People v. Brooks

• Decision Date: 20 February 1987
• Citation: 189 Cal.App.3d 866,234 Cal.Rptr. 573
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Joseph S. BROOKS, Defendant and Appellant. In re Joseph S. BROOKS, On Habeas Corpus. D003662, D004996.

Page 573

234 Cal.Rptr. 573

189 Cal.App.3d 866

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Joseph S. BROOKS, Defendant and Appellant In re Joseph S. BROOKS, On Habeas Corpus.

D003662, D004996.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

Feb. 20, 1987.

Denise Moreno Ducheny, San Diego, for defendant and appellant

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Frederick R. Millar, Jr., and Jay M. Bloom, Supervising Deputy Attys. Gen. and Maxine Cutler and David I. Friedenberg, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

WIENER, Associate Justice.

Joseph T. Brooks appeals from the judgment entered after he entered a negotiated guilty plea to unlawfully taking a vehicle. The prosecution dismissed a single count of robbery (Pen.Code, § 211) ¹ and enhancement allegations. Brooks challenges the denial of motions to withdraw his guilty plea and to dismiss the information pursuant to article III of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (the IAD), section 1389. We decide Brooks did not waive his right to assert a defense under the IAD. We conclude, however, Brooks' efforts to request a speedy resolution of charges against him did not trigger the statute because no detainer had been lodged with Oregon prison authorities. We therefore affirm the judgment of conviction and deny his petition for writ of habeas corpus.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The principal issues in this case involve the application of the IAD. Accordingly, we truncate our factual statement in order to focus on the procedural aspects of Brooks' efforts to invoke the IAD. In the discussion which follows, we include some information which was not before the trial court but which has been presented to us in Brooks' motion to dismiss and the judicially noticed documents submitted with Brooks' petition for writ of habeas corpus and the attorney general's response.

On August 23, 1983, two Los Angeles police officers observed Brooks and a second black male slumped in the front seat of a stolen silver Izuzu pick-up truck in a Hollywood parking lot. The officers arrested Brooks for grand theft auto. In custody, Brooks identified himself as Rahsaam Brown. Brooks later testified he never used the name Rahsaam Brown. The record provides no explanation for the failure to bring Brooks to trial in San Diego following this.

On February 1, 1984, a criminal complaint was filed in San Diego charging Rahsaan Al Brown aka Rahsaam Brown with auto theft and robbery with a deadly weapon enhancement. An arrest warrant for the same person was issued the same day. The real Rahsaam Brown was arrested but later released when the prosecutor concluded he was not responsible for the crimes charged. The court recalled the arrest warrant on February 17, 1984.

Meanwhile, the peripatetic Brooks had been arrested on December 23, 1983, in Portland, Oregon under the name Michael Thomas where he was later convicted of theft. The Oregon presentence report dated March 2, 1984, listed Brooks' aliases as Joseph St. Clair Brooks and Rahsaan Al Brown. The report also indicates Brooks' parole agent in Redwood City, California told the Oregon authorities about the armed robbery charges against Brooks in San Diego. Brooks himself learned about the San Diego charges when he saw the Oregon presentence report and talked with his Oregon trial attorney in March 1984. Sometime in March Brooks contacted his California parole agent who confirmed there were charges pending against him in San Diego.

On April 7, 1984, shortly after he was committed to the Oregon State Penitentiary, Brooks asked prison officials to prepare and mail the forms necessary to demand speedy resolution of charges pending in "San Mateo" and "Long Beach." His request stated, "The detainers in Calif. is a parole violation, plus some other charges I According to Brooks he returned the forms to the prison records officer to be forwarded to California. A statement quoted in the California probation report suggests he mailed the demand directly to the San Diego district attorney's office by certified mail. There is no evidence the Oregon State Penitentiary authorities completed the certificate required to accompany Brooks' IAD request. The chief records officer later declared the prison did not consider a warrant on an inmate the equivalent of a detainer and did not process a certificate until a detainer was actually lodged with the institution. There is no evidence the San Diego district attorney actually received Brooks' request.

                know nothing about."   In a memo the prison officials informed Brooks to take a copy of his detainer to the prison law library and have the paralegals assist him in filling out the necessary forms.  Brooks completed forms for San Mateo and San Diego Counties.  He addressed the July 19, 1984, demand to the district attorney's office in San Diego and listed his name as Joseph St. Clair Brooks aka M. Thomas
                

Sometime between April and November 1984 and after Brooks had been convicted in Oregon, his California parole agent informed the San Diego district attorney of Brooks' true name and whereabouts. The district attorney obtained a new arrest warrant in the name of Joseph St. Clair Brooks on November 28, 1984, and forwarded a letter of detainer to the Oregon State Penitentiary on December 5, 1984. Using an Oregon State Penitentiary form Brooks mailed a motion to dismiss to the San Diego Municipal Court on January 12, 1985, claiming California had failed to comply with his IAD demand. Brooks was returned to San Diego in early February 1985.

Following the preliminary hearing the district attorney filed an information on March 12, 1985, charging Brooks with the counts listed in the original complaint. Brooks entered his guilty plea under People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595, 91 Cal.Rptr. 385, 477 P.2d 409 on April 10, 1985, the date set for trial. The court continued the sentencing hearing several times to allow defense counsel to secure documents relevant to Brooks' IAD claim. Apparently those documents had been misplaced in Brooks' transfer from Oregon to San Diego. On June 21, 1985, the court ordered documents forwarded from Brooks' property in Vacaville.

Brooks then moved to withdraw his guilty plea and to dismiss all charges on grounds the state had failed to comply with the IAD. The court denied both motions and stated Brooks failed to follow procedural steps requiring that any request be accompanied by the custodian's certificate showing the terms of incarceration. The court also found there was no proof a detainer was ever lodged against Brooks under a name he was known by.

The court sentenced Brooks to prison for the middle term of two years and issued a certificate of probable cause regarding the contested issues. (§ 1237.5.) This appeal ensued. Brooks also seeks habeas corpus relief contending he was denied the effective assistance of counsel when he entered his guilty plea and when he unsuccessfully moved to withdraw his plea and to dismiss the charges. We have consolidated his appeal from the judgment and petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

DISCUSSION

I.

We first consider whether Brooks waived his IAD claim by pleading guilty. As a general rule a guilty plea does not constitute a waiver of a violation of the IAD properly asserted before the plea is entered. (People v. Cella (1981) 114 Cal.App.3d 905, 915, fn. 5, 170 Cal.Rptr. 915; People v. Reyes (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 524, 532, 159 Cal.Rptr. 572.) The problem here is that although Brooks raised the IAD violation before he pleaded guilty, the issue remained unresolved at the time he entered his negotiated guilty plea. The People say Brooks' neglect in failing to reassert his IAD violation before he pleaded guilty In January 1985 Brooks mailed his pro per motion to dismiss with prejudice to the court before he was extradited to California. At the conclusion of his preliminary hearing in February 1985 his appointed counsel requested a copy of the motion from the court file suggesting the document had been received by the court.

amounts to waiver of his rights under the statute. We believe the record supports a contrary conclusion.

Brooks' change of plea form contains no express waiver of his IAD claim. His attorney explained Brooks entered his guilty plea under People v. West, supra, 3 Cal.3d 595, 91 Cal.Rptr. 385, 477 P.2d 409 essentially to expedite the proceedings because the original demand for documents relevant to Brooks' IAD contention had not turned up either through discovery or through files available to him. Brooks believed he lost copies of the documents when transferred from Oregon to California. Brooks did not intend to waive his rights under the IAD.

After Brooks' guilty plea defense counsel continued his efforts to obtain the lost documents. The court continued the sentencing date at least three times to allow time to secure Brooks' papers and on June 21 ordered the forwarding of documents from Brooks' personal property held at Vacaville.

Brooks' intent not to waive his rights under the IAD is reflected in the proceedings of the trial court following the change of plea. The court's cooperative efforts allowing Brooks additional time to obtain the records to support his motion to dismiss are indicative of everyone's belief that Brooks' guilty plea did not foreclose him from arguing dismissal. The prosecution, clearly aware of the reason for continuing Brooks' sentencing hearing, made no objection. Presumably, had the People believed Brooks had waived his IAD argument, they would not have remained silent to permit a continuance for what would have been a useless legal proceeding. In these circumstances we hold Brooks did not waive his IAD challenge.

II.

The more interesting question in this case is whether Brooks is entitled to the protection of the IAD as a result of his demand for disposition of his criminal charges in San Diego before a formal detainer was lodged against him. As we shall explain, we...