People v. Lee, Cr. 18058
Decision Date | 03 May 1979 |
Docket Number | Cr. 18058 |
Citation | 92 Cal.App.3d 707,155 Cal.Rptr. 128 |
Parties | PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Robert E. LEE, Defendant and Appellant. |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Lawrence E. Kern, San Francisco, for defendant and appellant.
Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Jack R. Winkler, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Daniel J. Kremer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Karl J. Phaler, A. Wells Petersen, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Diego, for plaintiff and respondent.
Regrettably, we find ourselves compelled once again to reverse a judgment of conviction because of a trial court's erroneous extemporaneous comment and informal jury instructions, concerning the accused's critical defense.
Defendant Lee was charged with murder. He pleaded "not guilty" and "not guilty by reason of insanity." A theory of the prosecution was that the homicide was premeditated and deliberate. On trial of the issues posed by his not guilty plea, his only defense was that of "Diminished capacity." He was found "guilty of first degree murder," and "sane," by a jury and he appeals from the judgment.
As is now well known, under the Wells-Gorshen concept of diminished capacity even though a defendant be legally sane under the recently rejected M'Naghten test, or the now apposite American Law Institute criteria (see People v. Drew, 22 Cal.3d 333, 149 Cal.Rptr. 275, 583 P.2d 1318), if he suffers from a mental illness that prevents him from acting with malice he may not be convicted of murder, and if so prevented from acting with premeditation or deliberation, he may not under that theory be found guilty of murder, first degree. (People v. Henderson, 60 Cal.2d 482, 490-491, 35 Cal.Rptr. 77, 386 P.2d 677; see People v. Poddar, 10 Cal.3d 750, 758, 111 Cal.Rptr. 910, 518 P.2d 342; People v. Sedeno, 10 Cal.3d 703, 723, 112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913; People v. Anderson, 63 Cal.2d 351, 365, 46 Cal.Rptr. 763, 406 P.2d 43.)
Under this rule, if a mental illness precluded Lee from entertaining malice at the time of his criminal act he could not be found guilty of, or punished for, murder; his offense would be no greater than manslaughter. And under such circumstances, assuming malice, were he unable to premeditate or deliberate, his crime under such a theory was not murder, first degree.
We recognize that the defense of diminished capacity, although it has many supporters, has often been criticized as illogical and disregardful of the public safety and welfare. Some point out that it confers a lesser punishment upon otherwise sane and legally responsible criminals because of mental aberrations predisposing them to violence, thus allowing them sooner to resume their antisocial depradations. On the other hand, they argue, one who is not mentally so predisposed, and is therefore a lesser threat to the community, will suffer the full measure of punishment for a similar crime. We decline to enter upon the debate. The concept of diminished capacity is ingrained in the law of this state, and we as a lesser reviewing court are bound to apply it. (See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, 57 Cal.2d 450, 455, 20 Cal.Rptr. 321, 369 P.2d 937.)
We need not dwell upon the details of the offense which brought about Lee's conviction. It is sufficient to say that he assaulted a young college student and dragged her behind some bushes where in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, a sexual offense, he crushed her skull and killed her by repeated blows with a heavy pipe and rock. The crime was accompanied by nearly unbelievable viciousness and depravity.
The Attorney General's brief correctly describes the testimony of Lee's psychiatrist witness in this manner: Dr. Satten's testimony concerning Lee's mental condition was corroborated by other evidence.
During the guilt phase of the trial, Lee's attorney on direct examination, when educing testimony of Dr. Satten tending to establish Lee's inability to entertain the necessary malice, and the premeditation and deliberation of one theory of the murder charge, and thus his diminished capacity, was interrupted by the trial court and, in the jury's presence, the following comments were made (the emphases are ours):
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