People v. Jones
| Decision Date | 03 August 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 4-98-0704.,4-98-0704. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, Robert D. JONES, Defendant-Appellant. |
Defendant, Robert D. Jones, was charged with the first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1 (West 1992)) of Dr. Henry Dickerman, who disappeared from his home in Springfield on August 12, 1992. Defendant was convicted at a jury trial in August 1996, but this court reversed that judgment and remanded for a new trial. People v. Jones, No. 4-96-0855, 294 Ill. App.3d 1125, 242 Ill.Dec. 584, 721 N.E.2d 863 (February 23, 1998) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). Following remand defendant was convicted of first degree murder at a jury trial in June 1998 and sentenced to 85 years in prison. Defendant appeals. We affirm.
Defendant had been doing some repairs and painting to Dickerman's home at the time Dickerman disappeared. After the disappearance, it was discovered that a number of Dickerman's checks were missing and that checks totaling $6,845 had been made out to defendant. Defendant eventually pleaded guilty to forging a $4,200 check and was sentenced to the Department of Corrections.
Defendant was interviewed a number of times: on October 6, 1992, by a Federal Bureau of Investigation agent; on July 12, 1993, by various Springfield detectives; on July 27, 1994, while in the Big Muddy Correctional Center, by Springfield detectives; on August 3, 1994, while in the Franklin County jail; on August 15, 1994, while in jail; and on August 16, 1994, when he was served with an arrest warrant for first degree murder.
In Jones, defendant argued that the trial court erred in admitting the August 15, 1994, statement into evidence because it was made during the course of plea negotiations, in violation of Supreme Court Rule 402(f) (). During the July 27, 1994, interview, defendant had asked the detectives to inform the State's Attorney that he would plead guilty to involuntary manslaughter in return for a 10-year sentence. In the August 15, 1994, interview, the detectives asked defendant to write out exactly what deal he would be willing to accept. Defendant wrote out a two-page statement setting forth the deal he would accept and that statement was ultimately read into evidence at trial. Although the investigators had told defendant they could not negotiate a guilty plea, they did say they would relay the information to the State's Attorney's office. We concluded that defendant's two-page handwritten statement clearly demonstrated his willingness to plead guilty in exchange for concessions and was a plea-related statement inadmissible pursuant to Rule 402(f).
In his present appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred on remand when it admitted into evidence the July 27, 1994, and August 16, 1994, statements, which defendant asserts were also plea related. Defendant also argues that the court erred when it refused to reconsider its ruling in the first trial that the two statements were admissible.
In July 1994, while defendant was serving his prison term for the forgery conviction, a detective told defendant's mother to tell defendant that if he thought his crime was less than first degree murder, he should speak with detectives. Defendant subsequently requested to meet with Springfield detectives regarding Dickerman's disappearance.
During the interview, defendant sought to make a deal, but the detectives advised him they did not have authority to negotiate a plea. Defendant asked the detectives to inform the State's Attorney that he would plead guilty to involuntary manslaughter in return for a 10-year sentence to run concurrently with his federal sentence. The detectives indicated they would take the message to the State's Attorney.
Defendant told the detectives he knew they did not have the murder weapon, even though he had not been previously advised that Dickerman's disappearance was being investigated as a murder. (Dickerman's decomposed remains had been found in September 1992, at the bottom of a 20- to 25-foot-high bluff in a fishing and hiking area southwest of St. Louis.) Defendant also inquired about the blood found in the bathroom even though he was never told blood was found there.
Defendant told the detectives that earlier in the week of August 11, 1992, Dickerman had discovered his forgeries. Both men agreed that defendant would do additional work around the house in return for Dickerman's not pressing charges. On August 11, 1992, after returning from purchasing supplies, defendant found Dickerman dead in his living room with a spot of blood on the top of his head. Defendant was unable to resuscitate Dickerman, so he left the house but returned later that evening to place the body on the couch.
During an August 15, 1994, interview, defendant wrote out the deal he would be willing to accept, the two-page written statement we held was erroneously admitted in Jones. The next day, detectives returned and served defendant with an arrest warrant for first degree murder. A detective told him that if the crime was less than first degree murder it would behoove him to speak to the detectives and tell them what happened. Because defendant had earlier told the detectives he was guilty only of involuntary manslaughter and concealing a homicide, one of the detectives brought a copy of the Criminal Code of 1961 to show defendant the statutory definitions of the crimes and to specifically show him the elements of first degree murder. The detective had interviewed defendant on July 12, 1993, August 3, 1994, August 15, 1994, and August 16, 1994. On each of those occasions, defendant indicated that he would like to work out a deal and asked that his proposal be communicated to the State's Attorney, and on each occasion the detectives said they would do so.
After being given his Miranda rights (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)), defendant made a new statement to the detectives. This time, defendant stated that on August 11, 1992, he was at Dickerman's home when Dickerman confronted defendant about the forged checks. During the confrontation, Dickerman grabbed his chest, fell into the fireplace, and hit his head on a brick in the fireplace hearth. Defendant left the house with the door unlocked, hoping someone else would find the body. When defendant returned to the house the next day, he noticed blood on the top of Dickerman's head. He placed the body in Dickerman's car, took a shovel and Dickerman's personal effects, and drove the body to southern Illinois to bury it.
The State argues that defendant should have attacked the July 27, 1994, and August 16, 1994, interviews in his first appeal and that the trial court properly refused to reconsider its decision in the first trial to admit those interviews, on the basis of collateral estoppel. Certainly a trial court should not be forced to start over, after a case is remanded, and rule again on every motion. However, principles of collateral estoppel do not bar relitigation of a pretrial ruling after remand, where special circumstances are present. People v. Enis, 163 Ill.2d 367, 386, 206 Ill.Dec. 604, 645 N.E.2d 856, 864 (1994). A trial court retains jurisdiction to reconsider an order it has entered, even after remand, as long as the cause is pending before the trial court. Enis, 163 Ill.2d at 387, 206 Ill.Dec. 604, 645 N.E.2d at 865. Viewing the matter in terms of the doctrine of law of the case, there is no bar to the trial court conducting a new hearing. Enis, 163 Ill.2d at 387, 206 Ill.Dec. 604, 645 N.E.2d at 865; see also People v. Huff, 308 Ill.App.3d 1046, 1049, 242 Ill.Dec. 688, 721 N.E.2d 1219, 1221 (1999), appeal allowed, 188 Ill.2d 574, 246 Ill.Dec. 127, 729 N.E.2d 500 (2000).
Special circumstances were present in this case that required the trial court to reexamine its rulings on these two interviews in the first trial. Our decision in Jones addressed the precise issue that was raised after remand as to these two interviews. It was not necessary for us to address the other two interviews when we decided Jones. The trial court, which knew after remand that its ruling was erroneous as to the one interview, should have reconsidered its ruling as to the other two interviews to make certain that ruling did not suffer from the same infirmities.
Generally, a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence is subject to reversal only if it is manifestly erroneous. People v. Nielson, 187 Ill.2d 271, 286, 240 Ill.Dec. 650, 718 N.E.2d 131, 141 (1999). This clearly erroneous or manifestly erroneous test is based on the understanding that suppression motions usually raise mixed questions of law and fact. People v. Gray, 305 Ill.App.3d 835, 837, 239 Ill.Dec. 250, 713 N.E.2d 781, 782 (1999). Where neither the facts nor the credibility of the witnesses is at issue, de novo review is appropriate. Nielson, 187 Ill.2d at 286,240 Ill.Dec. 650,718 N.E.2d at 141; see also In re G.O., 191 Ill.2d 37, 46-47, 245 Ill.Dec. 269, 727 N.E.2d 1003, 1008-09 (2000) (). Even where the facts are undisputed, where reasonable persons could draw divergent inferences from those facts, any question of fact should be resolved by the trier of fact. Jackson v. TLC Associates, Inc., 185 Ill.2d 418, 424, 235 Ill.Dec. 905, 706 N.E.2d 460, 463 (1998); Rhodes v. Illinois...
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