People v. Lujan
| Decision Date | 20 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | Supreme Court Case No. 18SC582 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner v. Abel LUJAN, Respondent. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Attorneys for Petitioner: Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brittany L. Limes, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado
Attorneys for Respondent: Haddon, Morgan and Foreman, P.C., Adam Mueller, Denver, Colorado
En Banc
¶1 Abel Lujan was charged with first-degree murder for the death of his girlfriend after she was found beaten and strangled behind a friend’s house. At trial, two women testified for the People about Lujan’s prior violent behavior towards them. Prior to admitting this evidence, the trial court read a limiting instruction, telling the jury that it could only consider the evidence for the purposes of establishing Lujan’s motive, intent, or common plan. A copy of this instruction was not given to the jury for deliberations; however, the jury did receive an instruction at the close of the evidence explaining that certain evidence could only be considered for the limited purposes for which it was admitted.
¶2 While the jury was deliberating, it submitted a question asking for clarification about the limiting instruction that the court had read during trial specifying the permissible purposes for which the jury could consider the evidence of Lujan’s prior violent behavior. Over defense counsel’s objection, the trial court cleared the courtroom of the public and parties, leaving only the judge, bailiff, and court reporter; the judge then brought in the jury and reread the limiting instruction that it had previously read twice in open court. The jury ultimately found Lujan guilty of second-degree murder.
¶3 Lujan appealed, arguing that the court’s actions when rereading the jury instruction constituted a courtroom closure that violated his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. A division of the court of appeals agreed, reversing Lujan’s conviction for second-degree murder and remanding the case for a new trial. People v. Lujan , 2018 COA 95, ¶ 19, ––– P.3d ––––. On certiorari review, the People do not contest that a courtroom closure occurred; rather, the People’s argument pertains to the nature of the closure itself. Specifically, the People urge this court to adopt a triviality standard that is used in many jurisdictions, under which a defendant’s constitutional right to a public trial is not violated when the closure at issue was trivial. In so doing, the People argue that the brief courtroom closure here was trivial and therefore did not violate Lujan’s public trial right.1
¶4 We agree that adopting a triviality standard is appropriate in Colorado. Further, after applying the triviality standard, we hold that the courtroom closure in this case was trivial because it did not undermine the purposes of the public trial right guaranteed by the U.S. and Colorado Constitutions; hence, the closure here did not violate Lujan’s right to a public trial. We therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand to that court to address Lujan’s remaining contentions on appeal.
¶5 In 1999, Lujan’s girlfriend was found beaten and strangled to death. Fourteen years later, the People charged Lujan with one count of first-degree murder for her death. At trial, Lujan admitted to causing his girlfriend’s death, but he contended that he did not do so intentionally or after deliberation. Instead, he argued that he was only guilty of reckless manslaughter because he acted impulsively and did not plan to kill her.
¶6 During its case-in-chief, the People called both Lujan’s ex-wife and his former girlfriend to testify to his prior violent behavior towards them, over defense counsel’s objection. Both women testified that Lujan had previously hit them and tried to either strangle or suffocate them. Before each woman testified to these facts, the trial court read a limiting instruction regarding CRE 404(b), informing the jury that it was admitting the evidence for the limited purposes of establishing Lujan’s motive, intent, or common plan.
¶7 After the close of evidence, the trial court gave the jury an instruction regarding the 404(b) evidence: 2
¶8 During deliberations, the jury submitted a question to the trial court: "Please write down the statement for the limited use statement [sic] on the testimonies of [the two women]." Defense counsel objected to sending a written version of the earlier limiting instruction unless it contained a statement that the jury could not consider the evidence for propensity purposes. The court overruled defense counsel’s objection. The People then suggested that the court bring the jury into the courtroom and reread the prior limiting instruction to the jury. Ultimately, the court provided defense counsel with two options: (1) sending the jury a written version of the limiting instruction as it had read previously (without any added propensity language); or (2) bringing the jury back in and rereading that instruction aloud. Defense counsel chose the second option, at which point the court stated that it would "do that when the courtroom is clear." Concerned with the court’s decision to clear the courtroom, defense counsel responded, "I don’t think the Court can do that." The court nevertheless cleared the courtroom and reread the limiting instruction aloud to the jury, telling the jury that it could only consider certain portions of Lujan’s ex-wife’s and former girlfriend’s testimony for the purposes of establishing motive, intent, or common plan:
The only people present in the courtroom when this occurred were the trial judge, the bailiff, the court reporter, and the jury. This instruction was the same as the limiting instruction that the trial court had previously read to the jury twice in open court. The jury then completed its deliberations and found Lujan not guilty of first-degree murder but guilty of second-degree murder.
¶9 Lujan appealed, contending that the trial court violated his right to a public trial under the U.S. and Colorado Constitutions when it closed the courtroom to reread the limiting instruction. In response, the People conceded that the trial court did in fact close the courtroom, but they argued that the nature of the closure did not amount to a constitutional violation. In so arguing, the People urged the court of appeals to adopt a triviality standard under which a defendant’s right to a public trial is not violated when the closure at issue was trivial. The People further argued that under that standard, the closure here was so trivial that it did not violate Lujan’s public trial right. But the court of appeals concluded that it need not consider whether to adopt a triviality standard because the closure here was plainly not trivial. Lujan , ¶ 16. Instead, it held that "the closure of the courtroom was total, intentional, and unjustified," meaning it had violated Lujan’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. Id. at ¶ 19. The court then concluded that the error was structural, vacated Lujan’s conviction, and remanded the case for a new trial. Id. Because it reversed on these grounds, the court declined to address the remaining issues Lujan raised on appeal. Id. at ¶ 8.
¶10 We granted certiorari and now reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand to that court to consider Lujan’s remaining contentions on appeal.
¶11 "A trial court’s decision to close the courtroom presents a mixed question of law and fact." People v. Hassen , 2015 CO 49, ¶ 5, 351 P.3d 418, 420. "In reviewing such questions, ‘we accept the trial court’s findings of fact absent an abuse of discretion, but we review the court’s legal conclusions de novo.’ " Id. (quoting Peña–Rodriguez v. People , 2015 CO 31, ¶ 8, 350 P.3d 287, 289, rev’d on other grounds , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 855, 197 L.Ed.2d 107 (2017) ).
¶12 We begin by reviewing the relevant law pertaining to a defendant’s constitutional right to a public trial and the values furthered by that right. We then consider the triviality standard used by other jurisdictions for assessing whether a courtroom closure violates a defendant’s public trial right, and we elect to adopt that standard. Then, applying the triviality standard, we hold that the...
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...court's exclusion of Jones's parents was a closure, it was trivial. In a recent opinion, we adopted the triviality exception. See People v. Lujan , 2020 CO 26, ¶ 23, 461 P.3d 494, 499. A "trivial closure" is one where, although the closure might have been unjustified, it was " ‘so trivial a......
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People v. Turner
...the accused and the importance of their functions, ... encourage[s] witnesses to come forward, ... [and] discourage[s] perjury." People v. Lujan , 2020 CO 26, ¶¶ 13–16, 461 P.3d 494, 498 (quoting Peterson v. Williams , 85 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1996) ); see Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Ct. , ......
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People v. Turner
...accused and the importance of their functions, . . . encourage[s] witnesses to come forward, . . . [and] discourage[s] perjury." People v. Lujan, 2020 CO 26, ¶¶ 13-16, 461 P.3d 494, 498 (quoting v. Williams, 85 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1996)); see Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Ct., 464 U.S. 501,......
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...in open court or placed on the record, whether the closure was intentional, and whether the closure was total or partial." Lujan, 461 P.3d at 498-99. Applying considerations, courts have frequently held that inadvertent or brief closures, or the exclusion of a single spectator, are too triv......