police Narcotics Unit to inform him that defendant was seen exiting a known drug house and "[t]o see if [Feehan] wanted to conduct a traffic stop[.]" While following defendant, Deputy Horst conducted a license plate search and determined that defendant was driving an "out-of-town vehicle."[2] Detective Sergeant Feehan notified Michigan State Police Trooper Tyler Schuiteman of the information obtained by Deputy Horst, and Trooper Schuiteman located defendant's vehicle. Trooper Schuiteman observed defendant operating a vehicle with a cracked windshield while traveling in excess of the posted speed limit and initiated a traffic stop.
During the traffic stop, Trooper Schuiteman asked defendant about her previous location, her current destination, and whether she was in possession of any contraband. According to Trooper Schuiteman, defendant's body language indicated that she was not being truthful when responding to the questions. Trooper Schuiteman recalled that defendant was eating and drinking, evading questions, and changing conversation topics. Trooper Schuiteman asked defendant to exit her vehicle so he could "get clarification on her story" and for his safety because he did not know what was in the vehicle and he wanted to get a "better feeling on . . . [defendant's] body demeanor and facial expressions . . . ." Defendant complied. Trooper Schuiteman again asked defendant about contraband in the vehicle. He testified that defendant's demeanor became "very evasive." According to Trooper Schuiteman, "it was written all over [defendant's] face that she had something there that [she] did not want to tell me or did not want me to find." Trooper Schuiteman conducted a pat-down search of defendant's waistline in order to determine whether defendant was in possession of any weapons for his safety. The trooper also requested that defendant remove her shoes purportedly to check for weapons, for officer safety and defendant's safety once she was outside of her vehicle. She complied. Trooper Schuiteman did not find any weapons or contraband on defendant's person.
Rather than allowing the defendant to return to her vehicle (having found no weapons) and writing her tickets for the two civil infractions before concluding the stop, Trooper Schuiteman then informed defendant that a female officer would need to conduct a more thorough search of defendant's person. Trooper Schuiteman then determined that there were no female officers on duty at that time and informed defendant that he "would possibly have to take her down to the county jail where a female [officer] could search her . . . ." Then, according to Trooper Schuiteman, defendant became upset and "a little hostile." Schuiteman then handcuffed defendant with her hands behind her back, and placed her in the front passenger seat of his patrol vehicle. The Trooper acknowledged that defendant was not free to leave. Trooper Schuiteman then sat in the driver's seat of his patrol vehicle. During the entire duration of the traffic stop, Schuiteman repeatedly asked defendant if there was anything in her vehicle. Trooper Schuiteman stated on at least one occasion that "this is my last chance to help you." While defendant was inside of Schuiteman's patrol vehicle, he asked defendant, for a third time, if there was anything that he "need[ed] to know about before [he] search[ed]." Defendant eventually informed Trooper Schuiteman that she used cocaine. Trooper Schuiteman then asked defendant if she had cocaine on her person or in her vehicle, and defendant said that she had a packet of cocaine in her pocket. Trooper Schuiteman reached into defendant's pocket and retrieved the packet of cocaine. At no time did Trooper Schuiteman provide defendant with Miranda[3] warnings prior to defendant making statements to Schuiteman. Trooper Schuiteman subsequently conducted a search of defendant's vehicle with another trooper, and they located a small lockbox in the passenger seat. Schuiteman removed the lockbox and placed it in his patrol car. The lockbox was put back into defendant's vehicle. However, Schuiteman could not recall who returned the lockbox to the vehicle.
Defendant was arrested. Her vehicle was seized and driven to a Michigan State Police post. Detective Sergeant Feehan obtained a search warrant for defendant's vehicle and its contents, and the search warrant was executed on April 30, 2020. The lockbox found in defendant's vehicle contained a daily planner with names, dates, and dollar amounts written inside, 9 grams of cocaine inside of a plastic bag, a "few grams of cocaine" in another container, a scale that was partially covered in white residue, a glass jar that contained methamphetamine residue, suboxone pills, morphine pills, codeine or acetaminophen pills, a "Chore Boy, "[4] razor blades, and additional plastic baggies.
Defendant was charged with possession with intent to deliver less than 50 grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv), possession of methamphetamine, MCL 333.7403(2)(b)(i), possession of less than 25 grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7403(2)(a)(v), possession of buprenorphine, MCL 333.7403(2)(b)(ii), possession of morphine, MCL 333.7403(2)(b)(ii), and possession of codeine, MCL 333.7403(2)(b)(ii). Following a preliminary examination, defendant was bound over for trial on all counts. However, because defendant was not informed of her Miranda rights, the district court suppressed defendant's statements made while in the patrol vehicle. Nonetheless, the district court concluded that the physical evidence subsequently found would have been inevitably discovered, independent of defendant's statements, by lawful means. In circuit court, defendant filed a motion to quash the bindover in which she asserted that the physical evidence relied upon by the prosecution should have been suppressed. Ultimately, the circuit court issued an opinion and entered an order denying defendant's motion to quash the bindover. The circuit court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the physical evidence was admissible, adopting the opinion of the district court with regard to the Miranda issue. This appeal followed.
To bind a criminal defendant over for trial in the circuit court, the district court must find probable cause to believe that the defendant committed a felony, which requires sufficient evidence of each element of the crime charged, or from which the elements may be inferred, to cause a person of ordinary prudence and caution to conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief of the defendant's guilt. [People v Shami, 501 Mich. 243, 250-251; 912 N.W.2d 526 (2018) (cleaned up).]
"[T]his Court reviews de novo the bindover decision to determine whether the district court abused its discretion, giving no deference to the circuit court's decision." People v Norwood, 303 Mich.App. 466, 468; 843 N.W.2d 775 (2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "A district court abuses its discretion if its decision falls outside the range of principled outcomes." Shami, 501 Mich. at 251 (quotation marks and citations omitted). "Insofar as the district court based its ruling on questions of law, however, its ruling is reviewed de novo." Id. "This Court therefore essentially sits in the same position as the circuit court when determining whether the district court abused its discretion." People v Hudson, 241 Mich.App. 268, 276; 615 N.W.2d 784 (2000). Questions of law like whether the Fourth Amendment was violated and whether the exclusionary rule applies, are reviewed de novo. People v Jenkins, 472 Mich. 26, 31; 691 N.W.2d 759 (2005); People v Woodard, 321 Mich.App. 377, 382-383; 909 N.W.2d 299 (2017). However, a trial court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error. People v Barbarich, 291 Mich.App. 468, 471; 807 N.W.2d 56 (2011). "A finding is clearly...
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