People v. Manini

• Decision Date: 31 March 1992
• Citation: 584 N.Y.S.2d 282,594 N.E.2d 563,79 N.Y.2d 561
• Parties: , 594 N.E.2d 563 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Jaime MANINI, Respondent. The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Carlos FUENTE, Respondent.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 282

584 N.Y.S.2d 282

79 N.Y.2d 561, 594 N.E.2d 563

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Jaime MANINI, Respondent.

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Carlos FUENTE, Respondent.

Court of Appeals of New York.

March 31, 1992.

Steven Chananie, Ronald Goldstock and Carol Antonacci, for appellant in the first above-entitled action.

James Kousouros and Debra Kay Kousouros, for respondent in the first above-entitled action.

Steven Chananie and Ronald Goldstock, for appellant in the second above-entitled action.

John A. Cirando, Patrick J. Haber and Ivette C. Iza, for respondent in the second above-entitled action.

OPINION OF THE COURT

ALEXANDER, Judge.

In these cases, we consider the extent to which the principles of accessorial liability and constructive possession may support a finding that evidence presented to a Grand Jury is legally sufficient to establish a prima facie case of criminal possession of a controlled substance. In both cases the trial court's dismissal of counts of the indictments charging criminal possession of a controlled substance were affirmed by the Appellate Division. The People were granted leave to appeal in each case by a Judge of this Court. The legal principles we apply are the same in both cases, but the significantly different factual scenarios require an affirmance in People v. Manini, 174 A.D.2d 978, 572 N.Y.S.2d 137, and a reversal in People v. Fuente, 170 A.D.2d 986, 566 N.Y.S.2d 902.

The indictments in both cases resulted from investigations of the New York State Organized Crime Task Force (OCTF) into the importation of drugs into New York. In Manini, the investigation began in December 1987, and focused on drug trafficking in Onondaga and Cayuga Counties. In the course of its investigation, the OCTF discovered that Manini, an unindicted co-conspirator, Sanford Paige, and codefendant Vincent DeTomaso, along with several other parties, were involved in the importation into and distribution of drugs within New York. Operating out of California, Manini provided Paige and DeTomaso with cocaine on two separate occasions: in April of 1988 he flew to Buffalo from California with one kilogram of cocaine and sold it to Paige; in late June of 1988, Paige obtained nine ounces of cocaine from defendant "on credit" in California. Thereafter, on June 29, 1988, Paige flew from California to Rochester, New York, carrying almost four ounces of cocaine. ¹ He was met at the Rochester Airport by DeTomaso. They left the airport together and were both arrested and the cocaine seized. A 38-count indictment resulted; six of the charges related to Manini, including criminal possession in the second and third degrees for the possession by Paige of the almost four ounces of cocaine on June 29, 1988. ²

Defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the evidence presented to the Grand Jury was legally insufficient was granted by the trial court to the extent of dismissing counts 37 and 38, which related to the possession of the cocaine seized from Paige on June 29, 1988 in New York. The Appellate Division affirmed. The courts below held that the evidence presented to the Grand Jury was legally insufficient to establish Manini's liability for criminal possession of the cocaine physically possessed by Paige in New York on June 29, 1988 under either a theory of accessorial liability or constructive possession.

In People v. Fuente, the investigation leading to defendant's arrest and indictment began in the summer of 1988, and focused on cocaine trafficking by various individuals in the Monroe County area. Between November 12, 1988 and November 19, 1988, utilizing court-authorized electronic surveillance, the police intercepted calls to Fuente's telephone in Rochester. During various intercepted conversations relating to arrangements for the purchase of cocaine between Fuente, his girlfriend and a person who later testified before the Grand Jury, the police learned that Fuente was planning a trip to obtain cocaine for resale to his customers. On November 15, 1988, codefendant Disnardo Carballo was observed arriving at Fuente's apartment complex in a blue Dodge van registered to the mother of Carballo's girlfriend, codefendant Luz Martinez. About one hour later, Carballo left with another male, presumed to have been Fuente, and the two drove in the van to the home of Martinez's mother in Rochester. Minutes after the van left the apartment complex, the person who later testified before the Grand Jury called Fuente's apartment and was told by his girlfriend that he had gone to obtain cocaine, and would return later in the week. The witness testified that she understood that Fuente had gone to Florida to obtain cocaine. Over the next few days, surveillance attempts to locate the van were unsuccessful.

Finally, on November 19, 1988 the police observed the same blue van driven by Carballo earlier in the week pulling into the driveway at the home of Martinez's mother; Carballo was driving and Luz Martinez was in the front passenger seat. About 30 seconds later Fuente, driving his own car, also pulled into the driveway. Both vehicles pulled into a parking area behind the house and remained there for about 10 minutes. The police then observed the vehicles pull out of the driveway and head down the street. When the van turned the corner and pulled into another driveway the police blocked the driveway with two police vehicles, and searched the van pursuant to a search warrant. Approximately one kilogram of cocaine was seized from the van, and Carballo and Martinez were arrested. The cocaine was packaged in four separate packages, each marked with a name. Other items found in the van, including a recent newspaper and a merchandise receipt, indicated that the occupants had been in Florida as recently as November 17, 1988. Fuente was stopped at a different location nearby and also arrested.

On April 14, 1989, Fuente, Carballo and Martinez were indicted for conspiracy in the second degree and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first and third degrees. Fuente's motion to dismiss the indictment for legal insufficiency of the evidence before the Grand Jury was granted by the trial court to the extent of dismissing the two possession counts. Although the People argued that the evidence was sufficient under the principles of either accessorial liability or constructive possession, the Appellate Division affirmed, stating only that "[t]he evidence before the Grand Jury was insufficient to establish defendant's constructive possession of the contraband." (170 A.D.2d 986, 566 N.Y.S.2d 902.)

On this appeal the People contend in both cases that the evidence presented to the Grand Jury was legally sufficient to establish, prima facie, each defendant's liability for possession of drugs found in the actual possession of another under the theories of accessorial liability and/or constructive possession. They argue that each defendant should be liable for criminal possession of a controlled substance even though neither was in actual possession of the drugs upon which the dismissed counts were based. ³ They contend that the fact that narcotics suppliers and middle- and high-level drug dealers use others to actually transport and distribute the narcotics should not shield them from liability for possession of drugs by those others when they themselves caused or directed the possession. In Manini, the People point out that out-of-State suppliers of narcotics who provide drugs for distribution within New York often retain a "continuing possessory interest" in the drugs until they are sold; that if the out-of-State supplier's possessory interest extends into New York, there is no reason why the supplier should not be held liable by reason of that possessory interest either as an accessory or under the principles of constructive possession. In Fuente, the People contend that sophisticated, higher-level drug dealers often attempt to insulate themselves from potential criminal liability by having others handle drugs being bought and sold. They argue that these dealers should be held criminally liable, as accessories or under the principles of constructive possession, for their direct involvement in the possession of drugs by associates or others employed to assist them in their drug distribution business. Thus, they contend that in each case the evidence submitted to the Grand Jury was legally sufficient to support the indictments and that in each case there should be a reversal.

We begin our discussion by noting that under settled law "legally sufficient evidence" means competent evidence which, if accepted as true, would establish every element of the crime charged and the defendant's commission of it (CPL 70.10[1]; People v. Haney, 30 N.Y.2d 328, 335-336, 333 N.Y.S.2d 403, 284 N.E.2d 564). The test of legal sufficiency in this context is whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the People, if unexplained and uncontradicted, would be sufficient to warrant conviction by a trial jury (People v. Jennings, 69 N.Y.2d 103, 114-115, 512 N.Y.S.2d 652, 504 N.E.2d 1079; People v. Pelchat, 62 N.Y.2d 97, 105, 476 N.Y.S.2d 79, 464 N.E.2d 447). With this definition and test in mind, we address each of the People's liability theories in turn.

A. Accessorial Liability

Under section 20.00 of the Penal Law, a defendant is accessorially liable for a criminal offense committed by another when he "solicits, requests, commands, importunes or intentionally aids" another to engage in the offense, and when the defendant does so "with the mental culpability required for the commission" of the offense (Penal Law § 20.00; People v. Flayhart, 72 N.Y.2d 737, 741, 536 N.Y.S.2d 727, 533 N.E.2d 657). The People argue that inasmuch as defendant Manini "intentionally aided" Paige to commit the offense of criminal possession of a controlled substance when he sold...