People v. Jones

• Decision Date: 22 June 2021
• Docket Number: E074846
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DAVID PIERRE JONES, Defendant and Appellant.

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DAVID PIERRE JONES, Defendant and Appellant.

E074846

California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, Second Division

June 22, 2021

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. No FSB18003148 Ronald M. Christianson, Judge. Affirmed.

David W. Beaudreau, under appointment of the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson and Jennifer B. Truong, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

OPINION

FIELDS J.

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant and appellant David Pierre Jones was convicted of committing three one strike offenses (Pen. Code, § 667.61) ^[1] and other crimes, when he was 19 years old in 2018. He was sentenced to 105 years to life for his one strike offenses and enhancements, plus a determinate term of 32 years four months for his other crimes and enhancements.

Jones does not challenge his convictions or his sentence. Rather, he claims that section 3051, subdivision (h) (section 3051(h)) is facially unconstitutional because it violates the state and federal equal protection rights of all young adult one strike offenders. The statute categorically excludes all one strike offenders from eligibility for youth offender parole consideration under section 3051, while young adults convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to 25 years to life are eligible for youth offender parole consideration during their 25th year of incarceration. (§ 3051, subds. (b)(3), (h).)

In People v. Williams (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 475, review granted July 22, 2020, S262191 (Williams), our Supreme Court is reviewing whether section 3051(h) violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “by excluding young adults convicted and sentenced for serious sex crimes under the one strike law (Pen. Code, § 667.61) from youth offender parole consideration, while young adults convicted of first degree murder are entitled to such consideration.” (July 22, 2020, S262229 [order granting review and limiting scope of review].)

The Court of Appeal is split on the question of whether section 3051(h) violates the equal protection rights of one strike offenders, and is thus unconstitutional on its face. To date, three courts have concluded that section 3051(h) does not violate the equal protection rights of one strike offenders (Williams, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th 475; People v. Moseley (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 1160 (Moseley); People v. Miranda (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 162 (Miranda)), while two other courts have reached the contrary conclusion. (People v. Edwards (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 183 (Edwards); In re Woods (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 740 (Woods).)

Following Williams, Moseley, and this court's recent decision in Miranda, we conclude that section 3051 does not violate the equal protection rights of one strike offenders and is not unconstitutional on its face or as applied to all one strike offenders. There is a rational basis for excluding one strike offenders from youth offender parole eligibility under section 3051: the especially high risk that one strike offenders will recidivate if released on parole. Thus, we affirm the judgment and do not remand the matter to the sentencing court to make a record of information relevant to a future youth offender parole hearing for Jones. (People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261.)

II. FACTS AND PROCEDURE^[2]

A. Prosecution Evidence

In August 6, 2018, Jones went into a check cashing business in Ontario and robbed two of its employees of around $1, 200, while pointing a gun at them. Later that day, Jones went into a massage parlor in Colton. After he was taken into a massage room, Jones demanded money, at gunpoint, from two of the massage parlor's employees, Doe 1 and Doe 2. The three of them then went to the employee waiting room, where Doe 1 and Doe 2 gave Jones several hundred dollars. Jones dropped a bullet from a semiautomatic firearm on the floor of the employee waiting room.

Then, in the hallway next to the massage rooms, Jones attempted to rape Doe 2, then he forced Doe 2 to orally copulate him. Next, he forced Doe 2 into one of the massage rooms, where he raped Doe 2, then raped Doe 1. He was holding the gun the entire time.

B. Defense Evidence

Jonestestified that he committed the four robberies, but he claimed that he used a toy airsoft pistol in the robberies. He also claimed that his sex acts with Doe 1 and Doe 2 were consensual. He testified that Doe 2 offered him “two free dates” or “two free sexual intercourses”-with herself and Doe 1-in exchange for his agreeing not to take any more money from Doe 1 and Doe 2, and he accepted the offer.

C. Jones's Convictions and Sentence

A jury convicted Jones of four counts of second degree robbery (§ 211, counts 1-4), attempted forcible rape (§§ 664, subd. (a), 261, subd. (a)(2); count 5), forcible oral copulation (§ 287, subd. (c) (2)(A); count 6), and two counts of forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2); counts 7 & 8). The jury found that Jones personally used a firearm in each count. (§ 12022.53, subd. (b).)

In counts 6, 7, and 8, the jury found four one strike allegations true: (1) Jones kidnapped the victims, causing movement that substantially increased the risk of harm to the victims over and above the risk inherent in the offense (§ 667.61, subd. (d)(2)); (2) Jones kidnapped the victims (§ 667.61, subd. (e)(1)); (3) Jones personally used a firearm in each count (§ 667.61, subd. (e)(3)); and (4) Jones committed the offenses against more than one victim (§ 667.61, subd. (e)(4)).

Jones was sentenced to a determinate term of 32 years four months on his convictions and firearm enhancements in counts 1 through 5, plus an indeterminate term of 105 years to life on his one strike convictions and firearm enhancements in counts 6, 7 and 8 (three consecutive 25-year-to-life terms, plus three consecutive 10-year terms for the firearm enhancements).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7, of the California Constitution guarantee to all persons the equal protection of the law. Equal protection claims are reviewed de novo when, as here, they involve pure questions of law. (People v. McKee (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1338.) In addition, facial constitutional challenges presenting pure questions of law may be raised, as here, for the first time on appeal. (In re Shenna K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 885-886, 889.) Thus, here, although Jones did not raise a facial equal protection challenge to section 3052(h) in the trial court, including at sentencing, he has not forfeited the claim on appeal.^[3]

B. Section 3051, Relevant Provisions

In its current form, section 3051 allows an imprisoned offender to seek early release on parole at a “youth offender parole hearing” if the offender was 25 years of age or younger on the date of the offender's “controlling offense.” (§ 3051, subds. (a), (b).) A controlling offense “means the offense or enhancement for which any sentencing court imposed the longest term of imprisonment.” (§ 3051, subd. (a)(2)(B).)

As originally enacted in 2013, section 3051 applied only to juvenile offenders-those who committed their controlling offense while under 18 years of age. (Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 4, eff. Jan. 1, 2014.) In enacting section 3051, the Legislature found and declared, “that, as stated by the United States Supreme Court in Miller v. Alabama (2012) 183 L.Ed.2d 407, ‘only a relatively small proportion of adolescents' who engage in illegal activity ‘develop entrenched patterns of problem behavior,' and that ‘developments in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds,' including ‘parts of the brain involved in behavior control.' The Legislature recognizes that youthfulness both lessens a juvenile's moral culpability and enhances the prospect that, as a youth matures into an adult and neurological development occurs, these individuals can become contributing members of society.” (Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2014.) The Legislature stated its intent “to create a process by which growth and maturity of youthful offenders can be assessed and a meaningful opportunity for release established.” (Ibid.)

The Legislature further stated that its purpose in enacting the statute was, “to establish a parole eligibility mechanism that provides a person serving a sentence for crimes that he or she committed as a juvenile the opportunity to obtain release when he or she has shown that he or she has been rehabilitated and gained maturity, in accordance with the decision of the California Supreme Court in People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262 and the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48 [(Graham)] and Miller v. Alabama (2012) [(Miller)].” (Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 1.)

Since its 2013 enactment, section 3051 has twice been amended to extend the availability of youth offender parole consideration to offenders who committed a controlling offense while young adults. (See Williams supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 488.) In 2015, the statute was amended to apply to offenders who committed their controlling offense while under age 23 (Stats. 2015, ch. 471, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2016.) In 2017, the statute was again amended to extend youth offender parole consideration to offenders who committed their controlling offense while under age 26 (Stats. 2017, ch. 675, § 1, eff. Jan 1, 2018). The Legislature made these changes in light of scientific evidence that “certain areas of the brain, particularly those affecting judg[]ment...