People v. Ludwig

• Decision Date: 15 March 2013
• Citation: 2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 01655,104 A.D.3d 1162,961 N.Y.S.2d 657
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Daniel A. LUDWIG, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

104 A.D.3d 1162

961 N.Y.S.2d 657

2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 01655

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.Daniel A. LUDWIG, Defendant–Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.

March 15, 2013.

Easton Thompson Kasperek Shiffrin LLP, Rochester (Brian Shiffrin of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant.

Sandra Doorley, District Attorney, Rochester (Geoffrey Kaeuper of Counsel), for Respondent.

PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., PERADOTTO, CARNI, SCONIERS, AND WHALEN, JJ.

MEMORANDUM:

On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of predatory sexual assault against a child (Penal Law § 130.96), defendant contends that he was denied a fair trial by the prosecutor's references during her opening statement to prior consistent statements of the victim and by the prosecutor's bolstering of the victim's credibility through the elicitation of those prior consistent statements from five witnesses. Defendant's contention is preserved for our review only with respect to the testimony of two of those witnesses ( seeCPL 470.05[2] ). In any event, it is without merit. Two of the witnesses at issue were caseworkers who did not give any testimony regarding the victim's disclosures, and their testimony regarding her demeanor when they raised the abuse allegations with her was not improperly admitted ( see People v. Shepherd, 83 A.D.3d 1298, 1300, 921 N.Y.S.2d 666,lv. denied17 N.Y.3d 809, 929 N.Y.S.2d 569, 953 N.E.2d 807). We conclude that the testimony of the remaining witnesses at issue, including the victim, did not constitute improper bolstering inasmuch as the evidence was not admitted for its truth ( see People v. Rosario, 100 A.D.3d 660, 661, 953 N.Y.S.2d 299;People v. Burgos, 90 A.D.3d 1670, 1671–1672, 937 N.Y.S.2d 483,lv. denied19 N.Y.3d 862, 947 N.Y.S.2d 411, 970 N.E.2d 434). Rather, the evidence was admitted to explain how the victim eventually disclosed the abuse and how the investigation started ( see People v. Galloway, 93 A.D.3d 1069, 1072, 940 N.Y.S.2d 699,lv. denied19 N.Y.3d 996, 951 N.Y.S.2d 472, 975 N.E.2d 918;People v. Gregory, 78 A.D.3d 1246, 1246–1247, 910 N.Y.S.2d 295,lv. denied16 N.Y.3d 831, 921 N.Y.S.2d 195, 946 N.E.2d 183;People v. Rich, 78 A.D.3d 1200, 1202, 912 N.Y.S.2d 124,lv. denied17 N.Y.3d 799, 929 N.Y.S.2d 108, 952 N.E.2d 1103). Inasmuch as the testimony from the relevant witnesses was proper, defendant's further contention that he was denied effective assistance of counsel based on defense counsel's failure to object to the testimony regarding the victim's prior consistent statements and the prosecutor's opening statement is without merit ( see People v. Bernardez, 85 A.D.3d 936, 938, 925 N.Y.S.2d 604,lv. denied17 N.Y.3d 857, 932 N.Y.S.2d 22, 956 N.E.2d 803;see also People v. Hyatt, 2 A.D.3d 749, 749–750, 768 N.Y.S.2d 651,lv. denied1 N.Y.3d 629, 777 N.Y.S.2d 27, 808 N.E.2d 1286).

Defendant also contends that County Court erred in precluding his mother from testifying about a prior inconsistent statement of the victim, i.e., that she heard the victim say that she would only disclose what her mother told her to disclose (inconsistent statement testimony). To the extent that defendant contends that the preclusion of the inconsistent statement testimony denied him his constitutional right to present a defense, that contention is not preserved for our review ( see People v. Lane, 7 N.Y.3d 888, 889, 826 N.Y.S.2d 599, 860 N.E.2d 61;People v. Castor, 99 A.D.3d 1177, 1181, 952 N.Y.S.2d 318;People v. Metellus, 54 A.D.3d 601, 602, 864 N.Y.S.2d 408,lv. denied11 N.Y.3d 899, 873 N.Y.S.2d 275, 901 N.E.2d 769). To the extent that defendant contends that the inconsistent statement testimony was admissible to impeach the victim's credibility and to establish that the victim had a reason to fabricate the allegations against defendant, that contention is also not preserved for our review ( People v. Marthone, 281 A.D.2d 562, 562, 721 N.Y.S.2d 828,lv. denied96 N.Y.2d 904, 730 N.Y.S.2d 801, 756 N.E.2d 89). When the People objected to the inconsistent statement testimony on hearsay grounds, defense counsel was unable to articulate an exception to the hearsay rule ( see generally People v. Lyons, 81 N.Y.2d 753, 754, 593 N.Y.S.2d 776, 609 N.E.2d 129). We decline to exercise our power to review the contentions regarding the inconsistent statement testimony as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice ( seeCPL 470.15[6][a] ).

Viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crime as charged to the jury ( see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1),we reject defendant's contention that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence ( see generally People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672). “[N]othing in the record suggests that the victim was ‘so unworthy of belief as to be incredible as a matter of law’ or otherwise tends to establish defendant's innocence of [the] crime[ ] ..., and thus it cannot be said that the jury failed to give the evidence the weight it should be accorded” ( People v. Woods, 26 A.D.3d 818, 819, 810 N.Y.S.2d 274,lv. denied7 N.Y.3d 765, 819 N.Y.S.2d 890, 853 N.E.2d 261).

Defendant failed to preserve for our review his further contention that the sentence of 16 years to life imprisonment constitutes cruel and unusual punishment inasmuch as the maximum sentence for a crime with identical elements, i.e., course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree (Penal Law § 130.75[1][b] ), is 25 years ( see People v. Verbitsky, 90 A.D.3d 1516, 1516, 934 N.Y.S.2d 888,lv. denied19 N.Y.3d...