People v. Kohl

• Decision Date: 20 April 2006
• Docket Number: No. 2-04-0492.,2-04-0492.
• Citation: 847 N.E.2d 150
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Anthony W. KOHL, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

847 N.E.2d 150

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Anthony W. KOHL, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 2-04-0492.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

April 20, 2006.

Thomas A. Lilien, Deputy Defender (Court-appointed), Office of State Appellate Defender, Elgin, for Anthony W. Kohl.

Joseph E. Birkett, Du Page County State's Attorney, Wheaton, Martin P. Moltz, Deputy Director, Sally A. Swiss, State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Elgin, for the People.

Justice BOWMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

The resolution of this appeal depends on what the definition of "metal knuckles" is.¹ According to the State, an item consisting of a 3½-inch-long, 1½-inch-wide knife blade, two metal finger loops, and additional smaller blades is a set of metal knuckles. The trial court accepted this interpretation and accordingly it found defendant, Anthony W. Kohl, guilty of being a felon in possession of a per se unlawful weapon under sections 24-1.1(a) and 24-1(a)(1) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a), 24-1(a)(1) (West 2002)). Kohl appeals, and we reverse.

I. BACKGROUND

In March 2003, Kohl, who was on parole relating to a burglary conviction, received a visit at his Glendale Heights apartment from Agent Craig Woelfel of the Illinois Department of Corrections parole division. Agent Woelfel apparently went to Kohl's apartment to go over Kohl's parole agreement with him and to make sure he was complying with that agreement. While there, Agent Woelfel noticed some swords hanging on a wall and a pocket knife on a table. Agent Woelfel believed the swords and pocket knife might be considered collector's items, so he did not report Kohl as violating his parole agreement, which prohibited the possession of certain weapons. Nevertheless, Agent Woelfel told Kohl he needed to get rid of the items.

Kohl decided to have an indoor garage sale. He drew up and distributed flyers advertising the items for sale, which included coffee makers and swords. He got a quick response — from parole agent Jeffrey Bryant and a Glendale Heights police officer. Agent Bryant asked whether, as the garage sale flyer promised, Kohl had swords. Kohl said he did; he told Agent Bryant they were in a storage unit on the apartment's balcony. Agent Bryant searched the storage unit and found some swords and knives. At that point, Kohl was arrested.

Contending that several of the knives found in the storage unit were in fact "metal knuckles," the State charged Kohl with two counts of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. Under the Code, Kohl could be found guilty based on his mere possession of metal knuckles (see 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a), 24-1(a)(1) (West 2002)), but to be found guilty based on his possession of knives, Kohl had to have possessed the items with the intent to use them unlawfully against another (see 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a), 24-1(a)(2) (West 2002)).² The State did not contend that Kohl intended to use any of the items unlawfully. So the only way to prove him guilty was to establish that one or more of the items was a set of metal knuckles. To this end, the State introduced four of the items found in Kohl's storage unit. All of these items were comprised of blades and metal handle grips in one form or another. And, according to the State, all of these items were metal knuckles.

The trial court agreed that one of the items was a set of metal knuckles, but found that the other three were knives. As for the item determined to be a set of metal knuckles (which is the only one with which we are concerned here), it consists of the following: a grip on which the holder rests two fingers and from which two thin, pointed, two-inch metal projectiles extend at right angles; and two metal loops into which the holder inserts his or her middle and ring fingers, and from which extend at 45-degree angles two stubbier, half-inch metal projectiles, and from which also extends, straight out, a 3½inch-long, 1½inch-wide sharp pointed blade, shaped like an arrow head. Here is a picture of the item:

NOTE: OPINION CONTAINING TABLE OR OTHER DATA THAT IS NOT VIEWABLE

After determining that the above item was not a knife but, instead, a set of metal knuckles, the trial court found Kohl guilty of both counts of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon and merged the first count into the second (which alleged that Kohl was on parole). See 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(e) (West 2002). The court then denied Kohl's motion for a new trial and sentenced him to five years in prison. He appeals.

II. ANALYSIS

The question presented by Kohl's appeal is this: does an item consisting of a 3½-inch-long, 1½-inch-wide sharp knife blade, and several smaller, blade-like projectiles, amount to a set of metal knuckles simply because the item happens to be gripped by resting two fingers on the handle and inserting two fingers through metal loops, which, if the item were used against somebody, would not make contact with that person unless the 3½-inch knife blade were already buried in his or her body?

To answer that question, we must construe the meaning of "metal knuckles" as the term is used in the Code. As noted, the trial court construed "metal knuckles" as including the item described above. There is some dispute as to the standard we should apply in reviewing that determination. For his part, defendant argues that, since this is a question of statutory construction, we should apply the standard of review we always apply in cases of statutory construction, i.e., de novo. See, e.g., In re Detention of Powell, 217 Ill.2d 123, 135, 298 Ill.Dec. 361, 839 N.E.2d 1008 (2005) (stating that "[t]he issue before us is a matter of statutory construction, and our review is therefore de novo"); People v. Collins, 214 Ill.2d 206, 214, 291 Ill.Dec. 686, 824 N.E.2d 262 (2005) (stating that, "[b]ecause the construction of a statute is a question of law, the standard of review is de novo"); People v. Grever, 353 Ill. App.3d 736, 751, 289 Ill.Dec. 94, 819 N.E.2d 6 (2004) (stating that "[i]ssues of statutory construction are questions of law subject to de novo review"). The State, however, argues that, although this is a case of statutory construction, we should not apply the statutory construction standard of review. Instead, as the State sees it, the trial court's determination that the item at issue is a set of metal knuckles is a factual finding and, as such, it is entitled to deference.

There are two serious problems with the State's argument. First, the State has cited no authority in support of it, and, arguably, it is waived. See Official Reports Advance Sheet No. 21 (October 17, 2001), R. 341(e)(7), eff. October 1, 2001; People v. Morales, 343 Ill.App.3d 987, 989, 279 Ill.Dec. 183, 799 N.E.2d 986 (2003). Second, and more importantly, waiver aside, the State's argument demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the finding that the trial court made here. The State argues that the trial court's determination that the item at issue is a set of metal knuckles was a factual finding. In fact, however, it was a legal one. See People v. Velez, 336 Ill. App.3d 261, 265, 270 Ill.Dec. 651, 783 N.E.2d 226 (2003) (question of whether item at issue was "switch blade" within meaning of section 24-1 was one of statutory construction subject to de novo review). Of course, it is beyond serious dispute that legal findings—such as a trial court's interpretation of a statute—are entitled to no deference. Powell, 217 Ill.2d at 135, 298 Ill.Dec. 361, 839 N.E.2d 1008; Grever 353 Ill.App.3d at 751, 289 Ill.Dec. 94, 819 N.E.2d 6. Additionally, the facts concerning the composition and structure of the metal item are uncontested. See People v. Herman, 347 Ill.App.3d 525, 529, 283 Ill.Dec. 195, 807 N.E.2d 1036 (2004) (applying de novo review where facts were not contested). Accordingly, in this case, as in all cases of statutory construction, we review de novo the trial court's determination that an item comes within the definition of a statutory term.

We turn now to consider whether the item here fits within the meaning of metal knuckles. Our primary objective when construing the meaning of a statutory term is to give effect to the legislative intent behind that term. See In re Madison H., 215 Ill.2d 364, 372, 294 Ill.Dec. 86, 830 N.E.2d 498 (2005). In construing a statutory term, we must presume that the legislature did not intend unjust, inconvenient, or absurd results. People ex. rel Birkett v. Jorgensen, 216 Ill.2d 358, 363, 297 Ill.Dec. 289, 837 N.E.2d 69 (2005). Further, under the principle of lenity, we must construe any ambiguity in a penal statute in favor of the accused. See People v. Hicks, 164 Ill.2d 218, 222, 207 Ill.Dec. 295, 647 N.E.2d 257 (1995).

According to the Code, a person is guilty of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon if he or she "knowingly possesse[d] * * * any weapon prohibited under Section 24-1 of this [Code]." 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2002). Section 24-1 prohibits the possession of any "bludgeon, black-jack, slung-shot, sand-club, sand-bag, metal knuckles, throwing star, or any knife, commonly referred to as a switchblade knife, which has a blade that opens automatically by hand pressure applied to a button, spring or other device in the handle of the knife, or a ballistic knife, which is a device that propels a knifelike blade as a projectile by means of a coil spring, elastic material or compressed gas." 720 ILCS 5/24-1(a)(1) (West 2002). Under section 24-1 of the Code, we see that the possession of some items is considered per se unlawful—that is, their mere possession is illegal—whereas the possession of other items is considered illegal only if the possessor intends to use them unlawfully. Compare 720 ILCS 5/24-1(a)(1) (West 2002) ("[a] person commits [an] offense * * * when he knowingly * * * possesses") with 720 ILCS 5/241(a)(2) (West 2002) ("[a] person commits [an] offense * * * when he knowingly * * *...