People v. Metzler

• Decision Date: 06 April 1992
• Docket Number: 128752,Docket Nos. 128751
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Melvin METZLER, Defendant-Appellant.

Page 695

484 N.W.2d 695

193 Mich.App. 541

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Melvin METZLER, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket Nos. 128751, 128752.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Jan. 14, 1992, at Detroit.

Decided April 6, 1992, at 10:35 a.m.

Released for Publication June 22, 1992.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Gay Secor Hardy, Sol. Gen., John D. O'Hair, Pros. Atty., Timothy A. Baughman, Chief of Research, Training, and Appeals, and Jeffrey Caminsky, Asst. Pros. Atty., for the People.

Kraizman & Kraizman by Jack J. Kraizman, Detroit, for defendant-appellant on appeal.

Before MURPHY, P.J., and MARK J. CAVANAGH and CONNOR, JJ.

MURPHY, Presiding Judge.

Defendant Melvin Metzler appeals his convictions of second-degree murder, M.C.L. Sec. 750.317; M.S.A. Sec. 28.549, and possession with intent to distribute less than fifty grams of a mixture containing cocaine, M.C.L. Sec. 333.7401(2)(a)(iv); M.S.A. Sec. 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(iv). The convictions were entered after separate jury trials. Defendant was sentenced to twenty to forty years' imprisonment for the murder conviction and to a concurrent sentence of seven to twenty years' imprisonment for the possession conviction. The appeals have been consolidated for review by this Court. We affirm both convictions.

On July 1, 1986, Carter Henderson was shot to death in front of 9800 Wyoming, Detroit, Michigan. According to several witnesses, Mr. Henderson entered the Gaines Bar on Wyoming Street late in the evening of July 1, 1986. Mr. Henderson appeared to be intoxicated and attempted to buy a drink while showing a handful of money. Mr. Henderson talked with two women in the bar and then left, followed by one of the women. Outside the bar, Mr. Henderson was attacked by five or six young men, one of whom was armed with a club and another with a gun. After a struggle, Mr. Henderson was shot several times, resulting in his death.

On July 23, 1986, a warrant was issued for defendant's arrest on a charge of first-degree murder for the shooting death of Mr. Henderson. On December 6, 1986, defendant was arrested in Oakland County, where he was subsequently charged and convicted of larceny in an amount over $100 and of being an habitual offender. After sentencing, defendant was remanded to the custody of the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC). Apparently, neither the Oakland County law enforcement authorities nor the MDOC was aware of the outstanding Wayne County warrant for defendant's arrest in connection with Mr. Henderson's murder and therefore failed to notify the Wayne County Prosecutor's Office that defendant was incarcerated.

On November 10, 1988, defendant was released on parole for the Oakland County convictions. On June 1, 1989, defendant was arrested for possession of less than fifty grams of a mixture containing cocaine. While processing defendant for the arrest on the drug charge, the Detroit Police Department discovered the outstanding murder warrant. Defendant was subsequently charged and convicted of the possession offense and of second-degree murder.

I

We address first defendant's contention that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the murder charge on the ground that he was not brought to trial within 180 days. We conclude that the 180-day rule was not violated.

M.C.L. Sec. 780.131; M.S.A. Sec. 28.969(1) requires that a prisoner charged with a crime in this state be brought to trial within 180 days from the time that the MDOC is notified that the charge is pending and subsequently notifies the prosecutor in question of the location of the prisoner. This period does not begin to run, however, unless the prosecutor knows or should know that the defendant is incarcerated or the MDOC knows or should know that a warrant, indictment, information, or complaint is pending against a person in its custody. People v. Hill, 402 Mich. 272, 280-281, 262 N.W.2d 641 (1978); see also MCR 6.004(D).

In this case, defendant was in the custody of the MDOC pursuant to the Oakland County charges on February 12, 1987, and released on parole on November 10, 1988, without being brought to trial on the murder charge. The prosecutor, however, did not have actual notice that defendant was incarcerated during this period nor was the MDOC notified with regard to the outstanding warrant during this period, apparently because the Detroit Police Department failed to enter information regarding the warrant into the Law Enforcement Information Network. We therefore conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, it cannot be said that either the prosecutor or the MDOC should have known of defendant's incarceration. Under the facts of this case, we simply are unwilling to construe the 180-day rule under the statute or the court rule in a manner that results in a violation based on the alleged unintentional inaction or negligence of anyone other than the prosecutor or the MDOC.

In addition, defendant was arrested on the possession charge on June 1, 1989, but was not brought to trial on the murder charge until December 4, 1989. Because defendant was apparently held in a local facility with an MDOC parole hold, however, he was not an inmate of a penal institution of this state for purposes of the 180-day rule. People v. Hastings, 136 Mich.App. 380, 382, 356 N.W.2d 645 (1984), rev'd on other grounds 422 Mich. 267, 373 N.W.2d 533 (1985); People v. Rose, 132 Mich.App. 656, 658, 347 N.W.2d 774 (1984).

II

We also find to be without merit defendant's argument that he was denied a speedy trial as guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions, U.S. Const., Am. VI; Const.1963, art. 1, Sec. 20, and also by M.C.L. Sec. 768.1; M.S.A. Sec. 28.1024. In determining whether a defendant was denied a speedy trial, we consider (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant's assertion of the right to a speedy trial, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972); Hill, supra, at 283, 262 N.W.2d 641.

Defendant contends that he was prejudiced by the delay because four witnesses were unavailable for trial. Because the delay lasted more than eighteen months, it is presumed to be prejudicial unless the prosecution proves otherwise. People v. Sickles, 162 Mich.App. 344, 354, 412 N.W.2d 734 (1987). In this case, however, the prosecution demonstrated that the unavailability of the witnesses was not caused by the delay and that the witnesses' statements were actually adverse to defendant, so that there was no prejudice to him.

In addition, defendant first asserted his right to a speedy trial in a postverdict motion to dismiss. Although defendant's failure to earlier assert his right to a speedy trial does not waive consideration of this issue, his failure to timely do so weighs against defendant. People v. Hammond, 84 Mich.App. 60, 67-68, 269 N.W.2d 488 (1978). We therefore conclude that defendant was not denied a speedy trial.

III

Defendant next contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the murder conviction. When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial, this Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determines whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. A trier of fact may make reasonable inferences from the facts, but may not make inferences completely unsupported by any direct or circumstantial evidence. People v. Petrella, 424 Mich. 221, 275, 380 N.W.2d 11 (1985); People v. Vaughn, 186 Mich.App. 376, 380, 465 N.W.2d 365 (1990).

In this case, sufficient evidence was presented at trial from which a rational trier of fact could have concluded that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Testimony was presented that on the night of July 1, 1986, gunshots were heard outside 9800 Wyoming in Detroit and a man was seen lying in the street beside a red Cadillac. Five or six young men were seen standing near the man, and one had a club. The victim was found dead at the scene of the shooting, having been shot four times with a small-caliber gun. Defendant then confessed to the police that he had been involved in the robbery of Mr. Henderson.

Defendant argues, however, that his confession, which was admitted into evidence over his objection, is the only evidence offered at trial tending to prove that he was involved in Mr. Henderson's murder. Defendant correctly asserts that an accused's confession cannot be used to establish the corpus delicti of a crime. People v. Cotton, 191 Mich.App. 377, 387, 478 N.W.2d 681 (1991); People v. Williams, 114 Mich.App. 186, 193, 318 N.W.2d 671 (1982).

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