People v. Kassover

• Decision Date: 03 October 1960
• Citation: 24 Misc.2d 1080,205 N.Y.S.2d 428
• Parties: PEOPLE of The State of New York, Appellant, v. Martin KASSOVER, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: New York Court of Special Sessions

Page 428

205 N.Y.S.2d 428

24 Misc.2d 1080

PEOPLE of The State of New York, Appellant, v. Martin KASSOVER, Defendant-Respondent.

Court of Special Sessions of City of New York, Appellate

Part, First Department.

Oct. 3, 1960.

Frank S. Hogan, Dist. Atty., New York County, New York City (Arthur C. Muhlstock, Asst. Dist. Atty., New York City, of counsel), for appellant.

Martin Kassover, respondent, Atlantic Beach, in pro. per.

Before MURTAGH, P. J., and GASSMAN and RINGEL, JJ.

BENJAMIN GASSMAN, Justice.

The People appeal from a judgment rendered by the Magistrate's Court, granting the defendant's motion, made at the close of the People's case, to dismiss the complaint, for the reason, as stated in the opinion below, that Section 51(a) of the New York City Traffic Regulations is vague, indefinite and imprecise and, therefore, unconstitutional.

The defendant was charged with having made a U-turn on West 42nd Street between Fifth Avenue and Avenue of the Americas, in violation of Section 51(a) of the New York City Traffic Regulations, which provides that 'the driver of any vehicle shall not turn such vehicle so as to proceed in the opposite direction upon any street in a business district'. At the trial, the police officer testified that on June 6, 1959, at 11:30 a. m. he observed the defendant operating a Ford sports car easterly on West 42nd Street, between Fifth Avenue and Avenue of the Americas and that he made a U-turn in the middle of the block. He stated on cross-examination that there are no signs on that block 'denoting no U-turn'. However, he testified that on that street were a number of stores, including Stern's Department Store.

At the close of the People's case, defendant moved to dismiss the complaint and the court reserved decision on that motion. Defendant then rested and again moved to dismiss the complaint. The court again reserved decision and later, in a long opinion (People v. Kassover, 20 Misc.2d 782, 191 N.Y.S.2d 54) granted the motion made at the end of the People's case, holding that Section 51(a) of the New York City Traffic Regulations was unconstitutional on the ground that 'there is absolutely nothing in the complaint to apprise the defendant that 'business district' as used therein, is 'defined' in Section 105 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, or anywhere else, for that matter', and that 'from the record before me, we do not know whether the defendant made a U-turn 'so as to proceed in the opposite direction'. He may have made it for another purpose--to park, for instance. It would seem that a motorist making a U-turn and then parking, without proceeding, would not be violating the regulation'. The court below then concluded that the language of the regulation in question was 'vague, indefinite and imprecise' and, therefore, unconstitutional.

A criminal statute must, of course, be sufficiently definite, clear and positive to give unequivocal meaning to citizens of the rule to be obeyed. People v. Firth, 3 N.Y.2d 472, 474, 168 N.Y.S.2d 949, 950. Statutes which create crimes must be definite, specifying those acts which are prohibited. People v. Grogan, 260 N.Y. 138, 183 N.E. 273, 86 A.L.R. 1266. A penal statute must afford some comprehensive guide or rule as to what must be done and what must be avoided, so that an ordinary member of society may know how to comply with the law. People v. O'Gorman, 274 N.Y. 284, 8 N.E.2d 862, 110 A.L.R. 1231.

Because there was no sign on the street in question prohibiting U-turns, a driver making such a U-turn on that street could be convicted only if the traffic regulation in question apprised him of the fact that such a turn was prohibited by law. The question presented is whether the language in Section 51(a) of the Traffic Regulations is definite in specifying conduct which is prohibited. Does it give 'unequivocal warning' to citizens of the rule which is to be obeyed?

The court below held that the language in that regulation was vague and indefinite and that it did not meet the test of being 'informative on its face', because while it prohibited a U-turn on a street in a 'business district', it did not, on its face, define that term. In order to enable the driver of a vehicle to determine whether the street in question was in a 'business district', he would have to refer to Section 105 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law for a definition of that term. 'How', asked the court below, 'is such a person to know that the regulation is not complete on its face? How is he to know that a 'definition' of its crucial language is to be found in the Vehicle and Traffic Law?' The court below then concluded that 'the very fact that a 'definition' was necessary is cogent proof that the words 'business district' in the Traffic Regulations, are vague, indefinite, imprecise and equivocal; that the regulation does not inform on its face as mandated by the Court of Appeals in People v. Firth, supra'.

The fact that language in a statute or regulation may require reference to 'definitions' in that or in a related statute, does not necessarily render such statute or regulation vague or indefinite. Nor does the fact that a person would have to look to Section 105 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law for a definition of the term 'business district' used in the traffic regulation make the regulation vague. After all, one is presumed to know the law and that includes traffic regulations as well. A driver of a vehicle is chargeable with knowledge that, regardless of the absence of a sign prohibiting a U-turn on a certain street, if the street in question is, in fact, in a business district, such turns are prohibited by law. Certainly a driver, operating a vehicle on West 42nd Street, between Fifth Avenue and Avenue of the Americas, could not help but conclude that it is in a 'business district'. West 42nd Street between those two avenues is one of the longest streets in the City of New York. It is bounded on the south by the New York Public Library and by Bryant Park, and on the north by a number of large office buildings, a large department store, a large Woolworth store and a great number of other stores, frequented by thousands of shoppers daily. It is one of the heaviest-traveled crosstown arterial streets, used by busses, taxicabs, private automobiles and trucks. One cannot shut his eyes to the evident fact that it is one of the busiest shopping streets in Manhattan, on which there are 'buildings in use for business or industrial purposes * * * which occupy at least three hundred feet of frontage on one side' (Sec. 105, Vehicle and Traffic Law). It is, without question a 'business district'.

Nor could a person, operating a vehicle in any other section of the City of New York, where the physical characteristics are the same as or similar to those on West 42nd Street, claim that he was unaware that it was a street in a 'business district', and therefore, a street on which U-turns are prohibited.

The regulation in question was promulgated by the Commissioner of Traffic of the City of New York under authority granted by Section 1640 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law which provides that a city may 'by local law, ordinance, order, rule or regulation * * * prohibit or regulate the turning of vehicles * * * at intersections or other designated locations'. (subd. 2). Subdivision 15 of that Section empowers a city to 'adopt such additional reasonable local laws, ordinances, orders, rules and regulations with respect to traffic as local conditions may require subject to the limitations contained in the various laws of this state'. Section 1642 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law provides that 'in addition to the other powers granted by this article, the legislative body of any city having a population in excess of one million, may by local law, ordinance, order, rule, regulation or sanitary code provision prohibit, restrict or regulate * * * turning of vehicles'. Section 51(a) of the New York City Traffic Regulations is clear in its prohibition against making U-turns on any street in a business district. We do not agree with the learned court below that 'a motorist making a U-turn and then parking, without proceeding, would not be violating the regulation'. A driver operating a vehicle in one direction and making a complete U-turn, even if only for the purpose of parking on the opposite side of the street, would, at least for some distance, 'proceed in the opposite direction' before parking and would therefore be in violation of the regulation. The construction applied by the court below to the words 'so as to proceed in the opposite direction' as meaning that one who makes such a U-turn violates the regulation only if he continues to proceed in the opposite direction, is entirely too narrow. The regulation was intended to prevent...