People v. Leppanen
| Docket Number | 110611 |
| Decision Date | 27 July 2023 |
| Citation | 2023 NY Slip Op 03946 |
| Parties | The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Andrell Leppanen, Appellant. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Calendar Date: June 1, 2023
Timothy S. Brennan, Schenectady, for appellant.
Robert M. Carney, District Attorney, Schenectady (Peter H. Willis of counsel), for respondent.
Before: Egan Jr., J.P., Lynch, Aarons, Fisher and McShan, JJ.
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Michael V. Coccoma J.), rendered January 22, 2018 in Schenectady County, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of murder in the second degree and assault in the first degree.
In August 2016, defendant was involuntarily admitted into a local hospital's psychiatric crisis center for strange thoughts, feeling like he wanted to hurt people and saying that he felt "a storm coming." After being discharged and evaluated on two separate occasions but not admitted in either instance, in the early morning hours of August 26, 2016, defendant set his stepfather (hereinafter the victim) on fire by pouring gasoline on him while he slept and using a lit cigarette and a lighter to ignite the accelerant. Defendant fled and was arrested two days later, after he checked himself into a hospital for mental health treatment. He was arrested there and taken to a police station, where he received Miranda warnings and was interviewed by the police. During the videorecorded interrogation, defendant confessed to setting the victim on fire. Approximately two months later, the victim succumbed to his injuries and, in November 2016, defendant was charged by a superseding indictment with murder in the second degree (count 1), two counts of assault in the first degree (counts 2 and 3), arson in the fifth degree (count 4) and criminal mischief in the fourth degree (count 5).
At his arraignment, defendant served a notice of intent to present psychiatric evidence and subsequently consented to an examination by a psychiatrist or licensed psychologist (see CPL 250.10 [2], [3]). Thereafter, defendant moved to suppress certain statements made to the police during his initial arrest, which, after a Huntley hearing, was denied by County Court (Sypniewski, J.). The matter was removed to Supreme Court (Coccoma, J.) and the results of the psychiatric evaluation concluded that defendant, at the time of the incident, "did possess substantial capacity to understand the nature and consequences of his acts or that they were wrong." The matter proceeded to a jury trial where, despite advancing certain arguments and presenting relevant evidence related to defendant's mental health, defendant ultimately did not pursue the affirmative defense of not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect (see Penal Law § 40.15). Defendant was found guilty of count 1 (see Penal Law § 125.25) and count 2 (see Penal Law § 120.10 [1]) and acquitted of the remaining charges. Defendant was sentenced, as a second violent felony offender, to a prison term of 25 years to life on count 1 and to a concurrent prison term of 25 years to be followed by five years of postrelease supervision on count 2. Defendant appeals.
Initially, defendant failed to preserve his challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, inasmuch as he failed to renew his motion for a trial order of dismissal at the close of his case (see People v Truitt, 213 A.D.3d 1145, 1146 [3d Dept 2023], lv denied 39 N.Y.3d 1144 [2023]). However, because defendant also argues that his convictions are not supported by the weight of the evidence, we nevertheless must determine whether the People proved each element of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt (see People v Shabazz, 211 A.D.3d 1093, 1094 [3d Dept 2022], lv denied 39 N.Y.3d 1113 [2023]). In doing so, a weight of the evidence analysis requires us to "first determine whether, based on all the credible evidence, a different finding would not have been unreasonable and then, if not, weigh the relative probative force of conflicting testimony and the relative strength of conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the testimony to determine if the verdict is supported by the weight of the evidence" (People v Rivera, 212 A.D.3d 942, 944 [3d Dept 2023] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 39 N.Y.3d 1113 [2023]). Further, "we view the evidence in a neutral light and defer to the jury's credibility assessments" (People v Paige, 211 A.D.3d 1333, 1334 [3d Dept 2022] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 39 N.Y.3d 1143 [2023]).
As relevant here, a person is guilty of murder in the second degree when, "[w]ith intent to cause the death of another person, he [or she] causes the death of such person or of a third person" (Penal Law § 125.25 [1]; see People v Quinn, 210 A.D.3d 1284, 1285 [3d Dept 2022], lv denied 39 N.Y.3d 1079 [2023]). For a conviction of assault in the first degree, the People must prove that, "[w]ith intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, [the defendant] cause[d] such injury to such person or to a third person by means of... a dangerous instrument" (Penal Law 120.10 [1]; see People v Decamp, 211 A.D.3d 1121, 1122 [3d Dept 2022], lv denied 39 N.Y.3d 1077 [2023]). "Intent may be inferred from the defendant's conduct and the surrounding circumstances" (People v Stines, 212 A.D.3d 883, 885 [3d Dept 2023] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 39 N.Y.3d 1113 [2023]). However, "[i]nasmuch as evidence of mental illness may negate a specific intent necessary to establish guilt, it is possible for an individual... to present evidence at trial that he or she was mentally ill at the time of the incident and, thus, did not possess the requisite intent to commit the crime" (People v McCray, 96 A.D.3d 1160, 1161 [3d Dept 2012] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 19 N.Y.3d 1104 [2012]; see generally People v Diaz, 15 N.Y.3d 40, 46-47 [2010]). Therefore, "where, as here, there is conflicting expert evidence, the issue of a defendant's criminal responsibility is for the jury to resolve" (People v Demagall, 114 A.D.3d 189, 192 [3d Dept 2014] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted], lv denied 23 N.Y.3d 1035 [2014]).
With respect to the underlying incident, the evidence adduced at trial established that the victim was sleeping in his bedroom when defendant poured gasoline on him and chased him throughout the house before igniting the accelerant with a cigarette and a lighter. Various neighbors testified that they witnessed the victim engulfed in flames and suffering from severe burns all over his body. One neighbor testified that the victim specifically kept repeating, "why would [my son] do this to me?" Multiple first responders testified as to the severity of the physical injuries sustained by the victim as a result of being lit on fire. The victim confirmed to a detective at the scene that defendant was the individual who set him on fire. There was further medical testimony as to the severity of the victim's bodily injuries, and the medical examiner testified that the victim died approximately two months after the incident and, based on his autopsy examination, that the cause of death was directly attributed to the burn injuries suffered from being set on fire. Defendant's general motion for a trial order of dismissal as to count 1 and count 2 was the only challenge to these facts.
As it relates to defendant's mental health and capacity to form the requisite intent, it was undisputed at trial that defendant had a well-documented history of mental health concerns and previous crises dating back to at least 2013. This included various diagnoses, pertinently bipolar disorder, schizophrenia and depression. The jury heard testimony from several mental health professionals and witnesses, including defendant's mother, relating to defendant's mental health concerns and his capacity before and after the incident. Specifically, several psychiatrists testified that, in the months leading up to the incident, they treated defendant for various mental health conditions, including on August 10, 2016, when he was involuntarily admitted to the crisis center. According to one psychiatrist, defendant's admission assessment on that date reported that defendant was having violent dreams and that he felt like hurting people after waking up. The assessment further noted that defendant's mother dropped him off at the facility, expressing concern for the safety of others and that defendant "will become violent and hurt somebody as he has in the past when he decompensates."
Defendant was discharged two days later and, in the following weeks returned to the hospital twice but was not admitted either time. According to a different psychiatrist at a local hospital's mental health clinic who evaluated defendant on August 22, 2016, although defendant had previously been hearing voices, feeling paranoid, having hallucinations and had a thought process disorder, at the time of his evaluation, defendant had not been experiencing these symptoms. The psychiatrist agreed that defendant was "doing quite well" and that defendant was non-psychotic, not agitated, alert, fully conscious and was not suffering from delusions. He further recalled that this was a "fairly long appointment" because of the concerns of defendant's mother, however, the psychiatrist found none of the symptoms complained of were present during his evaluation. In contrast to this, the jury heard the testimony of defendant's mother, who explained that defendant had several episodes of mental health crises in August 2016 - including on August 22, 2016, when he was not admitted despite her pleas for the hospital to treat him. According to...
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