People v. Khalil

• Decision Date: 16 June 2022
• Docket Number: 112974
• Citation: 206 A.D.3d 1300,170 N.Y.S.3d 658
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Ahmed KHALIL, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

206 A.D.3d 1300

170 N.Y.S.3d 658

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.Ahmed KHALIL, Appellant.

112974

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Calendar Date: April 26, 2022

Decided and Entered: June 16, 2022

Tully Rinckey PLLC, Rochester (Peter J. Pullano of counsel), for appellant.

Gary M. Pasqua, District Attorney, Canton (Matthew L. Peabody of counsel), for respondent.

Before: Egan Jr., J.P., Lynch, Aarons, Reynolds Fitzgerald and Ceresia, JJ.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Ceresia, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of St. Lawrence County (McKeighan, J.), rendered June 29, 2020, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of stalking in the first degree, unlawful imprisonment in the second degree, menacing in the third degree, harassment in the second degree, petit larceny, grand larceny in the fourth degree and criminal mischief in the fourth degree.

Defendant and the victim were involved in a relationship in the spring and summer of 2018. Following an incident during which defendant confined the victim and took her cellphone when she tried to call the police, leading her to jump out of defendant's car and flee into a church to escape him, defendant was charged in an eight-count indictment with stalking in the first degree, unlawful imprisonment in the second degree, menacing in the third degree, harassment in the second degree, two counts of petit larceny, grand larceny in the fourth degree and criminal mischief in the fourth degree. Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on statutory speedy trial grounds, which motion was denied by County Court. Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of all of the charges with the exception of one count of petit larceny. He was thereafter sentenced to a prison term of four years followed by three years of postrelease supervision for his conviction of stalking in the first degree, a concurrent prison term of one to three years for his conviction of grand larceny in the fourth degree, and time served for the remaining convictions. Defendant appeals.

Defendant first argues that he was deprived of his statutory right to a speedy trial. The People are required to announce readiness for trial within 90 days when a defendant is charged with a misdemeanor, and within six months when he or she is charged with a felony ( CPL 30.30[1][a], [b] ). "Whether the People complied with this obligation is determined by computing the time elapsed from the filing of the first accusatory instrument and the People's declaration of readiness, subtracting any periods of delay that are excludable under the terms of the statute and then adding to the result any postreadiness periods of delay that are actually attributable to the People and are ineligible for an exclusion" ( People v. Pentalow, 196 A.D.3d 871, 872, 149 N.Y.S.3d 713 [2021] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

On August 25, 2018, defendant was arraigned in local criminal court on three informations charging him with the misdemeanors of unlawful imprisonment in the second degree and menacing in the third degree, as well as the violation of harassment in the second degree. The People declared their readiness for trial five days later, on August 30, 2018. Thereafter, between August 31, 2018 and July 11, 2019, defense counsel made successive written requests to adjourn the proceedings. On July 11, 2019, the People filed an indictment containing the three initial charges as well as five new charges, including two felonies, and announced their readiness for trial with respect to it.

Defendant contends that the People's initial declaration of readiness on August 30, 2018 was rendered illusory by the filing of the indictment, such that the approximately 10½ months that passed between his arraignment on August 25, 2018, and the People's announcement of readiness on the indictment on July 11, 2019, should be charged to the People. This contention is without merit (see People v. Morales, 309 A.D.2d 1065, 1066, 765 N.Y.S.2d 918 [2003], lv denied 1 N.Y.3d 576, 775 N.Y.S.2d 793, 807 N.E.2d 906 [2003] ). Where the charges set forth in an indictment are directly derived from previously-filed accusatory instruments in that they stem from the same criminal transaction, the indicted charges relate back to the date of the filing of the earlier accusatory instruments both for purposes of calculating the period within which the People must declare readiness (see People v. Osgood, 52 N.Y.2d 37, 45, 436 N.Y.S.2d 213, 417 N.E.2d 507 [1980] ) and for computing any excludable time (see People v. Sinistaj, 67 N.Y.2d 236, 237, 501 N.Y.S.2d 793, 492 N.E.2d 1209 [1986] ; People ex rel. Greenstein v. Sheriff of Schenectady County, 220 A.D.2d 190, 193, 645 N.Y.S.2d 339 [1996] ).

Preliminarily, we agree with defendant that all of the charges set forth in the indictment arose out of the same criminal transaction as that alleged in the local criminal court informations, such that they all relate back to the informations. Therefore, the speedy trial clock began to run on August 25, 2018, the date of the filing of the informations, and we must determine whether any of the time between that date and the People's announcement of readiness on July 11, 2019 can be excluded from the speedy trial calculation.

In that regard, "the period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the court at the request of, or with the consent of, the defendant or his or her counsel" is excludable ( CPL 30.30[4][b] ; see People v. Abdullah, 133 A.D.3d 925, 927, 20 N.Y.S.3d 659 [2015], lv denied 27 N.Y.3d 990, 38 N.Y.S.3d 101, 59 N.E.3d 1213 [2016] ). Although the People are charged with the five days of delay from August 26, 2018 to August 30, 2018, the period beginning on August 31, 2018 and continuing through July 11, 2019 is excluded from the speedy trial calculation due to defendant's own adjournment requests. Accordingly, defendant's speedy trial rights were not violated (see People v. Skinner, 211 A.D.2d 979, 979, 621 N.Y.S.2d 733 [1995], lv denied 86 N.Y.2d 741, 631 N.Y.S.2d 621, 655 N.E.2d 718 [1995] ). We also reject defendant's argument that the People violated notions of "fundamental fairness" by waiting over 10 months to present the case to a grand jury, as defendant's speculative assertion that the People engaged in tactical delay is unsupported by the record (see People v. Grey, 150 A.D.2d 823, 824, 540 N.Y.S.2d 378 [1989], lv denied 74 N.Y.2d 810, 546 N.Y.S.2d 568, 545 N.E.2d 882 [1989] ).

Next, defendant claims that his conviction for grand larceny in the fourth degree is not supported by legally sufficient evidence and is against the weight of the evidence, and that his remaining convictions are against the weight of the evidence. "When conducting a legal sufficiency analysis, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the People and evaluate whether there is any valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could lead a rational person to the conclusion reached by the jury on the basis of the evidence at trial and as a matter of law satisfy the proof and burden requirements for every element of the crime charged" ( People v. LaDuke, 204 A.D.3d 1083, 1084, 166 N.Y.S.3d 697 [2022] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). "In assessing whether a verdict is supported by the weight of the evidence, we must first determine whether, based on all the credible evidence, a different finding would not have been unreasonable, and, if it would have been reasonable for the jury to reach a different conclusion, then we must weigh the relative probative force of conflicting testimony and the relative strength of conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the testimony to determine whether the jury has failed to give the evidence the weight it should be accorded" ( People v. Cade, 203 A.D.3d 1221, 1221–1222, 164 N.Y.S.3d 288 [2022] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]). Our weight of the evidence "analysis entails viewing the evidence in a neutral light and giving deference to the jury's credibility assessments" ( People v. Kiah, 156 A.D.3d 1054, 1055, 67 N.Y.S.3d 337 [2017] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lvs denied 31 N.Y.3d 981, 984, 77 N.Y.S.3d 659, 662, 102 N.E.3d 436, 439 [2018]).

According to the victim's testimony at trial, her relationship with defendant, who shares her Muslim faith, was brief and tumultuous, marked by her increasing fear of defendant, who verbally abused her and prevented her from seeing her friends or moving about freely. The tension in the relationship escalated, culminating in the events giving rise to the charges in this case. On the evening of August 22, 2018, the two argued, and the victim attempted to find a place on her college campus where defendant would not find her, so she could study for an exam that she was scheduled to take the next morning. Defendant, however, ultimately found her and slept beside her while she studied all night.

On the morning of August 23, 2018, according to the victim, she wanted to take a shower before her exam, so they left the victim's car on campus and went in defendant's car to their shared residence, a recreational vehicle (hereinafter the RV). While in the RV, the...