People v. Lopez

• Decision Date: 20 March 2013
• Citation: 2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 01857,104 A.D.3d 876,961 N.Y.S.2d 295
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Joshua LOPEZ, appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

104 A.D.3d 876

961 N.Y.S.2d 295

2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 01857

The PEOPLE, etc., respondent,

v.Joshua LOPEZ, appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

March 20, 2013.

Robert C. Mitchell, Riverhead, N.Y. (Kirk R. Brandt of counsel), for appellant.

Thomas J. Spota, District Attorney, Riverhead, N.Y. (Glenn Green of counsel), for respondent.

PETER B. SKELOS, J.P., RUTH C. BALKIN, LEONARD B. AUSTIN, and SANDRA L. SGROI, JJ.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Suffolk County (Hinrichs, J.), rendered October 27, 2009, convicting him of murder in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress his statements to law enforcement officials.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

The County Court properly denied that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress, as the fruit of an unlawful warrantless arrest inside a motel room registered to another individual, statements he made to, or in the presence of, law enforcement officials ( see Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639). The defendant failed to meet his burden of demonstrating a legitimate expectation of privacy in the motel room ( see People v. Whitfield, 81 N.Y.2d 904, 597 N.Y.S.2d 641, 613 N.E.2d 547;People v. Lacey, 66 A.D.3d 704, 705–706, 887 N.Y.S.2d 158). Moreover, the defendant consented to the entry of the police into the motel room when, after a detective knocked on the door and identified himself as a police officer, the defendant opened the door, stepped back, and allowed the detective to enter ( see People v. Nielsen, 89 A.D.3d 1041, 1041–1042, 933 N.Y.S.2d 381).

The record supports the County Court's determination that a remark the defendant made after he was placed in custody, but before he was give Miranda warnings ( see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694), was made voluntarily and spontaneously and was not the product of police interrogation or its functional equivalent ( see People v. Fernandes, 62 A.D.3d 721, 878 N.Y.S.2d 418).

The defendant's contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction of murder in the second degree is unpreserved for appellate review ( seeCPL 470.05[2]; People v. Hawkins, 11 N.Y.3d 484, 491–492, 872 N.Y.S.2d 395, 900 N.E.2d 946). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution ( see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt of that crime beyond a reasonable doubt ( see People v. Correa, 265 A.D.2d 338, 339, 696 N.Y.S.2d 198). Additionally, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence ( seeCPL 470.15[5]; ...