People v. Lerma
| Decision Date | 08 January 1976 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 22783 |
| Citation | 66 Mich.App. 566,239 N.W.2d 424 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lawrence LERMA, Defendant-Appellant. 66 Mich.App. 566, 239 N.W.2d 424 |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
[66 MICHAPP 567] George E. Montgomery, Center Line, for defendant-appellant.
[66 MICHAPP 566] Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., George N. Parris, Pros. Atty., Don L. Milbourn, Chief Appellate[66 MICHAPP 567] Atty., William Alan Dardy, Asst. Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before McGREGOR, P.J., and T. M. BURNS and KAUFMAN, JJ.
Defendant, Lawrence Lerma, was convicted by a jury of taking possession and driving away a motor vehicle, contrary to M.C.L.A. § 750.413; M.S.A. § 28.645. 1 Defendant now appeals that conviction as a matter of right.
During trial, the defendant attempted to establish a defense based upon intoxication. However, the trial court, in its charge to the jury, precluded intoxication as a permissible defense, stating:
As a result, no other mention of defendant's intoxication was made during the remainder of the charge.
The primary issues raised by the defendant on appeal is whether voluntary intoxication can be a valid defense to the crime for which he was convicted. [66 MICHAPP 568] 2 The resolution of this issue essentially involves the determination of whether the crime of 'joyriding' is a specific intent crime, or, to be more precise, whether the word 'willfully' in the statute denotes a specific intent as a necessary element of that crime.
Preliminarily, we note that voluntary intoxication can be a defense only where the crime charged requires a specific intent to be proved, but not where a general intent need be proved. See People v. Guillett, 342 Mich. 1, 69 N.W.2d 140 (1955); People v. Kelley, 21 Mich.App. 612, 176 N.W.2d 435 (1970); People v. Widgren, 53 Mich.App. 375, 220 N.W.2d 130 (1974). 3
The People, relying primarily on People v. Stanley, 349 Mich. 362, 84 N.W.2d 787 (1957), and People v. Davis, 36 Mich.App. 164, 193 N.W.2d 393 (1971), argue that the 'joyriding' statute is not a specific intent crime, but rather, a general intent crime. However, these cases are not in point. In Stanley, cited and followed by this Court in Davis, the Supreme Court based its decision on the trial judge's reasoning that the Legislature passed M.C.L.A. § 750.413; M.S.A. § 28.645 in order to punish individuals who, although they had unlawfully taken an automobile, could not be punished under the larceny statute, since they did not possess the specific intent permanently to deprive the owner of his vehicle. Thus, Stanley was limited to a finding that the 'intent to steal' was not an [66 MICHAPP 569] element of the 'joyriding' statute. As a result, it does not preclude a finding that the statute could embody some other specific intent as a necessary element thereof.
Before determining whether the 'joyriding' statute's requirement that an offender act 'willfully' denotes a specific intent, it is, of course, necessary first to establish what is meant by the term 'specific intent'. Unfortunately, however, Michigan case law provides very little, if any, guidance in this regard. Perhaps this is understandable since it has been said that a specific intent cannot be meaningfully distinguished from a general intent. 4 Nevertheless, binding precedent requires us to make an attempt.
Specific intent has been defined as 'meaning some intent in addition to the intent to do the physical act which the crime requires', while general intent 'means an intent to do the physical act--or, perhaps, recklessly doing the physical act--which the crime requires'. LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law, p. 343.
A much more workable definition would center upon the several mental states set forth in the various proposed criminal codes. Analyzed in this fashion, specific intent crimes would be limited only to those crimes which are required to be committed either 'purposefully' or 'knowingly', while general intent crimes would encompass those crimes which can be committed either 'recklessly' or 'negligently'. Thus, in order to commit a specific intent crime, an offender would have to subjectively desire or know that the prohibited result will occur, whereas in a general intent crime, the prohibited result need only be reasonably[66 MICHAPP 570] expected to follow from the offender's voluntary act, irrespective of any subjective desire to have accomplished such result.
Having thus determined what we believe specific intent crime to entail, it still remains to be determined whether the word 'willfully' in the 'joyriding' statute connotes such an intent.
In this regard, also, the Michigan cases furnish little guidance. 'Willfully' has been variously defined as 'an evil intent', 5 'a bad purpose', 6 or a 'guilty knowledge'. 7 Additionally, cases from other jurisdictions are also of little use. 8 However, most decisions have concluded that 'willfully', at least when used in a criminal context, implies a knowledge and a purpose to do wrong. See 46 Words and Phrases, pp. 8--9 (Permanent Ed.). As such, 'willfully' would fall within our above definition of a 'specific intent'. Consequently, we hold that a specific intent to take possession unlawfully of the vehicle is a necessary ingredient of the 'joyriding' statute.
We believe that this result is appropriate for two reasons. First, in People v. Limon, 4 Mich.App. 440, 145 N.W.2d 287 (1966), our Court enumerated 'done willfully' as a separate and distinct element of the [66 MICHAPP 571] crime of 'joyriding'. Thus, 'willfully, as interpreted in Limon, would fulfill the standard definition that a specific intent be some intent in addition to the intent to do the mere physical act which the crime requires. The intent to do only the required physical act--the taking or driving away of the motor vehicle without authority--would therefore be insufficient to constitute the crime of 'joyriding', as the act must also be committed 'willfully'. Secondly, the only significant difference between the crime of 'joyriding' and the crime of larceny is that the 'joyriding' statute does not require that the offender intend Permanently to deprive the owner of the possession of the property. It would therefore seem somewhat incongruous that a defendant charged with larceny could go free if his evidence showed intoxication, 9 when the same defendant, if charged with joyriding would be completely precluded from raising that defense. We do not believe that the right to interpose a recognized defense should depend so heavily...
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