People v. Quinn

• Decision Date: 23 November 2022
• Docket Number: 110387, 113191
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Richard QUINN, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

210 A.D.3d 1284

178 N.Y.S.3d 623

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.Richard QUINN, Appellant.

110387, 113191

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Calendar Date: October 11, 2022

Decided and Entered: November 23, 2022

Paul J. Connolly, Delmar, for appellant.

P. David Soares, District Attorney, Albany (Emily Schultz of counsel), for respondent.

Before: Garry, P.J., Clark, Aarons, Pritzker and Fisher, JJ.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Pritzker, J. Appeals (1) from a judgment of the County Court of Albany County (William A. Carter, J.), rendered April 9, 2018, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crime of murder in the second degree, and (2) by permission, from an order of the Supreme Court (Roger D. McDonough, J.), entered November 12, 2021 in Albany County, which denied defendant's motion pursuant to CPL 440.10 to vacate the judgment of conviction, without a hearing.

In June 2017, defendant was charged by indictment with murder in the second degree based upon allegations that he stabbed the victim in the City of Albany, with the intent to kill him. After a jury trial, defendant was convicted as charged. Prior to sentencing, defendant moved to set aside the verdict, which motion County Court denied, after a hearing. Defendant was thereafter sentenced to a prison term of 25 years to life. Defendant subsequently moved to set aside the judgment of conviction pursuant to CPL 440.10(1) based upon allegedly improper conduct of the judge presiding over defendant's case. Supreme Court denied the motion without a hearing. Defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction and, by permission, from the denial of his CPL article 440 motion.

Defendant argues that the verdict is based on legally insufficient evidence and is against the weight of the evidence. These argument are devoid of merit and warrant little discussion. "To establish murder in the second degree as charged in the indictment, the People were required to prove that defendant, with intent to cause the death of another person, caused the death of such person or of a third person" ( People v. Slivienski, 204 A.D.3d 1228, 1229–1230, 166 N.Y.S.3d 392 [3d Dept. 2022] [internal quotation marks, brackets, ellipses and citation omitted], lv denied 38 N.Y.3d 1136, 172 N.Y.S.3d 854, 193 N.E.3d 519 [2022] ; see Penal Law § 125.25[1] ). At trial, two witnesses testified that they observed defendant stab the victim and explained that, at the time, he was wearing a black poncho and a skull cap or turban. Although they did not identify him in court, several other witnesses testified that they observed a man wearing a black poncho and skull cap or turban stab the victim. Testimony established that defendant stabbed the victim multiple times in the chest and heart area before leaving the scene. These stab wounds resulted in the victim's death. Video footage from various security cameras in the area show a man, dressed in a black poncho and skull cap, in the area where the incident occurred just prior to the stabbing and walking away shortly afterward. The jury was shown the surveillance video and had the opportunity to view defendant to determine whether this was the same person. "Based on the foregoing, when construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People as we must, a rational person could conclude that the [stabber's] identity was sufficiently proven to be defendant" ( People v. Slivienski, 204 A.D.3d at 1234, 166 N.Y.S.3d 392 [citation omitted]; see People v. Sweet, 200 A.D.3d 1315, 1315–1316, 157 N.Y.S.3d 636 [3d Dept. 2021], lv denied 38 N.Y.3d 930, 164 N.Y.S.3d 13, 184 N.E.3d 834 [2022] ). As to the weight of the evidence, although a different verdict would not have been unreasonable given inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimony and lack of physical evidence, "when viewing all of the evidence in a neutral light and deferring to the jury's credibility determinations, we find that the weight of the credible evidence supports the conclusion" that defendant was the stabber ( People v. Slivienski, 204 A.D.3d at 1235, 166 N.Y.S.3d 392 [citations omitted]; see People v. Ashe, 208 A.D.3d 1500, 1505, 174 N.Y.S.3d 509 [3d Dept. 2022] ).

Defendant also contends that County Court erred by denying his motion to preclude the People from admitting recordings of his calls from jail to family and friends on the basis of due process and equal protection.¹ We turn first to defendant's due process claim. NY Constitution, article I, § 6 and U.S. Constitution, 14th Amendment, § 1 each provide that a person may not be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law (see People v. David W., 95 N.Y.2d 130, 136, 711 N.Y.S.2d 134, 733 N.E.2d 206 [2000] ). A "[s]ubstantive due process analysis must begin with a careful description of the asserted right" ( Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302, 113 S.Ct. 1439, 123 L.Ed.2d 1 [1993] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). To that end, defendant generically sets forth several "rights" which he asserts are fundamental and violated by the correction facility's sharing of defendant's nonprivileged recorded calls with the People. These asserted rights include the right to a "fair trial" and a "fundamental due process right to prepare for trial and to defend himself with the assistance of counsel."² Although impairment of these generic fundamental rights may trigger strict scrutiny, this is not really what plagues defendant. Indeed, defendant does not set forth how his right to a fair trial was actually impaired, and the record fails to reveal same. Rather, defendant is arguing that making admissions to family and friends with impunity is a fundamental right – clearly, it is not (see Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 138 L.Ed.2d 772 [1997] ; People v. Knox, 12 N.Y.3d 60, 67, 875 N.Y.S.2d 828, 903 N.E.2d 1149 [2009], cert denied 558 U.S. 1011, 130 S.Ct. 552, 175 L.Ed.2d 382 [2009] ).

Because defendant failed to assert the violation of a fundamental right, the dissemination of his nonprivileged recorded phone calls must only be "rationally related to any conceivable legitimate State purpose" (People ex rel. Johnson v. Superintendent, Adirondack Corr. Facility, 36 N.Y.3d 187, 202, 140 N.Y.S.3d 124, 163 N.E.3d 1041 [2020] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). To that end, it is a fundamental principle of criminal procedure that, to be convicted of a crime, the People bear the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a defendant committed the crime for which he or she has been charged (see Matter of Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362–364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 [1970] ). To meet this burden, they must rely on evidence gathered by law enforcement, such as defendant's nonprivileged phone calls. Defendant does not dispute that he was aware that his phone calls were being monitored and recorded, thus he had no "reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of those phone calls ..., and there is no legitimate reason to think that [these] recordings, like any other evidence lawfully discovered, would not be admissible" ( People v. Diaz, 33 N.Y.3d 92, 100, 98 N.Y.S.3d 544, 122 N.E.3d 61 [2019] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted], cert denied ––– U.S. ––––, 140 S. Ct. 394, 205 L.Ed.2d 215 [2019] ). Accordingly, we find that the dissemination of defendant's nonprivileged recorded jail phone calls is rationally related to the State's discharging of its duty to prosecute criminal defendants.

This holding is consistent with those of the First and Second Departments (see People v. Utley, 170 A.D.3d 757, 758, 93 N.Y.S.3d 585 [2d Dept. 2019], lv denied 33 N.Y.3d 1074, 105 N.Y.S.3d 31, 129 N.E.3d 351 [2019] ; People v. Cisse, 149 A.D.3d 435, 436, 53 N.Y.S.3d 614 [1st Dept. 2017], affd 32 N.Y.3d 1198, 96 N.Y.S.3d 165, 120 N.E.3d 364 [2019], cert denied ––– U.S. ––––, 140 S. Ct. 83, 205 L.Ed.2d 77 [2019] ). The First Department has held that "[t]he admission of incriminating, nonprivileged phone calls that [a] defendant [chooses] to make while incarcerated, after receiving multiple forms of notice that [the defendant's] calls may be monitored and recorded, [does] not violate ... [the] defendant's ... due process right to participate in the preparation of his [or her] own defense" ( People v. Cisse, 149 A.D.3d at 436, 53 N.Y.S.3d 614 ). The First Department reasoned that, as here, a "[d]efendant [is] free to make privileged calls to his [or her] attorney on all aspects of his [or her] case" and "to limit his [or her] social calls to matters unrelated to his [or her] case," but nonetheless may "cho[o]se to assume the risks involved in making unprotected case-related communications" ( id. ).

Likewise, defendant's equal protection claim must also fail. "Where governmental action disadvantages a suspect class or burdens a fundamental right, the conduct must be subjected to strict scrutiny, and will be upheld only if the government can establish a compelling justification for the action.... Where[, however,] a suspect class or fundamental right is not implicated, the government action need only be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose" ( People v. Aviles, 28 N.Y.3d 497, 502, 46 N.Y.S.3d 478, 68 N.E.3d 1208 [2016] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Alevy v. Downstate Med. Ctr. of State of N.Y., 39 N.Y.2d 326, 332–333, 384 N.Y.S.2d 82, 348 N.E.2d 537 [1976] ). Here, defendant posits a compelling arbitrary distinction between wealthy and indigent criminal defendants. The latter are often subject to pretrial detention as they are not able to post bail and are thus subjected to recorded jailhouse telephone calls while, largely, wealthy criminal defendants are not. However, the Supreme Court of the United States has consistently held that "[p]overty, standing alone[,] is not a suspect classification" ( Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323, 100 S.Ct. 2671, 65 L.Ed.2d 784 [1980] ; see Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub....