People v. Lonsdale

• Decision Date: 21 December 1899
• Citation: 122 Mich. 388,81 N.W. 277
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: PEOPLE v. LONSDALE.

81 N.W. 277

122 Mich. 388

PEOPLE v. LONSDALE.

Supreme Court of Michigan

December 21, 1899

Error to recorder's court of Detroit; William W. Chapin, Judge.

Alice G. Lonsdale, convicted of manslaughter by abortion, brings error. Reversed.

Orville B. Cragg (Philip T. Van Zile, of counsel) for plaintiff in error.

Horace M. Oren, Atty. Gen., and Allan H. Frazer, Pros. Atty., for the People.

GRANT C.J.

Respondent was convicted of the crime of manslaughter by abortion. The theory of the prosecution was that on February 21, 1899, the respondent used an instrument for the purpose of procuring the abortion; that the womb was perforated; that deceased aborted on the morning of the 21st; and that she died at 5 o'clock on the 23d. That an abortion had been committed was conclusively established.

1. The first error alleged is the admission of the dying statement of the deceased that the respondent committed the act. The objection is that it does not appear that the dying declaration was made under a sense of impending death. The decisions upon this subject are many. See People v Knapp, 26 Mich. 115; People v. Olmstead, 30 Mich. 431; People v. Beverly, 108 Mich. 509, 66 N.W 379; People v. Weaver, 108 Mich. 649, 66 N.W. 567; People v. Simpson, 48 Mich. 477, 12 N.W. 662. The mother of the deceased testified that the daughter was ill on the morning of the 22d; that later in the day she had pains and cramps; that she vomited, was feverish, and looked very ill. Dr. Day was sent for in the evening, but was unable to come until about 6 o'clock on the morning of the 23d. The doctor testified that on entering the room he formed his opinion very quickly, from the odor that the girl had blood poison, brought on by an abortion. Her pulse was between 130 and 140; her temperature 103 or 104; her condition very low. 'Q. Did you communicate to her her condition? A. I told her that she was a very sick girl, and that I was surprised to find her in that condition; that under such circumstances I could promise her nothing in the way of recovery, but that I would simply promise to do all that medical skill was able to do under the circumstances; and that it would be impossible for me to properly treat her in her own house, and that she would have to be taken to the hospital for proper treatment. Q. Did she seem to realize that she was liable to die? A. Yes, sir. Q. How did she look? A. She looked like a person dying. Q. Then? A. Then; yes, sir. Q. Did she appear to realize it after you told her this? A. Yes, sir. Q. Did you ask her then any questions as to the cause of her sickness? A. I told her that, considering the grave condition in which I found her, that it was only fair and right that she should tell me how she happened to get in such a condition.' The deceased then told the doctor that the respondent produced the abortion by means of an instrument. The girl was removed to the hospital about 8 o'clock that morning, and died at 5 in the afternoon. Greenleaf says: 'It is enough, if it satisfactorily appears, in any mode, that they [dying declarations] were made under that sanction [impending death], whether it be proved by the express language of the declarant, or be inferred from his evident danger, or the opinions of the medical or other attendants, stated to him, or from his conduct, or other circumstances of the case.' 1 Greenl. Ev. � 158. The admission of dying declarations forms an exception to the law of evidence, and is now confined to cases of homicide. Their admission is based 'upon the ground of the public necessity of preserving the lives of the community by bringing manslayers to justice. For it often happens that there is no third person present to be an eyewitness to the fact; and the usual witness in other cases of felony, namely, the party injured, is himself destroyed.' 1 Greenl. Ev. � 156. When there is evidence to show that they are made in extremis, they are admissible, and the weight to be given to them in each case is the province of the jury. In People v. Knapp, this court, speaking through Justice Campbell, said: 'Their value depends on their intrinsic probability, and the candor and truthfulness of the person making them, as well as upon the fullness and fairness with which they are taken and reported. Where they are taken under suspicious circumstances, or drawn out by doubtful means, they are not excluded, but go to the jury for what they are worth. The whole admission is from...