People v. Madison

• Decision Date: 03 May 2007
• Docket Number: No. 04CA2427.,04CA2427.
• Citation: 176 P.3d 793
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. James Michael MADISON, Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

176 P.3d 793

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. James Michael MADISON, Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant.

No. 04CA2427.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. IV.

May 3, 2007.

Rehearing Denied June 21, 2007.

Certiorari Denied February 19, 2008.

John W. Suthers, Attorney General, Paul Koehler, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado; John R. Newsome, District Attorney, Donna Billek, Deputy District Attorney, Abby V. Wallace, Deputy District Attorney, Doyle Baker, Deputy District Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee.

Douglas K. Wilson, Colorado State Public Defender, Ned R. Jaeckle, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant.

Opinion by Judge CASEBOLT.

Defendant, James Michael Madison, appeals the judgment of conviction entered on jury verdicts finding him guilty of causing serious bodily injury to an at-risk adult by criminal negligence, a class five felony, and a crime of violence sentence enhancer therefor; possession of one gram or less of cocaine, a class six felony; possession of one to eight ounces of marijuana, a class one misdemeanor; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class two petty offense. The People also appeal, challenging the trial court's judgment of acquittal upon one count of second degree assault against an at-risk adult, a class three felony, and a crime of violence sentence enhancer therefor. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

Defendant lived in the basement of his parents' home and continued to live with the victim, his eighty-one-year-old father, following his mother's death. Although defendant was trained as a respiratory therapist, he did not work outside the home. Instead, he maintained that his job was to care for his father.

Father's neighbors, accustomed to seeing him sitting on his front porch, became concerned when he stopped coming outside. Two neighbors brought meals to father and attempted to ascertain his well-being but were unsuccessful in their efforts to see or speak with him. Concerned for father's welfare, one neighbor called the police and asked them to conduct a welfare check.

Officers went to the home and met defendant at the front door. Defendant told the officers that father was doing well, but allowed the officers inside and directed them to father's bedroom. A strong odor of urine and feces assailed the officers when they entered the house. Upon entering the father's room they found him lying on a mattress soaked with his own body waste. His clothes, stained with urine and feces, were embedded in his skin. His bed was covered with debris, making it impossible for him turn over or alter his reclined position. Father had not been out of bed for a month, was very weak, and had trouble talking.

An officer noted that defendant was comfortable using medical terminology and stated that he had received "a lot" of medical training. Defendant said that he had known of father's bedsores for a week, when he had first seen the open wounds. After a preliminary examination of the scene, the officers called for medical assistance.

Paramedics transported father to the hospital. There, medical staff cut off father's clothing, noting that it had become enmeshed in his skin. Father screamed in pain when his clothes were removed. Medical staff saw black and dead tissue come off father during a shower. One EMT saw what looked like maggots.

Father was examined by a physician, who testified at trial that father was dehydrated, anemic, suffering from malnutrition, and had pressure sores running from his shoulders to the back portion of his thighs. The physician also opined that father was receiving very little care.

Defendant had explained to the officers that he had tried to cleanse father, had examined his back because he was complaining of back pain, and had tried to take father to the hospital, but father had refused all his offers of help. But after his physical recovery, father told officers that defendant had called him names, yelled at him, and refused to get him out of bed, change his linens, or take him to the bathroom. Police officers testified at trial that father appeared to be afraid of defendant.

During a search of the residence, officers discovered cocaine, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia. Defendant was arrested and charged as previously noted.

At trial, following the conclusion of the prosecution's case-in-chief, defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal on count one, second degree assault, and count three, causing serious bodily injury to an at risk adult by criminal negligence, and the associated sentence enhancer counts (counts two and four). The trial court ruled that the prosecution had not presented sufficient evidence to prove the intent necessary to support a finding of guilt on second degree assault and granted the motion as to that charge, but denied the motion as to the criminal negligence charge.

Defendant presented two witnesses, both of whom testified concerning the acrimonious relationship between father and defendant. The prosecution then requested the court to reconsider its ruling on the motion for judgment of acquittal. Concluding that defendant had himself presented evidence of intent in the defense case, the court reversed itself, reinstated the second degree assault and sentence enhancer charges, and submitted all charges to the jury. The jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts.

During sentencing, defendant requested the court to reconsider its ruling reinstating counts one and two, contending that his right to present a defense had been chilled by the court's initial grant of the motion and its later reversal, and also asserting that principles of double jeopardy required it. The trial court rejected the double jeopardy argument, concluding that it maintained the ability to review its decision until the jury was dismissed. However, reasoning that its ruling and later reversal had chilled defendant's right to present a defense, the court again reversed itself and dismissed counts one and two. This appeal followed.

I.

We first address the People's appeal. The People contend that the trial court erred in granting defendant's initial motion for judgment of acquittal because the prosecution's evidence was sufficient to support a conclusion that defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of second degree assault upon an at-risk adult. We agree.

When ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal, the issue before the trial court is "whether the relevant evidence, both direct and circumstantial, when viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is substantial and sufficient to support a conclusion by a reasonable mind that the defendant is guilty of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt." People v. Gonzales, 666 P.2d 123, 127 (Colo.1983) (quoting People v. Bennett, 183 Colo. 125, 130, 515 P.2d 466, 469 (1973)).

In applying the substantial evidence test, the court must give the prosecution the benefit of every reasonable inference that might fairly be drawn from the evidence. People v. Brassfield, 652 P.2d 588, 592 (Colo. 1982).

Under § 18-3-203(1)(g), C.R.S.2006, a person commits second degree assault upon an at-risk adult (a disabled person who is sixty years of age or older) as set forth in § 18-6.5-103(1) & (3)(b), C.R.S.2006, if, with intent to cause bodily injury to another person, he causes serious bodily injury to that person or another.

Second degree assault requires specific intent to cause bodily injury. Specific intent exists when a perpetrator's "conscious objective is to cause the specific result proscribed by the statute defining the offense." Section 18-1-501(5), C.R.S.2006.

Bodily injury means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical or mental condition. Section 18-1-901(3)(c), C.R.S. 2006.

Intent can be proved by means other than direct evidence. A fact finder may infer intent to cause the natural and probable consequences of unlawful voluntary acts, and pertinent to the inquiry is the defendant's conduct and the circumstances surrounding any act or omission. See People v. Jutenile Court, 813 P.2d 326, 330 (Colo.1991); People v. Howard, 89 P.3d 441, 444 (Colo.App.2003) (jurors could infer defendant's specific intent from conduct and the overall circumstances); see also People v. Thompson, 121 P.3d 273, 278-79 (Colo.App.2005) (recognizing that if there is evidence upon which one may reasonably infer an element of the crime, the evidence is sufficient to sustain that element, and where reasonable minds could differ, the evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction).

Here, construing the evidence previously recited in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence to infer that it was defendant's conscious objective to cause father physical pain, based upon the following.

First, defendant had medical training, which allowed him to recognize father's serious physical and mental condition and its continuing deterioration. Essentially, the worse the conditions got, the greater is the inference that defendant intended to harm father and for his injuries to worsen.

Second, for a significant length of time, father had been bedridden without a change of clothing and without appropriate toileting or hygiene, allowing open sores to develop and bodily waste to intrude upon those wounds.

Third, defendant failed to seek any kind of professional care for father. After examining father's injuries, defendant did not call for medical assistance, nor did he clean the urine or feces off of father or assist him into a new reclined position. Instead, defendant rolled father back onto the mattress, which was soaked with urine and feces, into the same reclined position that was causing the bedsores. Defendant's physical act of putting father back onto the mattress and into the same...