People v. King
| Decision Date | 03 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | 248 KA 19-00965 |
| Citation | 2022 NY Slip Op 03606 |
| Parties | THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, v. ALVIN KING, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
KAMAN BERLOVE MARAFIOTI JACOBSTEIN & GOLDMAN, LLP, ROCHESTER (GARY MULDOON OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (MARTIN P. MCCARTHY II, OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., CENTRA, PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, AND WINSLOW, JJ.
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (Charles A. Schiano, Jr., J.), rendered February 4, 2019. The judgment convicted defendant upon a jury verdict of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree.
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is reversed on the law, the indictment is dismissed and the matter is remitted to Supreme Court, Monroe County, for proceedings pursuant to CPL 470.45.
Memorandum On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]), arising from the discovery of a loaded handgun in the drop ceiling of a living room in which defendant was present as a guest, defendant contends that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the conviction. We agree, and we therefore reverse the judgment and dismiss the indictment.
As relevant here, a person is guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree when that person knowingly possesses any loaded firearm and possession did not take place in that person's home or place of business (see Penal Law § 265.03 [3]; CJI2d[NY] Penal Law § 265.03 [3]). A person "may be found to possess a firearm through actual, physical possession or through constructive possession" (People v McCoy, 169 A.D.3d 1260, 1262 [3d Dept 2019], lv denied 33 N.Y.3d 1033 [2019]; see Penal Law § 10.00 [8]). To establish constructive possession "the People must show that [such person] exercised 'dominion or control' over the [firearm] by a sufficient level of control over the area in which the [firearm] is found or over the person from whom the [firearm] is seized" (People v Manini, 79 N.Y.2d 561, 573 [1992]; see CJI2d[NY] Constructive Possession).
Here viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People (see People v Diaz, 15 N.Y.3d 764, 765 [2010]), we agree with defendant that the evidence is legally insufficient to establish that he constructively possessed the firearm. A defendant's mere presence in the house where the weapon is found is insufficient to establish constructive possession, and it is undisputed here that defendant had no connection to the apartment other than being there for a brief period of time for the purpose of gambling (see People v Rolldan, 175 A.D.3d 1811, 1813 [4th Dept 2019], lv denied 34 N.Y.3d 1081 [2019]). Further, the People failed to establish that defendant "exercised dominion or control over the [handgun] by a sufficient level of control over the area in which [it was] found" (People v Burns, 17 A.D.3d 709, 710 [3d Dept 2005] [internal quotation marks omitted]).
Contrary to the People's contention, defendant's contemporaneous text messages did not evince defendant's consciousness of guilt and, in any event, "mere knowledge of the presence of the handgun would not establish constructive possession" (People v Hunt, 185 A.D.3d 1531, 1533 [4th Dept 2020]; see People v Mattison, 41 A.D.3d 1224, 1225 [4th Dept 2007], lv denied 9 N.Y.3d 924 [2007]; Burns, 17 A.D.3d at 711]; see generally People v Rivera, 82 N.Y.2d 695, 697 [1993]). Further, although evidence that defendant's DNA profile matched that of the major contributor to DNA found on the handgun and that other individuals in the apartment were excluded as contributors thereto would support an inference that defendant physically possessed the gun at some point in time (see Hunt, 185 A.D.3d at 1532-1533), we conclude that it was not sufficient to support an inference that defendant had constructive possession of the weapon at the time that it was discovered (cf. People v Crowley, 188 A.D.3d 1665, 1666 [4th Dept 2020], lv denied 36 N.Y.3d 1056 [2021]).
In light of our determination, we do not address defendant's remaining contentions.
All concur except Lindley, J., who dissents and votes to affirm in the following memorandum: I respectfully dissent. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, as we must (see People v Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621 [1983]), I conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the conviction of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (see Penal Law § 265.03 [3]; see generally People v Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495 [1987]). Further, viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the offense as charged to the jury (see People v Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 349 [2007]), I conclude that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence (see generally Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d at 495).
The record establishes that defendant was one of several people in a room where the weapon was found in the drop ceiling directly above the table at which defendant and others had been playing cards. Of all the people located in the residence that night, only defendant had DNA matching a DNA profile on the weapon. In addition, within moments of the time that police officers located the weapon, defendant texted another person and stated that he was "going to jail" and that his text messages from that night should be deleted.
To meet their burden of proving defendant's constructive possession of the weapon, the People were required to establish that defendant exercised dominion or control over the weapon by a sufficient level of control over the area in which it was found (see People v Manini, 79 N.Y.2d 561, 573-574 [1992]; People v McIver, 107 A.D.3d 1591, 1592 [4th Dept 2013], lv denied 22 N.Y.3d 997 [2013]). Although "[a] defendant's mere presence in the house where the weapon is found is insufficient to establish constructive possession" (People v Rolldan, 175 A.D.3d 1811, 1813 [4th Dept 2019], lv denied 34 N.Y.3d 1081 [2019]; see People v Diallo, 137 A.D.3d 1681, 1682 [4th Dept 2016]), I conclude that "the evidence in this case 'went beyond defendant's mere presence in the [room in the] residence... and established' a particular set of circumstances from which a jury could infer possession" (People v Boyd, 145 A.D.3d 1481, 1482 [4th Dept 2016], lv denied 29 N.Y.3d 947 [2017]; see People v Bundy, 90 N.Y.2d 918, 920 [1997]; cf. Rolldan, 175 A.D.3d at 1813).
The People established that the likelihood of a randomly-selected individual other than defendant matching the major component of the DNA profile taken from the weapon was less than one in 52.9 octillion. All other individuals present in the room on the night the weapon was seized were excluded as sources of the major component of the DNA profile taken from the weapon. Although the fact that a defendant's DNA is found on a weapon is merely evidence that the defendant possessed the weapon "at some point...
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