People v. Lavin
| Decision Date | 19 April 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. B140352.,B140352. |
| Citation | 88 Cal.App.4th 609,106 Cal.Rptr.2d 40 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Michael James LAVIN, Defendant and Appellant. |
Defendant Michael James Lavin appeals from a judgment of conviction entered after a no contest plea. He obtained a certificate of probable cause from the trial court to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss the charges against him for an alleged failure to comply with the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, codified by Penal Code section 1389.1 We affirm.
An information charged defendant with five counts of robbery (§ 211), one count of assault with intent to commit rape (§ 220), and one count of second degree commercial burglary (§ 459). The information alleged that defendant personally used a firearm in the robbery and assault charges (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)). It also alleged that he had suffered a serious felony conviction under the Three Strikes Law (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667, subds. (b)(i)), that he had served a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), and, as to four charged robberies and the assault charge, that he had suffered a serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)). Defendant initially pled not guilty and denied the allegations. However, after the trial court denied his motion to dismiss all charges under section 1389, he entered a negotiated disposition. He pled no contest to one robbery count, admitted the firearm use allegation, and admitted the serious felony conviction under the Three Strikes Law. The court sentenced him to a term or 14 years in state prison. The court dismissed the remaining charges and allegations. The court issued a certificate of probable cause allowing defendant to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss under section 1389. (See § 1237.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 31(d).)
The Interstate Agreement on Detainers ("IAD"), codified by section 1389, is (People v. Rhoden (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1242, 1249, 265 Cal. Rptr. 355; see People v. Cella (1981) 114 Cal.App.3d 905, 916-917, 170 Cal.Rptr. 915; People v. Castoe (1978) 86 Cal. App.3d 484, 487, 150 Cal.Rptr. 237.) Under the IAD, "[a] detainer is a notification filed with the institution in which a prisoner is serving a sentence, advising that he is wanted to face pending criminal charges in another jurisdiction.'" (United States v. Mauro (1978) 436 U.S. 340, 359, 98 S.Ct. 1834, 56 L.Ed.2d 329; see People v. Garner (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1363, 1369, 274 Cal.Rptr. 298.)
As relevant to the present case, .)" (People v. Brooks (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 866, 872, 234 Cal.Rptr. 573.)
On January 20, 2000, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charges against him under section 1389. The basis of the motion was his contention that while a sentenced prisoner in Oregon, he had been informed that a detainer from Los Angeles County had been lodged against him. He thereafter substantially complied with the requirement of section 1389, article III, subdivisions (a) and (b), by sending to the Van Nuys branch of the Los Angeles Municipal Court a handwritten demand for disposition of untried charges, which was received on May 28, 1999. The motion sought dismissal of the current charges because more then 180 days had expired since receipt of the demand.
The motion was supported in part by a declaration from defense counsel. On information and belief, counsel stated that in May 1999, Los Angeles County placed a detainer on defendant while he was a sentenced prisoner in the custody of the Clackamas County Jail, part of the Oregon Department of Corrections. According to counsel, defendant was informed that since the Clackamas facility was only an inmate classification center, it did not handle requests under the IAD, and that defendant would have to do everything himself. Defendant received no information as to where to send his notice, except that the case was pending in the Van Nuys Municipal Court. Defendant immediately requested legal forms from the Clackamas authorities, and caused to be filed a demand for disposition under the IAD. More than 180 days had passed since he had made his demand.
Attached as an exhibit to the motion was a copy of defendant's request for forms from the Clackamas County Jail, filed on May 12, 1999. He had requested "4 of these forms `[Interstate] Demand for Disposition of all Untried Warrants, Complaints, Informations and Indictments.'" The reply to the request from a sergeant at the jail, dated the next day, was printed across the form. It stated in relevant part that only copies of criminal law forms found in the law library would be provided. The sergeant asked defendant to provide the number of the form he needed, which could be found in the criminal law forms book. Only one copy would be provided. Defendant would have to handwrite additional copies.
Also attached to the motion as an exhibit was a copy of defendant's handwritten "Demand for Disposition and Speedy Trial on Any and All Untried Warrants, Complaints, Informations and/or Indictments," subscribed and sworn by defendant on May 24, 1999. The document had been sent by certified mail to the Los Angeles Municipal Court in Van Nuys, and received on May 28, 1999. In his demand, defendant identified himself by name, by his social security number, and by his Oregon prisoner number. He also listed his current address at the Eastern Oregon Correctional Institution. He stated that he had repeatedly tried to obtain legal forms but was unsuccessful, and so made his own form. He wrote that he was "making his demand for `disposition and speedy trial' to this County of Los Angeles through its Honorable Court as is his Constitutional Right."
Another exhibit attached to the motion was a copy of a letter dated June 5, 1999, in which defendant wrote to the Head Deputy District Attorney in Van Nuys. In the letter he asked, among other things, to be notified of the actual charges pending against him before he would sign a "Mandatory Waiver of Extradition." His prison counselor in Oregon had told him to sign the form, but he had balked. He also stated his willingness to discuss a settlement of the California charges. He referred to his earlier demand for disposition, but stated that he had received no notification of any resolution.
The trial court held a hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss. At the hearing, defendant offered no testimony. However, the court engaged in a dialogue with counsel and the defendant concerning certain matters the court believed relevant to the motion. The following is the substance of the various representations by the parties and defendant.
The parties agreed that defendant had been sentenced in Oregon on or about April 29, 1999. He was initially housed at the Clackamas County Jail, which is the equivalent of an inmate reception center, and is part of the Oregon prison system. On May 19, 1999, defendant was transferred to permanent housing at the Eastern Oregon Correctional Institution. Defendant apparently possessed a copy of the detainer filed against him. His counsel presented it to the court with the concurrence of the prosecutor.
Defendant himself made certain unsworn oral representations to the court. Piecing them together, his version of events appears to be as follows. When defendant was initially at the Clackamas County Jail, he was taken to a room where a sergeant informed him that he had a detainer from California. Defendant replied that those charges had been dismissed. The sergeant reiterated that there was a detainer, and that he had to so inform defendant because defendant had the right to a speedy trial. The sergeant said that defendant would have to handle the matter through the law library. Defendant did not then receive a copy of the detainer. However, when informing him of the detainer, the sergeant was apparently reading from the actual detainer on file at the institution.
Defendant made a request for forms from another sergeant who was in charge of the law library at the Clackamas facility. This sergeant told him that they would not provide forms, and that he would have to handwrite one. Therefore, defendant handwrote his own demand for disposition. After composing the demand, but before sending it, defendant was transferred from Clackamas County Jail to the Eastern Oregon facility.
Defendant recognized that "[t]he inmate always initiates the process as far as these detainers go." Therefore, he went to the law library at the Eastern Oregon facility, and presented the librarian with his handwritten demand. The librarian...
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